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hardware_interfaces/identity/support/tests/IdentityCredentialSupportTest.cpp

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/*
* Copyright (c) 2019, The Android Open Source Project
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#include <iomanip>
#include <iostream>
#include <sstream>
#include <gmock/gmock.h>
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
#include <android/hardware/identity/support/IdentityCredentialSupport.h>
#include <cppbor.h>
#include <cppbor_parse.h>
using std::optional;
using std::string;
using std::vector;
namespace android {
namespace hardware {
namespace identity {
TEST(IdentityCredentialSupport, encodeHex) {
EXPECT_EQ("", support::encodeHex(vector<uint8_t>({})));
EXPECT_EQ("01", support::encodeHex(vector<uint8_t>({1})));
EXPECT_EQ("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10",
support::encodeHex(
vector<uint8_t>({0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16})));
EXPECT_EQ("0102ffe060", support::encodeHex(vector<uint8_t>({1, 2, 255, 224, 96})));
}
TEST(IdentityCredentialSupport, decodeHex) {
EXPECT_EQ(vector<uint8_t>({}), support::decodeHex(""));
EXPECT_EQ(vector<uint8_t>({1}), support::decodeHex("01"));
EXPECT_EQ(vector<uint8_t>({0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16}),
support::decodeHex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10"));
EXPECT_FALSE(support::decodeHex("0g"));
EXPECT_FALSE(support::decodeHex("0"));
EXPECT_FALSE(support::decodeHex("012"));
}
TEST(IdentityCredentialSupport, Signatures) {
vector<uint8_t> data = {1, 2, 3};
optional<vector<uint8_t>> keyPair = support::createEcKeyPair();
ASSERT_TRUE(keyPair);
optional<vector<uint8_t>> privKey = support::ecKeyPairGetPrivateKey(keyPair.value());
ASSERT_TRUE(privKey);
optional<vector<uint8_t>> pubKey = support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(keyPair.value());
ASSERT_TRUE(pubKey);
optional<vector<uint8_t>> signature = support::signEcDsa(privKey.value(), data);
ASSERT_TRUE(
support::checkEcDsaSignature(support::sha256(data), signature.value(), pubKey.value()));
// Manipulate the signature, check that verification fails.
vector<uint8_t> modifiedSignature = signature.value();
modifiedSignature[0] ^= 0xff;
ASSERT_FALSE(
support::checkEcDsaSignature(support::sha256(data), modifiedSignature, pubKey.value()));
// Manipulate the data being checked, check that verification fails.
vector<uint8_t> modifiedDigest = support::sha256(data);
modifiedDigest[0] ^= 0xff;
ASSERT_FALSE(support::checkEcDsaSignature(modifiedDigest, signature.value(), pubKey.value()));
}
string replaceLine(const string& str, ssize_t lineNumber, const string& replacement) {
vector<string> lines;
std::istringstream f(str);
string s;
while (std::getline(f, s, '\n')) {
lines.push_back(s);
}
size_t numLines = lines.size();
if (lineNumber < 0) {
lineNumber = numLines - (-lineNumber);
}
string ret;
size_t n = 0;
for (const string& line : lines) {
if (n == lineNumber) {
ret += replacement + "\n";
} else {
ret += line + "\n";
}
n++;
}
return ret;
}
TEST(IdentityCredentialSupport, CoseSignatures) {
optional<vector<uint8_t>> keyPair = support::createEcKeyPair();
ASSERT_TRUE(keyPair);
optional<vector<uint8_t>> privKey = support::ecKeyPairGetPrivateKey(keyPair.value());
ASSERT_TRUE(privKey);
optional<vector<uint8_t>> pubKey = support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(keyPair.value());
ASSERT_TRUE(pubKey);
vector<uint8_t> data = {1, 2, 3};
optional<vector<uint8_t>> coseSign1 = support::coseSignEcDsa(
privKey.value(), data, {} /* detachedContent */, {} /* x5chain */);
ASSERT_TRUE(support::coseCheckEcDsaSignature(coseSign1.value(), {} /* detachedContent */,
pubKey.value()));
optional<vector<uint8_t>> payload = support::coseSignGetPayload(coseSign1.value());
ASSERT_TRUE(payload);
ASSERT_EQ(data, payload.value());
// Finally, check that |coseSign1| are the bytes of a valid COSE_Sign1 message
string out = cppbor::prettyPrint(coseSign1.value());
out = replaceLine(out, -2, " [] // Signature Removed");
EXPECT_EQ(
"[\n"
" {0xa1, 0x01, 0x26},\n" // Bytes of {1:-7} 1 is 'alg' label and -7 is "ECDSA 256"
" {},\n"
" {0x01, 0x02, 0x03},\n"
" [] // Signature Removed\n"
"]\n",
out);
}
TEST(IdentityCredentialSupport, CoseSignaturesAdditionalData) {
optional<vector<uint8_t>> keyPair = support::createEcKeyPair();
ASSERT_TRUE(keyPair);
optional<vector<uint8_t>> privKey = support::ecKeyPairGetPrivateKey(keyPair.value());
ASSERT_TRUE(privKey);
optional<vector<uint8_t>> pubKey = support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(keyPair.value());
ASSERT_TRUE(pubKey);
vector<uint8_t> detachedContent = {1, 2, 3};
optional<vector<uint8_t>> coseSign1 = support::coseSignEcDsa(privKey.value(), {} /* data */,
detachedContent, {} /* x5chain */);
ASSERT_TRUE(
support::coseCheckEcDsaSignature(coseSign1.value(), detachedContent, pubKey.value()));
optional<vector<uint8_t>> payload = support::coseSignGetPayload(coseSign1.value());
ASSERT_TRUE(payload);
ASSERT_EQ(0, payload.value().size());
// Finally, check that |coseSign1| are the bytes of a valid COSE_Sign1 message
string out = cppbor::prettyPrint(coseSign1.value());
out = replaceLine(out, -2, " [] // Signature Removed");
EXPECT_EQ(
"[\n"
" {0xa1, 0x01, 0x26},\n" // Bytes of {1:-7} 1 is 'alg' label and -7 is "ECDSA 256"
" {},\n"
" null,\n"
" [] // Signature Removed\n"
"]\n",
out);
}
vector<uint8_t> generateCertChain(size_t numCerts) {
vector<vector<uint8_t>> certs;
for (size_t n = 0; n < numCerts; n++) {
optional<vector<uint8_t>> keyPair = support::createEcKeyPair();
optional<vector<uint8_t>> privKey = support::ecKeyPairGetPrivateKey(keyPair.value());
optional<vector<uint8_t>> pubKey = support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(keyPair.value());
optional<vector<uint8_t>> cert = support::ecPublicKeyGenerateCertificate(
pubKey.value(), privKey.value(), "0001", "someIssuer", "someSubject", 0, 0, {});
certs.push_back(cert.value());
}
return support::certificateChainJoin(certs);
}
TEST(IdentityCredentialSupport, CoseSignaturesX5ChainWithSingleCert) {
optional<vector<uint8_t>> keyPair = support::createEcKeyPair();
ASSERT_TRUE(keyPair);
optional<vector<uint8_t>> privKey = support::ecKeyPairGetPrivateKey(keyPair.value());
ASSERT_TRUE(privKey);
optional<vector<uint8_t>> pubKey = support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(keyPair.value());
ASSERT_TRUE(pubKey);
vector<uint8_t> certChain = generateCertChain(1);
optional<vector<vector<uint8_t>>> splitCerts = support::certificateChainSplit(certChain);
ASSERT_EQ(1, splitCerts.value().size());
vector<uint8_t> detachedContent = {1, 2, 3};
optional<vector<uint8_t>> coseSign1 =
support::coseSignEcDsa(privKey.value(), {} /* data */, detachedContent, certChain);
ASSERT_TRUE(
support::coseCheckEcDsaSignature(coseSign1.value(), detachedContent, pubKey.value()));
optional<vector<uint8_t>> payload = support::coseSignGetPayload(coseSign1.value());
ASSERT_TRUE(payload);
ASSERT_EQ(0, payload.value().size());
optional<vector<uint8_t>> certsRecovered = support::coseSignGetX5Chain(coseSign1.value());
EXPECT_EQ(certsRecovered.value(), certChain);
}
TEST(IdentityCredentialSupport, CoseSignaturesX5ChainWithMultipleCerts) {
optional<vector<uint8_t>> keyPair = support::createEcKeyPair();
ASSERT_TRUE(keyPair);
optional<vector<uint8_t>> privKey = support::ecKeyPairGetPrivateKey(keyPair.value());
ASSERT_TRUE(privKey);
optional<vector<uint8_t>> pubKey = support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(keyPair.value());
ASSERT_TRUE(pubKey);
vector<uint8_t> certChain = generateCertChain(5);
optional<vector<vector<uint8_t>>> splitCerts = support::certificateChainSplit(certChain);
ASSERT_EQ(5, splitCerts.value().size());
vector<uint8_t> detachedContent = {1, 2, 3};
optional<vector<uint8_t>> coseSign1 =
support::coseSignEcDsa(privKey.value(), {} /* data */, detachedContent, certChain);
ASSERT_TRUE(
support::coseCheckEcDsaSignature(coseSign1.value(), detachedContent, pubKey.value()));
optional<vector<uint8_t>> payload = support::coseSignGetPayload(coseSign1.value());
ASSERT_TRUE(payload);
ASSERT_EQ(0, payload.value().size());
optional<vector<uint8_t>> certsRecovered = support::coseSignGetX5Chain(coseSign1.value());
EXPECT_EQ(certsRecovered.value(), certChain);
}
TEST(IdentityCredentialSupport, CertificateChain) {
optional<vector<uint8_t>> keyPair = support::createEcKeyPair();
ASSERT_TRUE(keyPair);
optional<vector<uint8_t>> privKey = support::ecKeyPairGetPrivateKey(keyPair.value());
ASSERT_TRUE(privKey);
optional<vector<uint8_t>> pubKey = support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(keyPair.value());
ASSERT_TRUE(pubKey);
optional<vector<uint8_t>> cert = support::ecPublicKeyGenerateCertificate(
pubKey.value(), privKey.value(), "0001", "someIssuer", "someSubject", 0, 0, {});
optional<vector<uint8_t>> extractedPubKey =
support::certificateChainGetTopMostKey(cert.value());
ASSERT_TRUE(extractedPubKey);
ASSERT_EQ(pubKey.value(), extractedPubKey.value());
// We expect to the chain returned by ecPublicKeyGenerateCertificate() to only have a
// single element
optional<vector<vector<uint8_t>>> splitCerts = support::certificateChainSplit(cert.value());
ASSERT_EQ(1, splitCerts.value().size());
ASSERT_EQ(splitCerts.value()[0], cert.value());
optional<vector<uint8_t>> otherKeyPair = support::createEcKeyPair();
ASSERT_TRUE(otherKeyPair);
optional<vector<uint8_t>> otherPrivKey = support::ecKeyPairGetPrivateKey(keyPair.value());
ASSERT_TRUE(otherPrivKey);
optional<vector<uint8_t>> otherPubKey = support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(keyPair.value());
ASSERT_TRUE(otherPubKey);
optional<vector<uint8_t>> otherCert = support::ecPublicKeyGenerateCertificate(
otherPubKey.value(), privKey.value(), "0001", "someIssuer", "someSubject", 0, 0, {});
// Now both cert and otherCert are two distinct certificates. Let's make a
// chain and check that certificateChainSplit() works as expected.
ASSERT_NE(cert.value(), otherCert.value());
const vector<vector<uint8_t>> certs2 = {cert.value(), otherCert.value()};
vector<uint8_t> certs2combined = support::certificateChainJoin(certs2);
ASSERT_EQ(certs2combined.size(), cert.value().size() + otherCert.value().size());
optional<vector<vector<uint8_t>>> splitCerts2 = support::certificateChainSplit(certs2combined);
ASSERT_EQ(certs2, splitCerts2.value());
}
vector<uint8_t> strToVec(const string& str) {
vector<uint8_t> ret;
size_t size = str.size();
ret.resize(size);
memcpy(ret.data(), str.data(), size);
return ret;
}
// Test vector from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMAC
TEST(IdentityCredentialSupport, hmacSha256) {
vector<uint8_t> key = strToVec("key");
vector<uint8_t> data = strToVec("The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog");
vector<uint8_t> expected =
support::decodeHex("f7bc83f430538424b13298e6aa6fb143ef4d59a14946175997479dbc2d1a3cd8")
.value();
optional<vector<uint8_t>> hmac = support::hmacSha256(key, data);
ASSERT_TRUE(hmac);
ASSERT_EQ(expected, hmac.value());
}
// See also CoseMac0 test in UtilUnitTest.java inside cts/tests/tests/identity/
TEST(IdentityCredentialSupport, CoseMac0) {
vector<uint8_t> key;
key.resize(32);
vector<uint8_t> data = {0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13};
vector<uint8_t> detachedContent = {};
optional<vector<uint8_t>> mac = support::coseMac0(key, data, detachedContent);
ASSERT_TRUE(mac);
EXPECT_EQ(
"[\n"
" {0xa1, 0x01, 0x05},\n"
" {},\n"
" {0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13},\n"
" {0x6c, 0xec, 0xb5, 0x6a, 0xc9, 0x5c, 0xae, 0x3b, 0x41, 0x13, 0xde, 0xa4, 0xd8, "
"0x86, 0x5c, 0x28, 0x2c, 0xd5, 0xa5, 0x13, 0xff, 0x3b, 0xd1, 0xde, 0x70, 0x5e, 0xbb, "
"0xe2, 0x2d, 0x42, 0xbe, 0x53},\n"
"]",
cppbor::prettyPrint(mac.value()));
}
TEST(IdentityCredentialSupport, CoseMac0DetachedContent) {
vector<uint8_t> key;
key.resize(32);
vector<uint8_t> data = {};
vector<uint8_t> detachedContent = {0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13};
optional<vector<uint8_t>> mac = support::coseMac0(key, data, detachedContent);
ASSERT_TRUE(mac);
// Same HMAC as in CoseMac0 test, only difference is that payload is null.
EXPECT_EQ(
"[\n"
" {0xa1, 0x01, 0x05},\n"
" {},\n"
" null,\n"
" {0x6c, 0xec, 0xb5, 0x6a, 0xc9, 0x5c, 0xae, 0x3b, 0x41, 0x13, 0xde, 0xa4, 0xd8, "
"0x86, 0x5c, 0x28, 0x2c, 0xd5, 0xa5, 0x13, 0xff, 0x3b, 0xd1, 0xde, 0x70, 0x5e, 0xbb, "
"0xe2, 0x2d, 0x42, 0xbe, 0x53},\n"
"]",
cppbor::prettyPrint(mac.value()));
}
identity: Fix attestation and documentation problems. - The docs said that IdentityCredential.createEphemeralKey() returned data encoded PKCS#8 which is wrong. It's supposed to be in DER format which is also what the VTS tests and credstore expects. - Clarify that createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(), and createAuthChallenge() are all optional. - Avoid passing an invalid profile ID in the IdentityCredentialTests. verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass test. - Update requirements for which tags must be present in the attestation for CredentialKey as well as the requirements on expiration date and the issuer name. Update default implementation to satisfy these requirements. Update VTS tests to carefully verify these requrements are met. - Clarify requirements for X.509 cert for AuthenticationKey. Add VTS test to verify. - Mandate that TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY must not be set for test credentials. Add VTS test to verify this. - Make default implementation pretend to be implemented in a trusted environment and streamline VTS tests to not special-case for the default implementation. - Switch to using the attestation extension parser from the KM 4.1 support library instead of the one from system/keymaster. The latter one did not support the latest attestation extension and thus would fail for pretty much anything that wasn't the default HAL impl. - Fix a couple of bugs in keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(): - Report root_of_trust.security_level - Add support for Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY - Fix how EMacKey is calculated. - Add test vectors to verify how EMacKey and DeviceMac is calculated. Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Bug: 171745570 Change-Id: I2f8bd772de078556733f769cec2021918d1d7de6
2020-10-26 20:26:36 -04:00
// Generates a private key in DER format for a small value of 'd'.
//
// Used for test vectors.
//
vector<uint8_t> p256PrivateKeyFromD(uint8_t d) {
vector<uint8_t> privateUncompressed;
privateUncompressed.resize(32);
privateUncompressed[31] = d;
optional<vector<uint8_t>> privateKey = support::ecPrivateKeyToKeyPair(privateUncompressed);
return privateKey.value();
}
std::pair<vector<uint8_t>, vector<uint8_t>> p256PrivateKeyGetXandY(
const vector<uint8_t> privateKey) {
optional<vector<uint8_t>> publicUncompressed = support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(privateKey);
vector<uint8_t> x = vector<uint8_t>(publicUncompressed.value().begin() + 1,
publicUncompressed.value().begin() + 33);
vector<uint8_t> y = vector<uint8_t>(publicUncompressed.value().begin() + 33,
publicUncompressed.value().begin() + 65);
return std::make_pair(x, y);
}
const cppbor::Item* findValueForTstr(const cppbor::Map* map, const string& keyValue) {
// TODO: Need cast until libcppbor's Map::get() is marked as const
const auto& item = map->get(keyValue);
if (!item) {
identity: Fix attestation and documentation problems. - The docs said that IdentityCredential.createEphemeralKey() returned data encoded PKCS#8 which is wrong. It's supposed to be in DER format which is also what the VTS tests and credstore expects. - Clarify that createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(), and createAuthChallenge() are all optional. - Avoid passing an invalid profile ID in the IdentityCredentialTests. verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass test. - Update requirements for which tags must be present in the attestation for CredentialKey as well as the requirements on expiration date and the issuer name. Update default implementation to satisfy these requirements. Update VTS tests to carefully verify these requrements are met. - Clarify requirements for X.509 cert for AuthenticationKey. Add VTS test to verify. - Mandate that TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY must not be set for test credentials. Add VTS test to verify this. - Make default implementation pretend to be implemented in a trusted environment and streamline VTS tests to not special-case for the default implementation. - Switch to using the attestation extension parser from the KM 4.1 support library instead of the one from system/keymaster. The latter one did not support the latest attestation extension and thus would fail for pretty much anything that wasn't the default HAL impl. - Fix a couple of bugs in keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(): - Report root_of_trust.security_level - Add support for Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY - Fix how EMacKey is calculated. - Add test vectors to verify how EMacKey and DeviceMac is calculated. Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Bug: 171745570 Change-Id: I2f8bd772de078556733f769cec2021918d1d7de6
2020-10-26 20:26:36 -04:00
return nullptr;
}
return item.get();
}
const cppbor::Array* findArrayValueForTstr(const cppbor::Map* map, const string& keyValue) {
const cppbor::Item* item = findValueForTstr(map, keyValue);
if (item == nullptr) {
return nullptr;
}
return item->asArray();
}
const cppbor::Map* findMapValueForTstr(const cppbor::Map* map, const string& keyValue) {
const cppbor::Item* item = findValueForTstr(map, keyValue);
if (item == nullptr) {
return nullptr;
}
return item->asMap();
}
const cppbor::SemanticTag* findSemanticValueForTstr(const cppbor::Map* map,
const string& keyValue) {
identity: Fix attestation and documentation problems. - The docs said that IdentityCredential.createEphemeralKey() returned data encoded PKCS#8 which is wrong. It's supposed to be in DER format which is also what the VTS tests and credstore expects. - Clarify that createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(), and createAuthChallenge() are all optional. - Avoid passing an invalid profile ID in the IdentityCredentialTests. verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass test. - Update requirements for which tags must be present in the attestation for CredentialKey as well as the requirements on expiration date and the issuer name. Update default implementation to satisfy these requirements. Update VTS tests to carefully verify these requrements are met. - Clarify requirements for X.509 cert for AuthenticationKey. Add VTS test to verify. - Mandate that TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY must not be set for test credentials. Add VTS test to verify this. - Make default implementation pretend to be implemented in a trusted environment and streamline VTS tests to not special-case for the default implementation. - Switch to using the attestation extension parser from the KM 4.1 support library instead of the one from system/keymaster. The latter one did not support the latest attestation extension and thus would fail for pretty much anything that wasn't the default HAL impl. - Fix a couple of bugs in keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(): - Report root_of_trust.security_level - Add support for Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY - Fix how EMacKey is calculated. - Add test vectors to verify how EMacKey and DeviceMac is calculated. Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Bug: 171745570 Change-Id: I2f8bd772de078556733f769cec2021918d1d7de6
2020-10-26 20:26:36 -04:00
const cppbor::Item* item = findValueForTstr(map, keyValue);
if (item == nullptr) {
return nullptr;
}
return item->asSemanticTag();
identity: Fix attestation and documentation problems. - The docs said that IdentityCredential.createEphemeralKey() returned data encoded PKCS#8 which is wrong. It's supposed to be in DER format which is also what the VTS tests and credstore expects. - Clarify that createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(), and createAuthChallenge() are all optional. - Avoid passing an invalid profile ID in the IdentityCredentialTests. verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass test. - Update requirements for which tags must be present in the attestation for CredentialKey as well as the requirements on expiration date and the issuer name. Update default implementation to satisfy these requirements. Update VTS tests to carefully verify these requrements are met. - Clarify requirements for X.509 cert for AuthenticationKey. Add VTS test to verify. - Mandate that TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY must not be set for test credentials. Add VTS test to verify this. - Make default implementation pretend to be implemented in a trusted environment and streamline VTS tests to not special-case for the default implementation. - Switch to using the attestation extension parser from the KM 4.1 support library instead of the one from system/keymaster. The latter one did not support the latest attestation extension and thus would fail for pretty much anything that wasn't the default HAL impl. - Fix a couple of bugs in keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(): - Report root_of_trust.security_level - Add support for Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY - Fix how EMacKey is calculated. - Add test vectors to verify how EMacKey and DeviceMac is calculated. Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Bug: 171745570 Change-Id: I2f8bd772de078556733f769cec2021918d1d7de6
2020-10-26 20:26:36 -04:00
}
const std::string findStringValueForTstr(const cppbor::Map* map, const string& keyValue) {
const cppbor::Item* item = findValueForTstr(map, keyValue);
if (item == nullptr) {
return nullptr;
}
const cppbor::Tstr* tstr = item->asTstr();
if (tstr == nullptr) {
return "";
}
return tstr->value();
}
TEST(IdentityCredentialSupport, testVectors_18013_5) {
// This is a test against known vectors for ISO 18013-5.
//
// The objective of this test is to verify that support::calcEMacKey() and
// support::calcMac() agree with the given test vectors.
//
// We're given static device key:
//
// x: 28412803729898893058558238221310261427084375743576167377786533380249859400145
// y: 65403602826180996396520286939226973026599920614829401631985882360676038096704
// d: 11
//
vector<uint8_t> deviceKey = p256PrivateKeyFromD(11);
auto [deviceKeyX, deviceKeyY] = p256PrivateKeyGetXandY(deviceKey);
EXPECT_EQ(support::encodeHex(deviceKeyX),
"3ed113b7883b4c590638379db0c21cda16742ed0255048bf433391d374bc21d1");
EXPECT_EQ(support::encodeHex(deviceKeyY),
"9099209accc4c8a224c843afa4f4c68a090d04da5e9889dae2f8eefce82a3740");
// We're given Ephemeral reader key:
//
// x: 59535862115950685744176693329402396749019581632805653266809849538337418304154
// y: 53776829996815113213100700404832701936765102413212294632483274374518863708344
// d: 20
//
vector<uint8_t> ephemeralReaderKey = p256PrivateKeyFromD(20);
auto [ephemeralReaderKeyX, ephemeralReaderKeyY] = p256PrivateKeyGetXandY(ephemeralReaderKey);
EXPECT_EQ(support::encodeHex(ephemeralReaderKeyX),
"83a01a9378395bab9bcd6a0ad03cc56d56e6b19250465a94a234dc4c6b28da9a");
EXPECT_EQ(support::encodeHex(ephemeralReaderKeyY),
"76e49b6de2f73234ae6a5eb9d612b75c9f2202bb6923f54ff8240aaa86f640b8");
vector<uint8_t> ephemeralReaderKeyPublic =
support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(ephemeralReaderKey).value();
// We're given SessionEstablishment.
//
// SessionEstablishment = {
// "eReaderKey" : EReaderKeyBytes,
// "data" : bstr ; Encrypted mdoc request
// }
//
// Fish out EReaderKey from this.
//
// Note that the test vector below is incorrect insofar that it uses
// "eReaderKeyBytes" instead of just "eReaderKey". This will be corrected in
// the future.
//
optional<vector<uint8_t>> sessionEstablishmentEncoded = support::decodeHex(
"a26f655265616465724b65794279746573d818584ba40102200121582083a01a9378395bab9bcd6a0ad03c"
"c56d56e6b19250465a94a234dc4c6b28da9a22582076e49b6de2f73234ae6a5eb9d612b75c9f2202bb6923"
"f54ff8240aaa86f640b864646174615902d945b31040c57491acb6d46a71f6c1f67a0b837df1bda9089fd0"
"3d0b1fdac3eeb2874a4ef6f90c97d03397186ba00a91102faae7e992e15f761d5662c3c37e3c6c2cfd2ebc"
"0bf59dbb8795e377bd7dd353230a41ba2d82294b45871a39b42ca531f26b52f46e356fbaf5075c8fd5b8b0"
"8a0df4a1d2e1bdd2e5d69169c1efbb51e393e608d833d325bebfbccb2e15ec08f94b264582fa7b93f7cebc"
"aa69f4f0cac2744d4fe35b04df26b2ae69273eed33024949080c1c95a6ef046beede959e9494297dd770af"
"4ac6fdd56783aa012555c213dc05cf0f41d1c95119720fcfe1621027f80e2ddd56ea3c1fc596f7b2579333"
"5a887ec788092b4a69d23b6219e27d0249b50b3fdcb95b5227007689362e0416b3bae3dae7cb56b4394666"
"4e3a3f60dce8d0b678fcd754bebf87bd2b0278dd782d952488a46f2874e34c2dd97bb74084a62b850e9719"
"252cd1dca7dbf1858193f6cf093cb3735312bbe1138cf29d8f350e285923f8ef07065299926720b42264e8"
"fd5d4b133e72f47c4e999ea689c353f8b41e50a59838e1a0d09eca4a557f77a9c389a0591ad1639119ce86"
"edc3320130480ee5101effae6066e8c85aac9ead2ae83e49c1e508aab02f753decbb522ea2200d62fd5d26"
"094bd35100bffaa1cdc6af9f7e9cfe7b63da6b5671cd5ac2cf5da450c72addc64cde441f3b7f7fdaf930ad"
"1e13388e8a7308d8ca4607e59e082db431a232e7e12cb692baeb4b2127e110ff24cea322ffdbc2e4d9c4c6"
"bed27753137d07897c8613627a799a560cf1a2d1edb3de029442862940a5ed7785eea8b6ace93aa6af0792"
"fd82877f62d07b757d0179ecbb7347004ecc9c0690d41f75f188cb17ffd2cec2ad8c9675466bb33b737a2a"
"e7592b2dcb8132aced2e572266f3f5413a5f9d6d4339a1e4662622af2e7e157a4ea3bfd5c4247e2ec91d8c"
"5c3c17427d5edfae673d0e0f782a8d40fa805fd8bc82ae3cb21a65cdad863e02309f6b01d1753fa884b778"
"f6e019a2004d8964deeb11f1fd478fcb");
ASSERT_TRUE(sessionEstablishmentEncoded);
auto [sessionEstablishmentItem, _se, _se2] = cppbor::parse(sessionEstablishmentEncoded.value());
const cppbor::Map* sessionEstablishment = sessionEstablishmentItem->asMap();
ASSERT_NE(sessionEstablishment, nullptr);
const cppbor::SemanticTag* eReaderKeyBytes =
identity: Fix attestation and documentation problems. - The docs said that IdentityCredential.createEphemeralKey() returned data encoded PKCS#8 which is wrong. It's supposed to be in DER format which is also what the VTS tests and credstore expects. - Clarify that createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(), and createAuthChallenge() are all optional. - Avoid passing an invalid profile ID in the IdentityCredentialTests. verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass test. - Update requirements for which tags must be present in the attestation for CredentialKey as well as the requirements on expiration date and the issuer name. Update default implementation to satisfy these requirements. Update VTS tests to carefully verify these requrements are met. - Clarify requirements for X.509 cert for AuthenticationKey. Add VTS test to verify. - Mandate that TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY must not be set for test credentials. Add VTS test to verify this. - Make default implementation pretend to be implemented in a trusted environment and streamline VTS tests to not special-case for the default implementation. - Switch to using the attestation extension parser from the KM 4.1 support library instead of the one from system/keymaster. The latter one did not support the latest attestation extension and thus would fail for pretty much anything that wasn't the default HAL impl. - Fix a couple of bugs in keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(): - Report root_of_trust.security_level - Add support for Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY - Fix how EMacKey is calculated. - Add test vectors to verify how EMacKey and DeviceMac is calculated. Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Bug: 171745570 Change-Id: I2f8bd772de078556733f769cec2021918d1d7de6
2020-10-26 20:26:36 -04:00
findSemanticValueForTstr(sessionEstablishment, "eReaderKeyBytes");
ASSERT_NE(eReaderKeyBytes, nullptr);
ASSERT_EQ(eReaderKeyBytes->semanticTag(), 24);
const cppbor::Bstr* eReaderKeyBstr = eReaderKeyBytes->asBstr();
identity: Fix attestation and documentation problems. - The docs said that IdentityCredential.createEphemeralKey() returned data encoded PKCS#8 which is wrong. It's supposed to be in DER format which is also what the VTS tests and credstore expects. - Clarify that createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(), and createAuthChallenge() are all optional. - Avoid passing an invalid profile ID in the IdentityCredentialTests. verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass test. - Update requirements for which tags must be present in the attestation for CredentialKey as well as the requirements on expiration date and the issuer name. Update default implementation to satisfy these requirements. Update VTS tests to carefully verify these requrements are met. - Clarify requirements for X.509 cert for AuthenticationKey. Add VTS test to verify. - Mandate that TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY must not be set for test credentials. Add VTS test to verify this. - Make default implementation pretend to be implemented in a trusted environment and streamline VTS tests to not special-case for the default implementation. - Switch to using the attestation extension parser from the KM 4.1 support library instead of the one from system/keymaster. The latter one did not support the latest attestation extension and thus would fail for pretty much anything that wasn't the default HAL impl. - Fix a couple of bugs in keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(): - Report root_of_trust.security_level - Add support for Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY - Fix how EMacKey is calculated. - Add test vectors to verify how EMacKey and DeviceMac is calculated. Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Bug: 171745570 Change-Id: I2f8bd772de078556733f769cec2021918d1d7de6
2020-10-26 20:26:36 -04:00
ASSERT_NE(eReaderKeyBstr, nullptr);
vector<uint8_t> eReaderKeyEncoded = eReaderKeyBstr->value();
// TODO: verify this agrees with ephemeralReaderKeyX and ephemeralReaderKeyY
// We're given DeviceEngagement.
//
vector<uint8_t> deviceEngagementEncoded =
support::decodeHex(
"a20063312e30018201d818584ba401022001215820cef66d6b2a3a993e591214d1ea223fb545ca"
"6c471c48306e4c36069404c5723f225820878662a229aaae906e123cdd9d3b4c10590ded29fe75"
"1eeeca34bbaa44af0773")
.value();
// Now calculate SessionTranscriptBytes. It is defined as
//
// SessionTranscript = [
// DeviceEngagementBytes,
// EReaderKeyBytes,
// Handover
// ]
//
// SessionTranscriptBytes = #6.24(bstr .cbor SessionTranscript)
//
cppbor::Array sessionTranscript;
sessionTranscript.add(cppbor::SemanticTag(24, deviceEngagementEncoded));
sessionTranscript.add(cppbor::SemanticTag(24, eReaderKeyEncoded));
identity: Fix attestation and documentation problems. - The docs said that IdentityCredential.createEphemeralKey() returned data encoded PKCS#8 which is wrong. It's supposed to be in DER format which is also what the VTS tests and credstore expects. - Clarify that createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(), and createAuthChallenge() are all optional. - Avoid passing an invalid profile ID in the IdentityCredentialTests. verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass test. - Update requirements for which tags must be present in the attestation for CredentialKey as well as the requirements on expiration date and the issuer name. Update default implementation to satisfy these requirements. Update VTS tests to carefully verify these requrements are met. - Clarify requirements for X.509 cert for AuthenticationKey. Add VTS test to verify. - Mandate that TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY must not be set for test credentials. Add VTS test to verify this. - Make default implementation pretend to be implemented in a trusted environment and streamline VTS tests to not special-case for the default implementation. - Switch to using the attestation extension parser from the KM 4.1 support library instead of the one from system/keymaster. The latter one did not support the latest attestation extension and thus would fail for pretty much anything that wasn't the default HAL impl. - Fix a couple of bugs in keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(): - Report root_of_trust.security_level - Add support for Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY - Fix how EMacKey is calculated. - Add test vectors to verify how EMacKey and DeviceMac is calculated. Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Bug: 171745570 Change-Id: I2f8bd772de078556733f769cec2021918d1d7de6
2020-10-26 20:26:36 -04:00
sessionTranscript.add(cppbor::Null());
vector<uint8_t> sessionTranscriptEncoded = sessionTranscript.encode();
vector<uint8_t> sessionTranscriptBytes =
cppbor::SemanticTag(24, sessionTranscriptEncoded).encode();
identity: Fix attestation and documentation problems. - The docs said that IdentityCredential.createEphemeralKey() returned data encoded PKCS#8 which is wrong. It's supposed to be in DER format which is also what the VTS tests and credstore expects. - Clarify that createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(), and createAuthChallenge() are all optional. - Avoid passing an invalid profile ID in the IdentityCredentialTests. verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass test. - Update requirements for which tags must be present in the attestation for CredentialKey as well as the requirements on expiration date and the issuer name. Update default implementation to satisfy these requirements. Update VTS tests to carefully verify these requrements are met. - Clarify requirements for X.509 cert for AuthenticationKey. Add VTS test to verify. - Mandate that TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY must not be set for test credentials. Add VTS test to verify this. - Make default implementation pretend to be implemented in a trusted environment and streamline VTS tests to not special-case for the default implementation. - Switch to using the attestation extension parser from the KM 4.1 support library instead of the one from system/keymaster. The latter one did not support the latest attestation extension and thus would fail for pretty much anything that wasn't the default HAL impl. - Fix a couple of bugs in keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(): - Report root_of_trust.security_level - Add support for Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY - Fix how EMacKey is calculated. - Add test vectors to verify how EMacKey and DeviceMac is calculated. Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Bug: 171745570 Change-Id: I2f8bd772de078556733f769cec2021918d1d7de6
2020-10-26 20:26:36 -04:00
// The expected EMacKey is 4c1ebb8aacc633465390fa44edfdb49cb57f2e079aaa771d812584699c0b97e2
//
// Verify that support::calcEMacKey() gets the same result.
//
optional<vector<uint8_t>> eMacKey =
support::calcEMacKey(support::ecKeyPairGetPrivateKey(deviceKey).value(), // private key
ephemeralReaderKeyPublic, // public key
sessionTranscriptBytes); // sessionTranscriptBytes
ASSERT_TRUE(eMacKey);
ASSERT_EQ(support::encodeHex(eMacKey.value()),
"4c1ebb8aacc633465390fa44edfdb49cb57f2e079aaa771d812584699c0b97e2");
// Also do it the other way around
//
optional<vector<uint8_t>> eMacKey2 = support::calcEMacKey(
support::ecKeyPairGetPrivateKey(ephemeralReaderKey).value(), // private key
support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(deviceKey).value(), // public key
sessionTranscriptBytes); // sessionTranscriptBytes
ASSERT_TRUE(eMacKey2);
ASSERT_EQ(support::encodeHex(eMacKey2.value()),
"4c1ebb8aacc633465390fa44edfdb49cb57f2e079aaa771d812584699c0b97e2");
// We're given DeviceResponse
//
vector<uint8_t> deviceResponseEncoded =
support::decodeHex(
"a36776657273696f6e63312e3069646f63756d656e747381a367646f6354797065756f72672e69"
"736f2e31383031332e352e312e6d444c6c6973737565725369676e6564a26a6e616d6553706163"
"6573a2716f72672e69736f2e31383031332e352e3181d8185863a4686469676573744944016672"
"616e646f6d58208798645b20ea200e19ffabac92624bee6aec63aceedecfb1b80077d22bfc20e9"
"71656c656d656e744964656e7469666965726b66616d696c795f6e616d656c656c656d656e7456"
"616c756563446f656b636f6d2e6578616d706c6581d8185864a468646967657374494401667261"
"6e646f6d5820218ecf13521b53f4b96abaebe56417afec0e4c91fc8fb26086cd1e5cdc1a94ff71"
"656c656d656e744964656e7469666965726f616e6f746865725f656c656d656e746c656c656d65"
"6e7456616c75650a6a697373756572417574688443a10126a118215901d2308201ce30820174a0"
"0302010202141f7d44f4f107c5ee3f566049cf5d72de294b0d23300a06082a8648ce3d04030230"
"233114301206035504030c0b75746f7069612069616361310b3009060355040613025553301e17"
"0d3230313030313030303030305a170d3231313030313030303030305a30213112301006035504"
"030c0975746f706961206473310b30090603550406130255533059301306072a8648ce3d020106"
"082a8648ce3d03010703420004301d9e502dc7e05da85da026a7ae9aa0fac9db7d52a95b3e3e3f"
"9aa0a1b45b8b6551b6f6b3061223e0d23c026b017d72298d9ae46887ca61d58db6aea17ee267a3"
"8187308184301e0603551d120417301581136578616d706c65406578616d706c652e636f6d301c"
"0603551d1f041530133011a00fa00d820b6578616d706c652e636f6d301d0603551d0e04160414"
"7bef4db59a1ffb07592bfc57f4743b8a73aea792300e0603551d0f0101ff040403020780301506"
"03551d250101ff040b3009060728818c5d050102300a06082a8648ce3d04030203480030450220"
"21d52fb1fbda80e5bfda1e8dfb1bc7bf0acb7261d5c9ff54425af76eb21571c602210082bf301f"
"89e0a2cb9ca9c9050352de80b47956764f7a3e07bf6a8cd87528a3b55901d2d8185901cda66776"
"657273696f6e63312e306f646967657374416c676f726974686d675348412d3235366c76616c75"
"6544696765737473a2716f72672e69736f2e31383031332e352e31a20058203b22af1126771f02"
"f0ea0d546d4ee3c5b51637381154f5211b79daf5f9facaa8015820f2cba0ce3cde5df901a3da75"
"13a4d7f7225fdfe5a306544529bf3dbcce655ca06b636f6d2e6578616d706c65a200582072636d"
"ddc282424a63499f4b3927aaa3b74da7b9c0134178bf735e949e4a761e01582006322d3cbe6603"
"876bdacc5b6679b51b0fc53d029c244fd5ea719d9028459c916d6465766963654b6579496e666f"
"a1696465766963654b6579a4010220012158203ed113b7883b4c590638379db0c21cda16742ed0"
"255048bf433391d374bc21d12258209099209accc4c8a224c843afa4f4c68a090d04da5e9889da"
"e2f8eefce82a374067646f6354797065756f72672e69736f2e31383031332e352e312e6d444c6c"
"76616c6964697479496e666fa3667369676e6564c074323032302d31302d30315431333a33303a"
"30325a6976616c696446726f6dc074323032302d31302d30315431333a33303a30325a6a76616c"
"6964556e74696cc074323032312d31302d30315431333a33303a30325a5840273ec1b59817d571"
"b5a2c5c0ab0ea213d42acb18547fd7097afcc888a22ecbb863c6461ce0e240880895b4aaa84308"
"784571c7be7aa3a2e7e3a2ea1a145ed1966c6465766963655369676e6564a26a6e616d65537061"
"636573d81841a06a64657669636541757468a1696465766963654d61638443a10105a0f6582009"
"da7c964ac004ec36ec64edd0c1abf50c03433c215c3ddb144768abcdf20a60667374617475730"
"0")
.value();
auto [deviceResponseItem, _, _2] = cppbor::parse(deviceResponseEncoded);
const cppbor::Map* deviceResponse = deviceResponseItem->asMap();
ASSERT_NE(deviceResponse, nullptr);
const cppbor::Array* documents = findArrayValueForTstr(deviceResponse, "documents");
ASSERT_NE(documents, nullptr);
ASSERT_EQ(documents->size(), 1);
const cppbor::Map* document = ((*documents)[0])->asMap();
ASSERT_NE(document, nullptr);
// Get docType
string docType = findStringValueForTstr(document, "docType");
ASSERT_EQ(docType, "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL");
// Drill down...
const cppbor::Map* deviceSigned = findMapValueForTstr(document, "deviceSigned");
ASSERT_NE(deviceSigned, nullptr);
// Dig out the encoded form of DeviceNameSpaces
//
const cppbor::SemanticTag* deviceNameSpacesBytes =
identity: Fix attestation and documentation problems. - The docs said that IdentityCredential.createEphemeralKey() returned data encoded PKCS#8 which is wrong. It's supposed to be in DER format which is also what the VTS tests and credstore expects. - Clarify that createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(), and createAuthChallenge() are all optional. - Avoid passing an invalid profile ID in the IdentityCredentialTests. verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass test. - Update requirements for which tags must be present in the attestation for CredentialKey as well as the requirements on expiration date and the issuer name. Update default implementation to satisfy these requirements. Update VTS tests to carefully verify these requrements are met. - Clarify requirements for X.509 cert for AuthenticationKey. Add VTS test to verify. - Mandate that TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY must not be set for test credentials. Add VTS test to verify this. - Make default implementation pretend to be implemented in a trusted environment and streamline VTS tests to not special-case for the default implementation. - Switch to using the attestation extension parser from the KM 4.1 support library instead of the one from system/keymaster. The latter one did not support the latest attestation extension and thus would fail for pretty much anything that wasn't the default HAL impl. - Fix a couple of bugs in keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(): - Report root_of_trust.security_level - Add support for Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY - Fix how EMacKey is calculated. - Add test vectors to verify how EMacKey and DeviceMac is calculated. Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Bug: 171745570 Change-Id: I2f8bd772de078556733f769cec2021918d1d7de6
2020-10-26 20:26:36 -04:00
findSemanticValueForTstr(deviceSigned, "nameSpaces");
ASSERT_NE(deviceNameSpacesBytes, nullptr);
ASSERT_EQ(deviceNameSpacesBytes->semanticTag(), 24);
const cppbor::Bstr* deviceNameSpacesBstr = deviceNameSpacesBytes->asBstr();
identity: Fix attestation and documentation problems. - The docs said that IdentityCredential.createEphemeralKey() returned data encoded PKCS#8 which is wrong. It's supposed to be in DER format which is also what the VTS tests and credstore expects. - Clarify that createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(), and createAuthChallenge() are all optional. - Avoid passing an invalid profile ID in the IdentityCredentialTests. verifyOneProfileAndEntryPass test. - Update requirements for which tags must be present in the attestation for CredentialKey as well as the requirements on expiration date and the issuer name. Update default implementation to satisfy these requirements. Update VTS tests to carefully verify these requrements are met. - Clarify requirements for X.509 cert for AuthenticationKey. Add VTS test to verify. - Mandate that TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY must not be set for test credentials. Add VTS test to verify this. - Make default implementation pretend to be implemented in a trusted environment and streamline VTS tests to not special-case for the default implementation. - Switch to using the attestation extension parser from the KM 4.1 support library instead of the one from system/keymaster. The latter one did not support the latest attestation extension and thus would fail for pretty much anything that wasn't the default HAL impl. - Fix a couple of bugs in keymaster::V4_1::parse_attestation_record(): - Report root_of_trust.security_level - Add support for Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY - Fix how EMacKey is calculated. - Add test vectors to verify how EMacKey and DeviceMac is calculated. Test: atest VtsHalIdentityTargetTest Test: atest android.security.identity.cts Bug: 171745570 Change-Id: I2f8bd772de078556733f769cec2021918d1d7de6
2020-10-26 20:26:36 -04:00
ASSERT_NE(deviceNameSpacesBstr, nullptr);
vector<uint8_t> deviceNameSpacesEncoded = deviceNameSpacesBstr->value();
// (For this version of 18013-5, DeviceNameSpaces is always supposed to be empty, check that.)
EXPECT_EQ(deviceNameSpacesEncoded, cppbor::Map().encode());
const cppbor::Map* deviceAuth = findMapValueForTstr(deviceSigned, "deviceAuth");
ASSERT_NE(deviceAuth, nullptr);
// deviceMac is is the COSE_Mac0.. dig out the encoded form to check that
// support::calcMac() gives exactly the same bytes.
//
const cppbor::Array* deviceMac = findArrayValueForTstr(deviceAuth, "deviceMac");
ASSERT_NE(deviceMac, nullptr);
vector<uint8_t> deviceMacEncoded = deviceMac->encode();
// Now we calculate what it should be..
optional<vector<uint8_t>> calculatedMac =
support::calcMac(sessionTranscriptEncoded, // SessionTranscript
docType, // DocType
deviceNameSpacesEncoded, // DeviceNamespaces
eMacKey.value()); // EMacKey
ASSERT_TRUE(calculatedMac);
// ... and hopefully it's the same!
ASSERT_EQ(calculatedMac.value().size(), deviceMacEncoded.size());
EXPECT_TRUE(memcmp(calculatedMac.value().data(), deviceMacEncoded.data(),
deviceMacEncoded.size()) == 0);
}
} // namespace identity
} // namespace hardware
} // namespace android
int main(int argc, char** argv) {
::testing::InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv);
return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
}