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https://github.com/Evolution-X/hardware_interfaces
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This flag is never used anywhere, so just remove it. When used, it would bypass signature checks. This is something we generally don't want to do, even in testing. So remove the flag so there's no temptation to use it. Bug: 190942528 Test: VtsHalRemotelyProvisionedComponentTargetTest Change-Id: I0433c1eedc08e9a5a5ad71347154867dba61689e Merged-In: I0433c1eedc08e9a5a5ad71347154867dba61689e
166 lines
6.9 KiB
C++
166 lines
6.9 KiB
C++
/*
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* Copyright (c) 2019, The Android Open Source Project
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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* You may obtain a copy of the License at
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*
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* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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*
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* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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* limitations under the License.
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*/
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#include <remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <cppbor.h>
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namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::remote_prov {
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bytevec kTestMacKey(32 /* count */, 0 /* byte value */);
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bytevec randomBytes(size_t numBytes) {
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bytevec retval(numBytes);
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RAND_bytes(retval.data(), numBytes);
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return retval;
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}
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ErrMsgOr<EekChain> generateEekChain(size_t length, const bytevec& eekId) {
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auto eekChain = cppbor::Array();
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bytevec prev_priv_key;
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for (size_t i = 0; i < length - 1; ++i) {
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bytevec pub_key(ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
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bytevec priv_key(ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN);
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ED25519_keypair(pub_key.data(), priv_key.data());
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// The first signing key is self-signed.
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if (prev_priv_key.empty()) prev_priv_key = priv_key;
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auto coseSign1 = constructCoseSign1(prev_priv_key,
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cppbor::Map() /* payload CoseKey */
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.add(CoseKey::KEY_TYPE, OCTET_KEY_PAIR)
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.add(CoseKey::ALGORITHM, EDDSA)
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.add(CoseKey::CURVE, ED25519)
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.add(CoseKey::PUBKEY_X, pub_key)
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.canonicalize()
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.encode(),
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{} /* AAD */);
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if (!coseSign1) return coseSign1.moveMessage();
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eekChain.add(coseSign1.moveValue());
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prev_priv_key = priv_key;
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}
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bytevec pub_key(X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN);
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bytevec priv_key(X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN);
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X25519_keypair(pub_key.data(), priv_key.data());
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auto coseSign1 = constructCoseSign1(prev_priv_key,
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cppbor::Map() /* payload CoseKey */
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.add(CoseKey::KEY_TYPE, OCTET_KEY_PAIR)
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.add(CoseKey::KEY_ID, eekId)
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.add(CoseKey::ALGORITHM, ECDH_ES_HKDF_256)
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.add(CoseKey::CURVE, cppcose::X25519)
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.add(CoseKey::PUBKEY_X, pub_key)
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.canonicalize()
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.encode(),
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{} /* AAD */);
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if (!coseSign1) return coseSign1.moveMessage();
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eekChain.add(coseSign1.moveValue());
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return EekChain{eekChain.encode(), pub_key, priv_key};
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}
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ErrMsgOr<bytevec> verifyAndParseCoseSign1Cwt(const cppbor::Array* coseSign1,
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const bytevec& signingCoseKey, const bytevec& aad) {
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if (!coseSign1 || coseSign1->size() != kCoseSign1EntryCount) {
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return "Invalid COSE_Sign1";
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}
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const cppbor::Bstr* protectedParams = coseSign1->get(kCoseSign1ProtectedParams)->asBstr();
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const cppbor::Map* unprotectedParams = coseSign1->get(kCoseSign1UnprotectedParams)->asMap();
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const cppbor::Bstr* payload = coseSign1->get(kCoseSign1Payload)->asBstr();
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const cppbor::Bstr* signature = coseSign1->get(kCoseSign1Signature)->asBstr();
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if (!protectedParams || !unprotectedParams || !payload || !signature) {
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return "Invalid COSE_Sign1";
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}
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auto [parsedProtParams, _, errMsg] = cppbor::parse(protectedParams);
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if (!parsedProtParams) {
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return errMsg + " when parsing protected params.";
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}
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if (!parsedProtParams->asMap()) {
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return "Protected params must be a map";
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}
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auto& algorithm = parsedProtParams->asMap()->get(ALGORITHM);
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if (!algorithm || !algorithm->asInt() || algorithm->asInt()->value() != EDDSA) {
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return "Unsupported signature algorithm";
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}
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// TODO(jbires): Handle CWTs as the CoseSign1 payload in a less hacky way. Since the CWT payload
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// is extremely remote provisioning specific, probably just make a separate
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// function there.
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auto [parsedPayload, __, payloadErrMsg] = cppbor::parse(payload);
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if (!parsedPayload) return payloadErrMsg + " when parsing key";
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if (!parsedPayload->asMap()) return "CWT must be a map";
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auto serializedKey = parsedPayload->asMap()->get(-4670552)->clone();
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if (!serializedKey || !serializedKey->asBstr()) return "Could not find key entry";
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bool selfSigned = signingCoseKey.empty();
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auto key =
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CoseKey::parseEd25519(selfSigned ? serializedKey->asBstr()->value() : signingCoseKey);
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if (!key) return "Bad signing key: " + key.moveMessage();
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bytevec signatureInput =
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cppbor::Array().add("Signature1").add(*protectedParams).add(aad).add(*payload).encode();
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if (!ED25519_verify(signatureInput.data(), signatureInput.size(), signature->value().data(),
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key->getBstrValue(CoseKey::PUBKEY_X)->data())) {
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return "Signature verification failed";
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}
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return serializedKey->asBstr()->value();
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}
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ErrMsgOr<std::vector<BccEntryData>> validateBcc(const cppbor::Array* bcc) {
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if (!bcc || bcc->size() == 0) return "Invalid BCC";
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std::vector<BccEntryData> result;
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bytevec prevKey;
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// TODO(jbires): Actually process the pubKey at the start of the new bcc entry
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for (size_t i = 1; i < bcc->size(); ++i) {
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const cppbor::Array* entry = bcc->get(i)->asArray();
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if (!entry || entry->size() != kCoseSign1EntryCount) {
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return "Invalid BCC entry " + std::to_string(i) + ": " + prettyPrint(entry);
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}
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auto payload = verifyAndParseCoseSign1Cwt(entry, std::move(prevKey), bytevec{} /* AAD */);
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if (!payload) {
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return "Failed to verify entry " + std::to_string(i) + ": " + payload.moveMessage();
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}
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auto& certProtParms = entry->get(kCoseSign1ProtectedParams);
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if (!certProtParms || !certProtParms->asBstr()) return "Invalid prot params";
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auto [parsedProtParms, _, errMsg] = cppbor::parse(certProtParms->asBstr()->value());
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if (!parsedProtParms || !parsedProtParms->asMap()) return "Invalid prot params";
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result.push_back(BccEntryData{*payload});
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// This entry's public key is the signing key for the next entry.
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prevKey = payload.moveValue();
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}
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return result;
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}
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} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::remote_prov
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