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https://github.com/Evolution-X/hardware_interfaces
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Merge "Update cellular security transparency HAL language" into main am: 82b2a3a1a5
Original change: https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/hardware/interfaces/+/3308110 Change-Id: I7e26de3fd99a3277a2eb3369d69f13a1cfffd2ea Signed-off-by: Automerger Merge Worker <android-build-automerger-merge-worker@system.gserviceaccount.com>
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Yomna ~
Automerger Merge Worker
@@ -221,6 +221,12 @@ oneway interface IRadioNetworkIndication {
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* - If a device uses a 2G network to send a AUTHENTICATION_AND_CIPHERING_RESPONSE message on
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* the NAS and the message includes an IMEISV.
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*
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* cellularIdentifierDisclosure indications must be sent to Android regardless of the screen
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* state. If the screen is off, the indications must still be sent to Android.
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*
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* Note: in the NRSA scenario, only a SUCI generated by a null scheme should be considered as a
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* plain-text identifier.
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*
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* @param type Type of radio indication
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* @param disclosure A CellularIdentifierDisclosure as specified by
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* IRadioNetwork.setCellularIdentifierTransparencyEnabled.
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@@ -232,23 +238,78 @@ oneway interface IRadioNetworkIndication {
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/*
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* Indicates that a new ciphering or integrity algorithm was used for a particular voice,
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* signaling, or data connection for a given PLMN and/or access network. Due to power
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* concerns, once a connection type has been reported on, follow-up reports about that
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* connection type are only generated if there is any change to the most-recently reported
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* encryption or integrity, or if the value of SecurityAlgorithmUpdate#isUnprotectedEmergency
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* changes. A change only in cell ID should not trigger an update, as the design is intended
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* to be agnostic to dual connectivity ("secondary serving cells").
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* concerns, once a ConnectionEvent has been reported on, follow-up reports about that
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* ConnectionEvent are only generated if there is any change to the most-recently reported
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* encryption or integrity, if there is a RAT change, or if the value of
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* SecurityAlgorithmUpdate#isUnprotectedEmergency changes. A change only in cell ID should not
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* trigger an update, as the design is intended to be agnostic to dual connectivity ("secondary
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* serving cells").
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*
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* Sample scenario to further clarify "most-recently reported":
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* Example to further clarify "most-recently reported":
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* 1. After booting up, the UE is in ENDC with LTE. Modem reports NAS_SIGNALLING_LTE and
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* AS_SIGNALLING_LTE are well-ciphered but AS_SIGNALLING_5G is null-ciphered.
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* 2. UE moves to 3G and enters the connected mode. Modem reports indications of PS_SERVICE_3G
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* and SIGNALLING_3G to Android.
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* 3. UE moves to LTE. UE enters the connected mode and there is no ENDC. The algorithms of
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* NAS_SIGNALLING_LTE and AS_SIGNALLING_LTE are the same as in Step 1. The UE should send
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* this indication to AP as it’s a RAT switch.
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* 4. Later, UE establishes ENDC. AS_SIGNALLING_5G is null-ciphered. The UE should send this
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* indication as well, as it is a RAT switch.
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* 5. The UE enter IDLE mode, and later connected mode in ENDC. There are no changes to security
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* algorithms, so the modem does not need to send any updates.
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*
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* 1. Modem reports user is connected to a null-ciphered 3G network.
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* 2. User then moves and connects to a well-ciphered 5G network, and modem reports this.
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* 3. User returns to original location and reconnects to the null-ciphered 3G network. Modem
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* should report this as it's different than the most-recently reported data from step (2).
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* Most recently reported state is reset when (1) RadioState is transitioned to ON from any
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* other state (e.g. radio is turned on during device boot, or modem boot), and (2) when
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* CardState is transitioned to PRESENT from any other state (e.g. when SIM is inserted), or (3)
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* if there is a change in access network (PLMN) or RAT.
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*
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* State is reset when (1) RadioState is transitioned to ON from any other state (e.g. radio
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* is turned on during device boot, or modem boot), and (2) when CardState is transitioned
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* to PRESENT from any other state (e.g. when SIM is inserted), or (3) if there is a change in
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* access network (PLMN).
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* securityAlgorithmUpdate indications must be sent to Android regardless of the screen state.
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* If the screen is off, the indications must still be sent to Android.
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*
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*
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* 5G TS 38.331 cipheringDisabled and integrityProtection
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* ======================================================
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* For most connections, generally what is reported by the network is what ends up being used.
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* There are two significant cases where this may not be the case. In 5G, per the introduction
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* of network configuration options cipheringDisabled and integrityProtection (TS 38.331), the
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* network can have declared certain security algorithms to be used while also requiring a null
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* algorithm via those parameters.
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*
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*
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* Exceptions for DRBs with null integrity (pre-5G Rel 16)
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* =======================================================
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* When reporting the SecurityAlgorithm for a ConnectionType which includes a DRB, there is an
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* exception where a DRB with null integrity is not to be considered/included in reporting
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* except for 5G Rel 16 connections and newer. Because DRBs almost always use null integrity in
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* practice, and thus if included the report would always be null, rendering the report
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* useless. For anything 5G Rel 16 or newer, accurate reporting for the DRB's integrity is
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* required.
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*
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*
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* NRDC MCG and SCGs
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* =================
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* In the NRDC case, there can be two sets of algorithms, one for the MCG (Master Cell Group)
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* and one for the SCG (Secondary Cell Group). In this case, always send a combined update that
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* reflects the weaker of the algorithms, e.g. (weakest) NEA0 < NEA1 < NEA2 < NEA3 (strongest).
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* This applies to both the ciphering and integrity algorithms.
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*
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*
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* Determining the value of isUnprotectedEmergency
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* ===============================================
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* 2G: isUnprotectedEmergency is true if the ciphering algorithm is NULL.
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* 3G: isUnprotectedEmergency is true if the ciphering and integrity algorithm are NULL.
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* 4G: isUnprotectedEmergency is true if the ciphering algorithm is NULL.
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* 5G: isUnprotectedEmergency is true if the ciphering algorithm is NULL.
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* Notes:
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* - On integrity: In 4G, PDCP can be LTE-based or NR-based. Starting from 5G Rel 17, only
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* the NR-based PDCP supports DRB integrity. As the PDCP version can change during a DRB's
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* operation, it becomes complicated when integrity is used to determine whether an
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* emergency call is protected or not, hence its exclusion to simplify implementation.
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* - 4G and 5G with multiple DRBs : emergency calls are protected under that RAT only if all
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* DRBs are protected (including IMS DRB).
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* - 4G and 5G DRB integrity: Since DRB integrity is not enabled in most networks, if both
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* ciphering and integrity are taken into account to determine the value of
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* isUnprotectedEmergency, the value will mostly be false, hence why it is excluded.
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*
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* @param type Type of radio indication
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* @param securityAlgorithmUpdate SecurityAlgorithmUpdate encapsulates details of security
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