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hardware_interfaces/identity/aidl/vts/Util.cpp

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/*
* Copyright 2019, The Android Open Source Project
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#define LOG_TAG "Util"
identity: Fix attestation and documentation problems. - The docs said that IdentityCredential.createEphemeralKey() returned data encoded PKCS#8 which is wrong. It's supposed to be in DER format which is also what the VTS tests and credstore expects. - Clarify that createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(), and createAuthChallenge() are all optional. - Avoid passing an invalid profile ID in the IdentityCredentialTests. verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass test. - Update requirements for which tags must be present in the attestation for CredentialKey as well as the requirements on expiration date and the issuer name. Update default implementation to satisfy these requirements. Update VTS tests to carefully verify these requrements are met. - Clarify requirements for X.509 cert for AuthenticationKey. Add VTS test to verify. - Mandate that TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY must not be set for test credentials. Add VTS test to verify this. - Make default implementation pretend to be implemented in a trusted environment and streamline VTS tests to not special-case for the default implementation. - Switch to using the attestation extension parser from the KM 4.1 support library instead of the one from system/keymaster. The latter one did not support the latest attestation extension and thus would fail for pretty much anything that wasn't the default HAL impl. - Fix a couple of bugs in keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(): - Report root_of_trust.security_level - Add support for Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY - Fix how EMacKey is calculated. - Add test vectors to verify how EMacKey and DeviceMac is calculated. Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Bug: 171745570 Change-Id: I2f8bd772de078556733f769cec2021918d1d7de6
2020-10-26 20:26:36 -04:00
#include "Util.h"
identity: Fix attestation and documentation problems. - The docs said that IdentityCredential.createEphemeralKey() returned data encoded PKCS#8 which is wrong. It's supposed to be in DER format which is also what the VTS tests and credstore expects. - Clarify that createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(), and createAuthChallenge() are all optional. - Avoid passing an invalid profile ID in the IdentityCredentialTests. verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass test. - Update requirements for which tags must be present in the attestation for CredentialKey as well as the requirements on expiration date and the issuer name. Update default implementation to satisfy these requirements. Update VTS tests to carefully verify these requrements are met. - Clarify requirements for X.509 cert for AuthenticationKey. Add VTS test to verify. - Mandate that TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY must not be set for test credentials. Add VTS test to verify this. - Make default implementation pretend to be implemented in a trusted environment and streamline VTS tests to not special-case for the default implementation. - Switch to using the attestation extension parser from the KM 4.1 support library instead of the one from system/keymaster. The latter one did not support the latest attestation extension and thus would fail for pretty much anything that wasn't the default HAL impl. - Fix a couple of bugs in keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(): - Report root_of_trust.security_level - Add support for Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY - Fix how EMacKey is calculated. - Add test vectors to verify how EMacKey and DeviceMac is calculated. Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Bug: 171745570 Change-Id: I2f8bd772de078556733f769cec2021918d1d7de6
2020-10-26 20:26:36 -04:00
#include <android-base/logging.h>
#include <KeyMintAidlTestBase.h>
#include <aidl/Gtest.h>
#include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/MacedPublicKey.h>
#include <android-base/stringprintf.h>
identity: Fix attestation and documentation problems. - The docs said that IdentityCredential.createEphemeralKey() returned data encoded PKCS#8 which is wrong. It's supposed to be in DER format which is also what the VTS tests and credstore expects. - Clarify that createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(), and createAuthChallenge() are all optional. - Avoid passing an invalid profile ID in the IdentityCredentialTests. verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass test. - Update requirements for which tags must be present in the attestation for CredentialKey as well as the requirements on expiration date and the issuer name. Update default implementation to satisfy these requirements. Update VTS tests to carefully verify these requrements are met. - Clarify requirements for X.509 cert for AuthenticationKey. Add VTS test to verify. - Mandate that TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY must not be set for test credentials. Add VTS test to verify this. - Make default implementation pretend to be implemented in a trusted environment and streamline VTS tests to not special-case for the default implementation. - Switch to using the attestation extension parser from the KM 4.1 support library instead of the one from system/keymaster. The latter one did not support the latest attestation extension and thus would fail for pretty much anything that wasn't the default HAL impl. - Fix a couple of bugs in keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(): - Report root_of_trust.security_level - Add support for Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY - Fix how EMacKey is calculated. - Add test vectors to verify how EMacKey and DeviceMac is calculated. Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Bug: 171745570 Change-Id: I2f8bd772de078556733f769cec2021918d1d7de6
2020-10-26 20:26:36 -04:00
#include <keymaster/km_openssl/openssl_utils.h>
#include <keymasterV4_1/attestation_record.h>
#include <keymint_support/openssl_utils.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <charconv>
#include <map>
namespace android::hardware::identity::test_utils {
using std::endl;
using std::map;
using std::optional;
using std::string;
using std::vector;
using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test::check_maced_pubkey;
using ::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test::p256_pub_key;
using ::android::sp;
using ::android::String16;
using ::android::base::StringPrintf;
using ::android::binder::Status;
using ::android::hardware::security::keymint::MacedPublicKey;
identity: Fix attestation and documentation problems. - The docs said that IdentityCredential.createEphemeralKey() returned data encoded PKCS#8 which is wrong. It's supposed to be in DER format which is also what the VTS tests and credstore expects. - Clarify that createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(), and createAuthChallenge() are all optional. - Avoid passing an invalid profile ID in the IdentityCredentialTests. verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass test. - Update requirements for which tags must be present in the attestation for CredentialKey as well as the requirements on expiration date and the issuer name. Update default implementation to satisfy these requirements. Update VTS tests to carefully verify these requrements are met. - Clarify requirements for X.509 cert for AuthenticationKey. Add VTS test to verify. - Mandate that TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY must not be set for test credentials. Add VTS test to verify this. - Make default implementation pretend to be implemented in a trusted environment and streamline VTS tests to not special-case for the default implementation. - Switch to using the attestation extension parser from the KM 4.1 support library instead of the one from system/keymaster. The latter one did not support the latest attestation extension and thus would fail for pretty much anything that wasn't the default HAL impl. - Fix a couple of bugs in keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(): - Report root_of_trust.security_level - Add support for Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY - Fix how EMacKey is calculated. - Add test vectors to verify how EMacKey and DeviceMac is calculated. Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Bug: 171745570 Change-Id: I2f8bd772de078556733f769cec2021918d1d7de6
2020-10-26 20:26:36 -04:00
using ::keymaster::X509_Ptr;
bool setupWritableCredential(sp<IWritableIdentityCredential>& writableCredential,
identity: Fix attestation and documentation problems. - The docs said that IdentityCredential.createEphemeralKey() returned data encoded PKCS#8 which is wrong. It's supposed to be in DER format which is also what the VTS tests and credstore expects. - Clarify that createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(), and createAuthChallenge() are all optional. - Avoid passing an invalid profile ID in the IdentityCredentialTests. verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass test. - Update requirements for which tags must be present in the attestation for CredentialKey as well as the requirements on expiration date and the issuer name. Update default implementation to satisfy these requirements. Update VTS tests to carefully verify these requrements are met. - Clarify requirements for X.509 cert for AuthenticationKey. Add VTS test to verify. - Mandate that TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY must not be set for test credentials. Add VTS test to verify this. - Make default implementation pretend to be implemented in a trusted environment and streamline VTS tests to not special-case for the default implementation. - Switch to using the attestation extension parser from the KM 4.1 support library instead of the one from system/keymaster. The latter one did not support the latest attestation extension and thus would fail for pretty much anything that wasn't the default HAL impl. - Fix a couple of bugs in keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(): - Report root_of_trust.security_level - Add support for Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY - Fix how EMacKey is calculated. - Add test vectors to verify how EMacKey and DeviceMac is calculated. Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Bug: 171745570 Change-Id: I2f8bd772de078556733f769cec2021918d1d7de6
2020-10-26 20:26:36 -04:00
sp<IIdentityCredentialStore>& credentialStore, bool testCredential) {
if (credentialStore == nullptr) {
return false;
}
string docType = "org.iso.18013-5.2019.mdl";
Status result = credentialStore->createCredential(docType, testCredential, &writableCredential);
if (result.isOk() && writableCredential != nullptr) {
return true;
} else {
return false;
}
}
optional<vector<vector<uint8_t>>> createFakeRemotelyProvisionedCertificateChain(
const MacedPublicKey& macedPublicKey) {
// The helper library uses the NDK symbols, so play a little trickery here to convert
// the data into the proper type so we can reuse the helper function to get the pubkey.
::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::MacedPublicKey ndkMacedPublicKey;
ndkMacedPublicKey.macedKey = macedPublicKey.macedKey;
vector<uint8_t> publicKeyBits;
check_maced_pubkey(ndkMacedPublicKey, /*testMode=*/true, &publicKeyBits);
::aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::EVP_PKEY_Ptr publicKey;
p256_pub_key(publicKeyBits, &publicKey);
// Generate an arbitrary root key for our chain
bssl::UniquePtr<EC_KEY> ecRootKey(EC_KEY_new());
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> rootKey(EVP_PKEY_new());
if (ecRootKey.get() == nullptr || rootKey.get() == nullptr) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Memory allocation failed";
return {};
}
bssl::UniquePtr<EC_GROUP> group(EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1));
if (group.get() == nullptr) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Error creating EC group by curve name";
return {};
}
if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecRootKey.get(), group.get()) != 1 ||
EC_KEY_generate_key(ecRootKey.get()) != 1 || EC_KEY_check_key(ecRootKey.get()) < 0) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Error generating key";
return {};
}
if (EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(rootKey.get(), ecRootKey.get()) != 1) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Error getting private key";
return {};
}
// The VTS test does not fully validate the chain, so we're ok without the proper CA extensions.
map<string, vector<uint8_t>> extensions;
// Now make a self-signed cert
optional<vector<uint8_t>> root = support::ecPublicKeyGenerateCertificate(
rootKey.get(), rootKey.get(),
/*serialDecimal=*/"31415",
/*subject=*/"Android IdentityCredential VTS Test Root Certificate",
/*subject=*/"Android IdentityCredential VTS Test Root Certificate",
/*validityNotBefore=*/time(nullptr),
/*validityNotAfter=*/time(nullptr) + 365 * 24 * 3600, extensions);
if (!root) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Error generating root cert";
return std::nullopt;
}
// Now sign a CA cert so that we have a chain that's good enough to satisfy
// the VTS tests.
optional<vector<uint8_t>> intermediate = support::ecPublicKeyGenerateCertificate(
publicKey.get(), rootKey.get(),
/*serialDecimal=*/"42",
/*subject=*/"Android IdentityCredential VTS Test Root Certificate",
/*subject=*/"Android IdentityCredential VTS Test Attestation Certificate",
/*validityNotBefore=*/time(nullptr),
/*validityNotAfter=*/time(nullptr) + 365 * 24 * 3600, extensions);
if (!intermediate) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Error generating intermediate cert";
return std::nullopt;
}
return vector<vector<uint8_t>>{std::move(*intermediate), std::move(*root)};
}
optional<vector<uint8_t>> generateReaderCertificate(string serialDecimal) {
vector<uint8_t> privKey;
return generateReaderCertificate(serialDecimal, &privKey);
}
optional<vector<uint8_t>> generateReaderCertificate(string serialDecimal,
vector<uint8_t>* outReaderPrivateKey) {
optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerKeyPKCS8 = support::createEcKeyPair();
if (!readerKeyPKCS8) {
return {};
}
optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerPublicKey =
support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(readerKeyPKCS8.value());
optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerKey = support::ecKeyPairGetPrivateKey(readerKeyPKCS8.value());
if (!readerPublicKey || !readerKey) {
return {};
}
if (outReaderPrivateKey == nullptr) {
return {};
}
*outReaderPrivateKey = readerKey.value();
string issuer = "Android Open Source Project";
string subject = "Android IdentityCredential VTS Test";
time_t validityNotBefore = time(nullptr);
time_t validityNotAfter = validityNotBefore + 365 * 24 * 3600;
return support::ecPublicKeyGenerateCertificate(readerPublicKey.value(), readerKey.value(),
serialDecimal, issuer, subject,
validityNotBefore, validityNotAfter, {});
}
optional<vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>> addAccessControlProfiles(
sp<IWritableIdentityCredential>& writableCredential,
const vector<TestProfile>& testProfiles) {
Status result;
vector<SecureAccessControlProfile> secureProfiles;
for (const auto& testProfile : testProfiles) {
SecureAccessControlProfile profile;
Certificate cert;
cert.encodedCertificate = testProfile.readerCertificate;
int64_t secureUserId = testProfile.userAuthenticationRequired ? 66 : 0;
result = writableCredential->addAccessControlProfile(
testProfile.id, cert, testProfile.userAuthenticationRequired,
testProfile.timeoutMillis, secureUserId, &profile);
// Don't use assert so all errors can be outputed. Then return
// instead of exit even on errors so caller can decide.
EXPECT_TRUE(result.isOk()) << result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage()
<< "test profile id = " << testProfile.id << endl;
EXPECT_EQ(testProfile.id, profile.id);
EXPECT_EQ(testProfile.readerCertificate, profile.readerCertificate.encodedCertificate);
EXPECT_EQ(testProfile.userAuthenticationRequired, profile.userAuthenticationRequired);
EXPECT_EQ(testProfile.timeoutMillis, profile.timeoutMillis);
EXPECT_EQ(support::kAesGcmTagSize + support::kAesGcmIvSize, profile.mac.size());
if (!result.isOk() || testProfile.id != profile.id ||
testProfile.readerCertificate != profile.readerCertificate.encodedCertificate ||
testProfile.userAuthenticationRequired != profile.userAuthenticationRequired ||
testProfile.timeoutMillis != profile.timeoutMillis ||
support::kAesGcmTagSize + support::kAesGcmIvSize != profile.mac.size()) {
return {};
}
secureProfiles.push_back(profile);
}
return secureProfiles;
}
// Most test expects this function to pass. So we will print out additional
// value if failed so more debug data can be provided.
bool addEntry(sp<IWritableIdentityCredential>& writableCredential, const TestEntryData& entry,
int dataChunkSize, map<const TestEntryData*, vector<vector<uint8_t>>>& encryptedBlobs,
bool expectSuccess) {
Status result;
vector<vector<uint8_t>> chunks = support::chunkVector(entry.valueCbor, dataChunkSize);
result = writableCredential->beginAddEntry(entry.profileIds, entry.nameSpace, entry.name,
entry.valueCbor.size());
if (expectSuccess) {
EXPECT_TRUE(result.isOk())
<< result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage() << endl
<< "entry name = " << entry.name << ", name space=" << entry.nameSpace << endl;
}
if (!result.isOk()) {
return false;
}
vector<vector<uint8_t>> encryptedChunks;
for (const auto& chunk : chunks) {
vector<uint8_t> encryptedContent;
result = writableCredential->addEntryValue(chunk, &encryptedContent);
if (expectSuccess) {
EXPECT_TRUE(result.isOk())
<< result.exceptionCode() << "; " << result.exceptionMessage() << endl
<< "entry name = " << entry.name << ", name space = " << entry.nameSpace
<< endl;
EXPECT_GT(encryptedContent.size(), 0u) << "entry name = " << entry.name
<< ", name space = " << entry.nameSpace << endl;
}
if (!result.isOk() || encryptedContent.size() <= 0u) {
return false;
}
encryptedChunks.push_back(encryptedContent);
}
encryptedBlobs[&entry] = encryptedChunks;
return true;
}
void setImageData(vector<uint8_t>& image) {
image.resize(256 * 1024 - 10);
for (size_t n = 0; n < image.size(); n++) {
image[n] = (uint8_t)n;
}
}
identity: Fix attestation and documentation problems. - The docs said that IdentityCredential.createEphemeralKey() returned data encoded PKCS#8 which is wrong. It's supposed to be in DER format which is also what the VTS tests and credstore expects. - Clarify that createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(), and createAuthChallenge() are all optional. - Avoid passing an invalid profile ID in the IdentityCredentialTests. verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass test. - Update requirements for which tags must be present in the attestation for CredentialKey as well as the requirements on expiration date and the issuer name. Update default implementation to satisfy these requirements. Update VTS tests to carefully verify these requrements are met. - Clarify requirements for X.509 cert for AuthenticationKey. Add VTS test to verify. - Mandate that TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY must not be set for test credentials. Add VTS test to verify this. - Make default implementation pretend to be implemented in a trusted environment and streamline VTS tests to not special-case for the default implementation. - Switch to using the attestation extension parser from the KM 4.1 support library instead of the one from system/keymaster. The latter one did not support the latest attestation extension and thus would fail for pretty much anything that wasn't the default HAL impl. - Fix a couple of bugs in keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(): - Report root_of_trust.security_level - Add support for Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY - Fix how EMacKey is calculated. - Add test vectors to verify how EMacKey and DeviceMac is calculated. Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Bug: 171745570 Change-Id: I2f8bd772de078556733f769cec2021918d1d7de6
2020-10-26 20:26:36 -04:00
string x509NameToRfc2253String(X509_NAME* name) {
char* buf;
size_t bufSize;
BIO* bio;
bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
X509_NAME_print_ex(bio, name, 0, XN_FLAG_RFC2253);
bufSize = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &buf);
string ret = string(buf, bufSize);
BIO_free(bio);
return ret;
}
int parseDigits(const char** s, int numDigits) {
int result;
auto [_, ec] = std::from_chars(*s, *s + numDigits, result);
if (ec != std::errc()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Error parsing " << numDigits << " digits "
<< " from " << s;
return 0;
}
identity: Fix attestation and documentation problems. - The docs said that IdentityCredential.createEphemeralKey() returned data encoded PKCS#8 which is wrong. It's supposed to be in DER format which is also what the VTS tests and credstore expects. - Clarify that createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(), and createAuthChallenge() are all optional. - Avoid passing an invalid profile ID in the IdentityCredentialTests. verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass test. - Update requirements for which tags must be present in the attestation for CredentialKey as well as the requirements on expiration date and the issuer name. Update default implementation to satisfy these requirements. Update VTS tests to carefully verify these requrements are met. - Clarify requirements for X.509 cert for AuthenticationKey. Add VTS test to verify. - Mandate that TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY must not be set for test credentials. Add VTS test to verify this. - Make default implementation pretend to be implemented in a trusted environment and streamline VTS tests to not special-case for the default implementation. - Switch to using the attestation extension parser from the KM 4.1 support library instead of the one from system/keymaster. The latter one did not support the latest attestation extension and thus would fail for pretty much anything that wasn't the default HAL impl. - Fix a couple of bugs in keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(): - Report root_of_trust.security_level - Add support for Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY - Fix how EMacKey is calculated. - Add test vectors to verify how EMacKey and DeviceMac is calculated. Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Bug: 171745570 Change-Id: I2f8bd772de078556733f769cec2021918d1d7de6
2020-10-26 20:26:36 -04:00
*s += numDigits;
return result;
}
identity: Fix attestation and documentation problems. - The docs said that IdentityCredential.createEphemeralKey() returned data encoded PKCS#8 which is wrong. It's supposed to be in DER format which is also what the VTS tests and credstore expects. - Clarify that createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(), and createAuthChallenge() are all optional. - Avoid passing an invalid profile ID in the IdentityCredentialTests. verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass test. - Update requirements for which tags must be present in the attestation for CredentialKey as well as the requirements on expiration date and the issuer name. Update default implementation to satisfy these requirements. Update VTS tests to carefully verify these requrements are met. - Clarify requirements for X.509 cert for AuthenticationKey. Add VTS test to verify. - Mandate that TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY must not be set for test credentials. Add VTS test to verify this. - Make default implementation pretend to be implemented in a trusted environment and streamline VTS tests to not special-case for the default implementation. - Switch to using the attestation extension parser from the KM 4.1 support library instead of the one from system/keymaster. The latter one did not support the latest attestation extension and thus would fail for pretty much anything that wasn't the default HAL impl. - Fix a couple of bugs in keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(): - Report root_of_trust.security_level - Add support for Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY - Fix how EMacKey is calculated. - Add test vectors to verify how EMacKey and DeviceMac is calculated. Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Bug: 171745570 Change-Id: I2f8bd772de078556733f769cec2021918d1d7de6
2020-10-26 20:26:36 -04:00
bool parseAsn1Time(const ASN1_TIME* asn1Time, time_t* outTime) {
struct tm tm;
memset(&tm, '\0', sizeof(tm));
const char* timeStr = (const char*)asn1Time->data;
const char* s = timeStr;
if (asn1Time->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
tm.tm_year = parseDigits(&s, 2);
if (tm.tm_year < 70) {
tm.tm_year += 100;
}
} else if (asn1Time->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) {
tm.tm_year = parseDigits(&s, 4) - 1900;
tm.tm_year -= 1900;
} else {
identity: Fix attestation and documentation problems. - The docs said that IdentityCredential.createEphemeralKey() returned data encoded PKCS#8 which is wrong. It's supposed to be in DER format which is also what the VTS tests and credstore expects. - Clarify that createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(), and createAuthChallenge() are all optional. - Avoid passing an invalid profile ID in the IdentityCredentialTests. verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass test. - Update requirements for which tags must be present in the attestation for CredentialKey as well as the requirements on expiration date and the issuer name. Update default implementation to satisfy these requirements. Update VTS tests to carefully verify these requrements are met. - Clarify requirements for X.509 cert for AuthenticationKey. Add VTS test to verify. - Mandate that TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY must not be set for test credentials. Add VTS test to verify this. - Make default implementation pretend to be implemented in a trusted environment and streamline VTS tests to not special-case for the default implementation. - Switch to using the attestation extension parser from the KM 4.1 support library instead of the one from system/keymaster. The latter one did not support the latest attestation extension and thus would fail for pretty much anything that wasn't the default HAL impl. - Fix a couple of bugs in keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(): - Report root_of_trust.security_level - Add support for Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY - Fix how EMacKey is calculated. - Add test vectors to verify how EMacKey and DeviceMac is calculated. Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Bug: 171745570 Change-Id: I2f8bd772de078556733f769cec2021918d1d7de6
2020-10-26 20:26:36 -04:00
LOG(ERROR) << "Unsupported ASN1_TIME type " << asn1Time->type;
return false;
}
tm.tm_mon = parseDigits(&s, 2) - 1;
tm.tm_mday = parseDigits(&s, 2);
tm.tm_hour = parseDigits(&s, 2);
tm.tm_min = parseDigits(&s, 2);
tm.tm_sec = parseDigits(&s, 2);
// This may need to be updated if someone create certificates using +/- instead of Z.
//
if (*s != 'Z') {
LOG(ERROR) << "Expected Z in string '" << timeStr << "' at offset " << (s - timeStr);
return false;
}
time_t t = timegm(&tm);
if (t == -1) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Error converting broken-down time to time_t";
return false;
}
identity: Fix attestation and documentation problems. - The docs said that IdentityCredential.createEphemeralKey() returned data encoded PKCS#8 which is wrong. It's supposed to be in DER format which is also what the VTS tests and credstore expects. - Clarify that createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(), and createAuthChallenge() are all optional. - Avoid passing an invalid profile ID in the IdentityCredentialTests. verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass test. - Update requirements for which tags must be present in the attestation for CredentialKey as well as the requirements on expiration date and the issuer name. Update default implementation to satisfy these requirements. Update VTS tests to carefully verify these requrements are met. - Clarify requirements for X.509 cert for AuthenticationKey. Add VTS test to verify. - Mandate that TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY must not be set for test credentials. Add VTS test to verify this. - Make default implementation pretend to be implemented in a trusted environment and streamline VTS tests to not special-case for the default implementation. - Switch to using the attestation extension parser from the KM 4.1 support library instead of the one from system/keymaster. The latter one did not support the latest attestation extension and thus would fail for pretty much anything that wasn't the default HAL impl. - Fix a couple of bugs in keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(): - Report root_of_trust.security_level - Add support for Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY - Fix how EMacKey is calculated. - Add test vectors to verify how EMacKey and DeviceMac is calculated. Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Bug: 171745570 Change-Id: I2f8bd772de078556733f769cec2021918d1d7de6
2020-10-26 20:26:36 -04:00
*outTime = t;
return true;
}
void validateAttestationCertificate(const vector<Certificate>& credentialKeyCertChain,
const vector<uint8_t>& expectedChallenge,
const vector<uint8_t>& expectedAppId, bool isTestCredential) {
ASSERT_GE(credentialKeyCertChain.size(), 2);
vector<uint8_t> certBytes = credentialKeyCertChain[0].encodedCertificate;
const uint8_t* certData = certBytes.data();
X509_Ptr cert = X509_Ptr(d2i_X509(nullptr, &certData, certBytes.size()));
vector<uint8_t> batchCertBytes = credentialKeyCertChain[1].encodedCertificate;
const uint8_t* batchCertData = batchCertBytes.data();
X509_Ptr batchCert = X509_Ptr(d2i_X509(nullptr, &batchCertData, batchCertBytes.size()));
// First get some values from the batch certificate which is checked
// against the top-level certificate (subject, notAfter)
//
X509_NAME* batchSubject = X509_get_subject_name(batchCert.get());
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, batchSubject);
time_t batchNotAfter;
ASSERT_TRUE(parseAsn1Time(X509_get0_notAfter(batchCert.get()), &batchNotAfter));
// Check all the requirements from IWritableIdentityCredential::getAttestationCertificate()...
//
// - version: INTEGER 2 (means v3 certificate).
EXPECT_EQ(2, X509_get_version(cert.get()));
identity: Fix attestation and documentation problems. - The docs said that IdentityCredential.createEphemeralKey() returned data encoded PKCS#8 which is wrong. It's supposed to be in DER format which is also what the VTS tests and credstore expects. - Clarify that createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(), and createAuthChallenge() are all optional. - Avoid passing an invalid profile ID in the IdentityCredentialTests. verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass test. - Update requirements for which tags must be present in the attestation for CredentialKey as well as the requirements on expiration date and the issuer name. Update default implementation to satisfy these requirements. Update VTS tests to carefully verify these requrements are met. - Clarify requirements for X.509 cert for AuthenticationKey. Add VTS test to verify. - Mandate that TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY must not be set for test credentials. Add VTS test to verify this. - Make default implementation pretend to be implemented in a trusted environment and streamline VTS tests to not special-case for the default implementation. - Switch to using the attestation extension parser from the KM 4.1 support library instead of the one from system/keymaster. The latter one did not support the latest attestation extension and thus would fail for pretty much anything that wasn't the default HAL impl. - Fix a couple of bugs in keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(): - Report root_of_trust.security_level - Add support for Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY - Fix how EMacKey is calculated. - Add test vectors to verify how EMacKey and DeviceMac is calculated. Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Bug: 171745570 Change-Id: I2f8bd772de078556733f769cec2021918d1d7de6
2020-10-26 20:26:36 -04:00
// - serialNumber: INTEGER 1 (fixed value: same on all certs).
EXPECT_EQ(1, ASN1_INTEGER_get(X509_get_serialNumber(cert.get())));
identity: Fix attestation and documentation problems. - The docs said that IdentityCredential.createEphemeralKey() returned data encoded PKCS#8 which is wrong. It's supposed to be in DER format which is also what the VTS tests and credstore expects. - Clarify that createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(), and createAuthChallenge() are all optional. - Avoid passing an invalid profile ID in the IdentityCredentialTests. verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass test. - Update requirements for which tags must be present in the attestation for CredentialKey as well as the requirements on expiration date and the issuer name. Update default implementation to satisfy these requirements. Update VTS tests to carefully verify these requrements are met. - Clarify requirements for X.509 cert for AuthenticationKey. Add VTS test to verify. - Mandate that TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY must not be set for test credentials. Add VTS test to verify this. - Make default implementation pretend to be implemented in a trusted environment and streamline VTS tests to not special-case for the default implementation. - Switch to using the attestation extension parser from the KM 4.1 support library instead of the one from system/keymaster. The latter one did not support the latest attestation extension and thus would fail for pretty much anything that wasn't the default HAL impl. - Fix a couple of bugs in keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(): - Report root_of_trust.security_level - Add support for Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY - Fix how EMacKey is calculated. - Add test vectors to verify how EMacKey and DeviceMac is calculated. Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Bug: 171745570 Change-Id: I2f8bd772de078556733f769cec2021918d1d7de6
2020-10-26 20:26:36 -04:00
// - signature: must be set to ECDSA.
EXPECT_EQ(NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, X509_get_signature_nid(cert.get()));
identity: Fix attestation and documentation problems. - The docs said that IdentityCredential.createEphemeralKey() returned data encoded PKCS#8 which is wrong. It's supposed to be in DER format which is also what the VTS tests and credstore expects. - Clarify that createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(), and createAuthChallenge() are all optional. - Avoid passing an invalid profile ID in the IdentityCredentialTests. verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass test. - Update requirements for which tags must be present in the attestation for CredentialKey as well as the requirements on expiration date and the issuer name. Update default implementation to satisfy these requirements. Update VTS tests to carefully verify these requrements are met. - Clarify requirements for X.509 cert for AuthenticationKey. Add VTS test to verify. - Mandate that TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY must not be set for test credentials. Add VTS test to verify this. - Make default implementation pretend to be implemented in a trusted environment and streamline VTS tests to not special-case for the default implementation. - Switch to using the attestation extension parser from the KM 4.1 support library instead of the one from system/keymaster. The latter one did not support the latest attestation extension and thus would fail for pretty much anything that wasn't the default HAL impl. - Fix a couple of bugs in keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(): - Report root_of_trust.security_level - Add support for Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY - Fix how EMacKey is calculated. - Add test vectors to verify how EMacKey and DeviceMac is calculated. Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Bug: 171745570 Change-Id: I2f8bd772de078556733f769cec2021918d1d7de6
2020-10-26 20:26:36 -04:00
// - subject: CN shall be set to "Android Identity Credential Key". (fixed value:
// same on all certs)
X509_NAME* subject = X509_get_subject_name(cert.get());
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, subject);
EXPECT_EQ("CN=Android Identity Credential Key", x509NameToRfc2253String(subject));
identity: Fix attestation and documentation problems. - The docs said that IdentityCredential.createEphemeralKey() returned data encoded PKCS#8 which is wrong. It's supposed to be in DER format which is also what the VTS tests and credstore expects. - Clarify that createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(), and createAuthChallenge() are all optional. - Avoid passing an invalid profile ID in the IdentityCredentialTests. verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass test. - Update requirements for which tags must be present in the attestation for CredentialKey as well as the requirements on expiration date and the issuer name. Update default implementation to satisfy these requirements. Update VTS tests to carefully verify these requrements are met. - Clarify requirements for X.509 cert for AuthenticationKey. Add VTS test to verify. - Mandate that TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY must not be set for test credentials. Add VTS test to verify this. - Make default implementation pretend to be implemented in a trusted environment and streamline VTS tests to not special-case for the default implementation. - Switch to using the attestation extension parser from the KM 4.1 support library instead of the one from system/keymaster. The latter one did not support the latest attestation extension and thus would fail for pretty much anything that wasn't the default HAL impl. - Fix a couple of bugs in keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(): - Report root_of_trust.security_level - Add support for Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY - Fix how EMacKey is calculated. - Add test vectors to verify how EMacKey and DeviceMac is calculated. Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Bug: 171745570 Change-Id: I2f8bd772de078556733f769cec2021918d1d7de6
2020-10-26 20:26:36 -04:00
// - issuer: Same as the subject field of the batch attestation key.
X509_NAME* issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(cert.get());
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, issuer);
EXPECT_EQ(x509NameToRfc2253String(batchSubject), x509NameToRfc2253String(issuer));
// - validity: Should be from current time and expire at the same time as the
// attestation batch certificate used.
//
// Allow for 10 seconds drift to account for the time drift between Secure HW
// and this environment plus the difference between when the certificate was
// created and until now
//
time_t notBefore;
ASSERT_TRUE(parseAsn1Time(X509_get0_notBefore(cert.get()), &notBefore));
uint64_t now = time(nullptr);
int64_t diffSecs = now - notBefore;
int64_t allowDriftSecs = 10;
EXPECT_LE(-allowDriftSecs, diffSecs);
EXPECT_GE(allowDriftSecs, diffSecs);
time_t notAfter;
ASSERT_TRUE(parseAsn1Time(X509_get0_notAfter(cert.get()), &notAfter));
EXPECT_EQ(notAfter, batchNotAfter);
auto [err, attRec] = keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(certBytes);
ASSERT_EQ(keymaster::V4_1::ErrorCode::OK, err);
// - subjectPublicKeyInfo: must contain attested public key.
// - The attestationVersion field in the attestation extension must be at least 3.
EXPECT_GE(attRec.attestation_version, 3);
// - The attestationSecurityLevel field must be set to either Software (0),
// TrustedEnvironment (1), or StrongBox (2) depending on how attestation is
// implemented.
EXPECT_GE(attRec.attestation_security_level,
keymaster::V4_0::SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT);
// - The keymasterVersion field in the attestation extension must be set to the.
// same value as used for Android Keystore keys.
//
// Nothing to check here...
// - The keymasterSecurityLevel field in the attestation extension must be set to
// either Software (0), TrustedEnvironment (1), or StrongBox (2) depending on how
// the Trusted Application backing the HAL implementation is implemented.
EXPECT_GE(attRec.keymaster_security_level, keymaster::V4_0::SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT);
// - The attestationChallenge field must be set to the passed-in challenge.
EXPECT_EQ(expectedChallenge.size(), attRec.attestation_challenge.size());
EXPECT_TRUE(memcmp(expectedChallenge.data(), attRec.attestation_challenge.data(),
attRec.attestation_challenge.size()) == 0);
// - The uniqueId field must be empty.
EXPECT_EQ(attRec.unique_id.size(), 0);
// - The softwareEnforced field in the attestation extension must include
// Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID which must be set to the bytes of the passed-in
// attestationApplicationId.
EXPECT_TRUE(attRec.software_enforced.Contains(keymaster::V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID,
expectedAppId));
// - The teeEnforced field in the attestation extension must include
//
// - Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY which indicates that the key is an Identity
// Credential key (which can only sign/MAC very specific messages) and not an Android
// Keystore key (which can be used to sign/MAC anything). This must not be set
// for test credentials.
bool hasIcKeyTag =
attRec.hardware_enforced.Contains(static_cast<android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::Tag>(
keymaster::V4_1::Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY));
if (isTestCredential) {
EXPECT_FALSE(hasIcKeyTag);
} else {
identity: Fix attestation and documentation problems. - The docs said that IdentityCredential.createEphemeralKey() returned data encoded PKCS#8 which is wrong. It's supposed to be in DER format which is also what the VTS tests and credstore expects. - Clarify that createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(), and createAuthChallenge() are all optional. - Avoid passing an invalid profile ID in the IdentityCredentialTests. verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass test. - Update requirements for which tags must be present in the attestation for CredentialKey as well as the requirements on expiration date and the issuer name. Update default implementation to satisfy these requirements. Update VTS tests to carefully verify these requrements are met. - Clarify requirements for X.509 cert for AuthenticationKey. Add VTS test to verify. - Mandate that TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY must not be set for test credentials. Add VTS test to verify this. - Make default implementation pretend to be implemented in a trusted environment and streamline VTS tests to not special-case for the default implementation. - Switch to using the attestation extension parser from the KM 4.1 support library instead of the one from system/keymaster. The latter one did not support the latest attestation extension and thus would fail for pretty much anything that wasn't the default HAL impl. - Fix a couple of bugs in keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(): - Report root_of_trust.security_level - Add support for Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY - Fix how EMacKey is calculated. - Add test vectors to verify how EMacKey and DeviceMac is calculated. Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Bug: 171745570 Change-Id: I2f8bd772de078556733f769cec2021918d1d7de6
2020-10-26 20:26:36 -04:00
EXPECT_TRUE(hasIcKeyTag);
}
identity: Fix attestation and documentation problems. - The docs said that IdentityCredential.createEphemeralKey() returned data encoded PKCS#8 which is wrong. It's supposed to be in DER format which is also what the VTS tests and credstore expects. - Clarify that createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(), and createAuthChallenge() are all optional. - Avoid passing an invalid profile ID in the IdentityCredentialTests. verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass test. - Update requirements for which tags must be present in the attestation for CredentialKey as well as the requirements on expiration date and the issuer name. Update default implementation to satisfy these requirements. Update VTS tests to carefully verify these requrements are met. - Clarify requirements for X.509 cert for AuthenticationKey. Add VTS test to verify. - Mandate that TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY must not be set for test credentials. Add VTS test to verify this. - Make default implementation pretend to be implemented in a trusted environment and streamline VTS tests to not special-case for the default implementation. - Switch to using the attestation extension parser from the KM 4.1 support library instead of the one from system/keymaster. The latter one did not support the latest attestation extension and thus would fail for pretty much anything that wasn't the default HAL impl. - Fix a couple of bugs in keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(): - Report root_of_trust.security_level - Add support for Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY - Fix how EMacKey is calculated. - Add test vectors to verify how EMacKey and DeviceMac is calculated. Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Bug: 171745570 Change-Id: I2f8bd772de078556733f769cec2021918d1d7de6
2020-10-26 20:26:36 -04:00
// - Tag::PURPOSE must be set to SIGN
EXPECT_TRUE(attRec.hardware_enforced.Contains(keymaster::V4_0::TAG_PURPOSE,
keymaster::V4_0::KeyPurpose::SIGN));
// - Tag::KEY_SIZE must be set to the appropriate key size, in bits (e.g. 256)
EXPECT_TRUE(attRec.hardware_enforced.Contains(keymaster::V4_0::TAG_KEY_SIZE, 256));
// - Tag::ALGORITHM must be set to EC
EXPECT_TRUE(attRec.hardware_enforced.Contains(keymaster::V4_0::TAG_ALGORITHM,
keymaster::V4_0::Algorithm::EC));
// - Tag::NO_AUTH_REQUIRED must be set
EXPECT_TRUE(attRec.hardware_enforced.Contains(keymaster::V4_0::TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED));
// - Tag::DIGEST must be include SHA_2_256
EXPECT_TRUE(attRec.hardware_enforced.Contains(keymaster::V4_0::TAG_DIGEST,
keymaster::V4_0::Digest::SHA_2_256));
// - Tag::EC_CURVE must be set to P_256
EXPECT_TRUE(attRec.hardware_enforced.Contains(keymaster::V4_0::TAG_EC_CURVE,
keymaster::V4_0::EcCurve::P_256));
// - Tag::ROOT_OF_TRUST must be set
//
EXPECT_GE(attRec.root_of_trust.security_level,
keymaster::V4_0::SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT);
// - Tag::OS_VERSION and Tag::OS_PATCHLEVEL must be set
EXPECT_TRUE(attRec.hardware_enforced.Contains(keymaster::V4_0::TAG_OS_VERSION));
EXPECT_TRUE(attRec.hardware_enforced.Contains(keymaster::V4_0::TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL));
// TODO: we could retrieve osVersion and osPatchLevel from Android itself and compare it
// with what was reported in the certificate.
}
void verifyAuthKeyCertificate(const vector<uint8_t>& authKeyCertChain) {
const uint8_t* data = authKeyCertChain.data();
auto cert = X509_Ptr(d2i_X509(nullptr, &data, authKeyCertChain.size()));
// - version: INTEGER 2 (means v3 certificate).
EXPECT_EQ(X509_get_version(cert.get()), 2);
// - serialNumber: INTEGER 1 (fixed value: same on all certs).
EXPECT_EQ(ASN1_INTEGER_get(X509_get_serialNumber(cert.get())), 1);
// - signature: must be set to ECDSA.
EXPECT_EQ(X509_get_signature_nid(cert.get()), NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256);
// - subject: CN shall be set to "Android Identity Credential Authentication Key". (fixed
// value: same on all certs)
X509_NAME* subject = X509_get_subject_name(cert.get());
ASSERT_NE(subject, nullptr);
EXPECT_EQ(x509NameToRfc2253String(subject),
"CN=Android Identity Credential Authentication Key");
// - issuer: CN shall be set to "Android Identity Credential Key". (fixed value:
// same on all certs)
X509_NAME* issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(cert.get());
ASSERT_NE(issuer, nullptr);
EXPECT_EQ(x509NameToRfc2253String(issuer), "CN=Android Identity Credential Key");
// - subjectPublicKeyInfo: must contain attested public key.
// - validity: should be from current time and one year in the future (365 days).
time_t notBefore, notAfter;
ASSERT_TRUE(parseAsn1Time(X509_get0_notAfter(cert.get()), &notAfter));
ASSERT_TRUE(parseAsn1Time(X509_get0_notBefore(cert.get()), &notBefore));
// Allow for 10 seconds drift to account for the time drift between Secure HW
// and this environment plus the difference between when the certificate was
// created and until now
//
uint64_t now = time(nullptr);
int64_t diffSecs = now - notBefore;
int64_t allowDriftSecs = 10;
EXPECT_LE(-allowDriftSecs, diffSecs);
EXPECT_GE(allowDriftSecs, diffSecs);
constexpr uint64_t kSecsInOneYear = 365 * 24 * 60 * 60;
EXPECT_EQ(notBefore + kSecsInOneYear, notAfter);
}
vector<RequestNamespace> buildRequestNamespaces(const vector<TestEntryData> entries) {
vector<RequestNamespace> ret;
RequestNamespace curNs;
for (const TestEntryData& testEntry : entries) {
if (testEntry.nameSpace != curNs.namespaceName) {
if (curNs.namespaceName.size() > 0) {
ret.push_back(curNs);
}
curNs.namespaceName = testEntry.nameSpace;
curNs.items.clear();
}
RequestDataItem item;
item.name = testEntry.name;
item.size = testEntry.valueCbor.size();
item.accessControlProfileIds = testEntry.profileIds;
curNs.items.push_back(item);
}
if (curNs.namespaceName.size() > 0) {
ret.push_back(curNs);
}
return ret;
}
} // namespace android::hardware::identity::test_utils