1. AES operation attempted with unauthorized purpose.
2. AES-GCM encryption performed with different nonces, should
generate different ciphertexts.
3. AES-GCM encryption decryption round trip with delays between
begin and update and finish.
Bug: 133258003
Test: VtsHalKeymasterV4_0TargetTest
Change-Id: Ia8b4b4b317ecff51b18e64dfa3b84bf77475812d
Replace libcrypto with libcrypto_static, which can be protected through
visibility to ensure only modules that don't affect FIPS certification
can use it.
Bug: 141248879
Test: m checkbuild
Change-Id: I8685cb06d15f3425eeb96d998ffda54c82dcd387
BUG: b/139689895
TEST: Added VTS tests to keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
TEST: Ran on emulator against soft keymaster::v4_0::ng
Change-Id: I6c682cafee65cf7ea426bd03865bf868586efc62
Since these were combined into libhidlbase.
Bug: 135686713
Test: build only (libhwbinder/libhidltransport are empty)
Change-Id: I075670b64eebbbbd6a6ae0e84ad51bf1c6f5ba36
Due to changes in implementation between keymaster 3.0 and 4.0, rollback
resistance is now specified by the caller. This patch addresses that
inconsistency to make sure rollback resistance is properly tested. If
rollback resistance is supported by the hardware, then it will now be
tested.
Test: atest VtsHalKeymasterV4_0TargetTest
Change-Id: I21e8d1e66932ddfad2d42ce8a43591431f3ff284
GSI images do not have AVB verification enabled and therefore lack
several properties the keymaster HAL test depended on. Selectively
disable those parts of the test that would fail with AVB verification
disabled. Also disable date format checks under GSI. When invoked from
GSI the TEE-backed keymaster doesn't use the correct date format.
Bug: 130843899
Test: VtsHalKeymasterV4_0TargetTest
Exempt-From-Owner-Approval: change only affects VTS-on-GSI behavior
Change-Id: Idaafb7b515c41290c766a8132f35d498ca15f48a
The TEE keymaster has been seen to be almost a minute out of sync with
the host clock during attestation. Increase the leniency window to two
minutes.
Bug: 134408892
Bug: 134408367
Test: VtsHalKeymasterV4_0TargetTest
Change-Id: Ic256a939dcd7e7b108099cfcf237cacde8dde059
Object derived from RefBase must be owned by sp rather then other smart
pointer implementations.
Bug: 79474587
Change-Id: I866f67e1cb091efb3026450d50a410b5985539b6
This does two things:
- makes sure that HALs configured as lazy HALs will be retrieved
- will detect bad manifest entries earlier
Bug: 131703193
Test: boot
Change-Id: I82e10f49367b097023eb31797c877c15eedb5e00
In Keymaster 3, both INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH and INVALID_ARGUMENT were
acceptable for oversized messages. Keymaster 4 VTS requires that
INVALID_ARGUMENT be returned, but the spec has no such restriction. This
loosens VTS to allow either INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH or INVALID_ARGUMENT in
this case.
Bug: 129297054
Test: atest VtsHalKeymasterV4_0TargetTest Pixel 3, Trusty tests
The spec requires that SHA1 not be allowed for wrapped keys and that
only SHA_2_256 be used. Unfortunately, the previous VTS required SHA1
support. This patch takes the middle ground by requiring SHA_2_256 be
supported for importWrappedKey, but not disallowing it from supporting
SHA1.
This makes it possible for a spec compliant keymaster to pass VTS
while not disqualifying shipped devices.
Bug: 129291873
Test: atest VtsHalKeymasterV4_0TargetTest:ImportWrappedKeyTest, Trusty
Change-Id: I6c3a9182b51f2e7a46173d5bfc34d3c3264d954f
This test verifies that verification tokens with different time stamps do
not have the same MAC. This may not guarantee that the MAC is computed
correctly but it catches implementation that do not include the time
stamp in the mac.
It also checks that the MAC changes when both time stamp and challenge
changes.
Test: yes it is
Bug: 131859731
Bug: 132288466
Bug: 132287277
Change-Id: I85aa1d873eff46df7a66fc69bd61a031e6e6fbe0
The BOOT_PATCHLEVEL value is allowed to have 00 in the days position
according to the keymaster specification. This test's comment already
suggests that it's allowed, so update the expectation to match.
Test: VtsHalKeymasterV4_0TargetTest
Bug: 130843899
Change-Id: Ib43da43b2e0398b48fb59710bf4066f2641de2eb
The verified boot hash in the attestation record is a binary blob, while
the property read from the system is a hex-encoded value. Convert the
boot hash from the attestation record into hex before comparing.
Test: VtsHalKeymasterV4_0TargetTest
Bug: 130843899
Change-Id: I6f6e0da71501d741dd8b27d0778e1854af17ace6
