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hardware_interfaces/keymaster/3.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
David Benjamin 727f1ed7f3 Use BoringSSL's public API in keymaster_hidl_hal_test 
Reaching into the struct will fail to build in the future when we make
the struct opaque. Use the public APIs instead.

Test: mm, treehugger
Change-Id: I78cbf5e66f0c4a891049edd187c8705ad163f658
2023-05-15 00:16:39 -04:00

4255 lines
176 KiB
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/*
* Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#define LOG_TAG "keymaster_hidl_hal_test"
#include <cutils/log.h>
#include <iostream>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <android/hardware/keymaster/3.0/IKeymasterDevice.h>
#include <android/hardware/keymaster/3.0/types.h>
#include <cutils/properties.h>
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
#include <hidl/GtestPrinter.h>
#include <hidl/ServiceManagement.h>
#include <keymaster/keymaster_configuration.h>
#include "authorization_set.h"
#include "key_param_output.h"
#include "attestation_record.h"
#include "openssl_utils.h"
using ::android::sp;
using ::std::string;
static bool arm_deleteAllKeys = false;
static bool dump_Attestations = false;
namespace android {
namespace hardware {
template <typename T> bool operator==(const hidl_vec<T>& a, const hidl_vec<T>& b) {
if (a.size() != b.size()) {
return false;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i) {
if (a[i] != b[i]) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
namespace keymaster {
namespace V3_0 {
bool operator==(const KeyParameter& a, const KeyParameter& b) {
if (a.tag != b.tag) {
return false;
}
switch (a.tag) {
/* Boolean tags */
case Tag::INVALID:
case Tag::CALLER_NONCE:
case Tag::INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID:
case Tag::ECIES_SINGLE_HASH_MODE:
case Tag::BOOTLOADER_ONLY:
case Tag::NO_AUTH_REQUIRED:
case Tag::ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY:
case Tag::EXPORTABLE:
case Tag::ALL_APPLICATIONS:
case Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANT:
case Tag::RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION:
return true;
/* Integer tags */
case Tag::KEY_SIZE:
case Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH:
case Tag::MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS:
case Tag::MAX_USES_PER_BOOT:
case Tag::ALL_USERS:
case Tag::USER_ID:
case Tag::OS_VERSION:
case Tag::OS_PATCHLEVEL:
case Tag::MAC_LENGTH:
case Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT:
return a.f.integer == b.f.integer;
/* Long integer tags */
case Tag::RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT:
case Tag::USER_SECURE_ID:
return a.f.longInteger == b.f.longInteger;
/* Date-time tags */
case Tag::ACTIVE_DATETIME:
case Tag::ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME:
case Tag::USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME:
case Tag::CREATION_DATETIME:
return a.f.dateTime == b.f.dateTime;
/* Bytes tags */
case Tag::APPLICATION_ID:
case Tag::APPLICATION_DATA:
case Tag::ROOT_OF_TRUST:
case Tag::UNIQUE_ID:
case Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE:
case Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID:
case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND:
case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE:
case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT:
case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL:
case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI:
case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MEID:
case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER:
case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL:
case Tag::ASSOCIATED_DATA:
case Tag::NONCE:
case Tag::AUTH_TOKEN:
return a.blob == b.blob;
/* Enum tags */
case Tag::PURPOSE:
return a.f.purpose == b.f.purpose;
case Tag::ALGORITHM:
return a.f.algorithm == b.f.algorithm;
case Tag::BLOCK_MODE:
return a.f.blockMode == b.f.blockMode;
case Tag::DIGEST:
return a.f.digest == b.f.digest;
case Tag::PADDING:
return a.f.paddingMode == b.f.paddingMode;
case Tag::EC_CURVE:
return a.f.ecCurve == b.f.ecCurve;
case Tag::BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS:
return a.f.keyBlobUsageRequirements == b.f.keyBlobUsageRequirements;
case Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE:
return a.f.integer == b.f.integer;
case Tag::ORIGIN:
return a.f.origin == b.f.origin;
/* Unsupported tags */
case Tag::KDF:
return false;
}
}
bool operator==(const AuthorizationSet& a, const AuthorizationSet& b) {
return a.size() == b.size() && std::equal(a.begin(), a.end(), b.begin());
}
bool operator==(const KeyCharacteristics& a, const KeyCharacteristics& b) {
// This isn't very efficient. Oh, well.
AuthorizationSet a_sw(a.softwareEnforced);
AuthorizationSet b_sw(b.softwareEnforced);
AuthorizationSet a_tee(b.teeEnforced);
AuthorizationSet b_tee(b.teeEnforced);
a_sw.Sort();
b_sw.Sort();
a_tee.Sort();
b_tee.Sort();
return a_sw == b_sw && a_tee == b_sw;
}
::std::ostream& operator<<(::std::ostream& os, const AuthorizationSet& set) {
if (set.size() == 0)
os << "(Empty)" << ::std::endl;
else {
os << "\n";
for (size_t i = 0; i < set.size(); ++i)
os << set[i] << ::std::endl;
}
return os;
}
namespace test {
namespace {
template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag, typename ValueT>
bool contains(hidl_vec<KeyParameter>& set, TypedTag<tag_type, tag> ttag, ValueT expected_value) {
size_t count = std::count_if(set.begin(), set.end(), [&](const KeyParameter& param) {
return param.tag == tag && accessTagValue(ttag, param) == expected_value;
});
return count == 1;
}
template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag>
bool contains(hidl_vec<KeyParameter>& set, TypedTag<tag_type, tag>) {
size_t count = std::count_if(set.begin(), set.end(),
[&](const KeyParameter& param) { return param.tag == tag; });
return count > 0;
}
constexpr char hex_value[256] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, // '0'..'9'
0, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, // 'A'..'F'
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, // 'a'..'f'
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
string hex2str(string a) {
string b;
size_t num = a.size() / 2;
b.resize(num);
for (size_t i = 0; i < num; i++) {
b[i] = (hex_value[a[i * 2] & 0xFF] << 4) + (hex_value[a[i * 2 + 1] & 0xFF]);
}
return b;
}
char nibble2hex[16] = {'0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
'8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f'};
string bin2hex(const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& data) {
string retval;
retval.reserve(data.size() * 2 + 1);
for (uint8_t byte : data) {
retval.push_back(nibble2hex[0x0F & (byte >> 4)]);
retval.push_back(nibble2hex[0x0F & byte]);
}
return retval;
}
string rsa_key = hex2str(
"30820275020100300d06092a864886f70d01010105000482025f3082025b"
"02010002818100c6095409047d8634812d5a218176e45c41d60a75b13901"
"f234226cffe776521c5a77b9e389417b71c0b6a44d13afe4e4a2805d46c9"
"da2935adb1ff0c1f24ea06e62b20d776430a4d435157233c6f916783c30e"
"310fcbd89b85c2d56771169785ac12bca244abda72bfb19fc44d27c81e1d"
"92de284f4061edfd99280745ea6d2502030100010281801be0f04d9cae37"
"18691f035338308e91564b55899ffb5084d2460e6630257e05b3ceab0297"
"2dfabcd6ce5f6ee2589eb67911ed0fac16e43a444b8c861e544a05933657"
"72f8baf6b22fc9e3c5f1024b063ac080a7b2234cf8aee8f6c47bbf4fd3ac"
"e7240290bef16c0b3f7f3cdd64ce3ab5912cf6e32f39ab188358afcccd80"
"81024100e4b49ef50f765d3b24dde01aceaaf130f2c76670a91a61ae08af"
"497b4a82be6dee8fcdd5e3f7ba1cfb1f0c926b88f88c92bfab137fba2285"
"227b83c342ff7c55024100ddabb5839c4c7f6bf3d4183231f005b31aa58a"
"ffdda5c79e4cce217f6bc930dbe563d480706c24e9ebfcab28a6cdefd324"
"b77e1bf7251b709092c24ff501fd91024023d4340eda3445d8cd26c14411"
"da6fdca63c1ccd4b80a98ad52b78cc8ad8beb2842c1d280405bc2f6c1bea"
"214a1d742ab996b35b63a82a5e470fa88dbf823cdd02401b7b57449ad30d"
"1518249a5f56bb98294d4b6ac12ffc86940497a5a5837a6cf946262b4945"
"26d328c11e1126380fde04c24f916dec250892db09a6d77cdba351024077"
"62cd8f4d050da56bd591adb515d24d7ccd32cca0d05f866d583514bd7324"
"d5f33645e8ed8b4a1cb3cc4a1d67987399f2a09f5b3fb68c88d5e5d90ac3"
"3492d6");
string ec_256_key = hex2str(
"308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30"
"6b0201010420737c2ecd7b8d1940bf2930aa9b4ed3ff941eed09366bc032"
"99986481f3a4d859a14403420004bf85d7720d07c25461683bc648b4778a"
"9a14dd8a024e3bdd8c7ddd9ab2b528bbc7aa1b51f14ebbbb0bd0ce21bcc4"
"1c6eb00083cf3376d11fd44949e0b2183bfe");
string ec_521_key = hex2str(
"3081EE020100301006072A8648CE3D020106052B810400230481D63081D3"
"02010104420011458C586DB5DAA92AFAB03F4FE46AA9D9C3CE9A9B7A006A"
"8384BEC4C78E8E9D18D7D08B5BCFA0E53C75B064AD51C449BAE0258D54B9"
"4B1E885DED08ED4FB25CE9A1818903818600040149EC11C6DF0FA122C6A9"
"AFD9754A4FA9513A627CA329E349535A5629875A8ADFBE27DCB932C05198"
"6377108D054C28C6F39B6F2C9AF81802F9F326B842FF2E5F3C00AB7635CF"
"B36157FC0882D574A10D839C1A0C049DC5E0D775E2EE50671A208431BB45"
"E78E70BEFE930DB34818EE4D5C26259F5C6B8E28A652950F9F88D7B4B2C9"
"D9");
struct RSA_Delete {
void operator()(RSA* p) { RSA_free(p); }
};
X509* parse_cert_blob(const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& blob) {
const uint8_t* p = blob.data();
return d2i_X509(nullptr, &p, blob.size());
}
bool verify_chain(const hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>>& chain) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < chain.size(); ++i) {
X509_Ptr key_cert(parse_cert_blob(chain[i]));
X509_Ptr signing_cert;
if (i < chain.size() - 1) {
signing_cert.reset(parse_cert_blob(chain[i + 1]));
} else {
signing_cert.reset(parse_cert_blob(chain[i]));
}
EXPECT_TRUE(!!key_cert.get() && !!signing_cert.get());
if (!key_cert.get() || !signing_cert.get()) return false;
EVP_PKEY_Ptr signing_pubkey(X509_get_pubkey(signing_cert.get()));
EXPECT_TRUE(!!signing_pubkey.get());
if (!signing_pubkey.get()) return false;
EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_verify(key_cert.get(), signing_pubkey.get()))
<< "Verification of certificate " << i << " failed";
char* cert_issuer = //
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(key_cert.get()), nullptr, 0);
char* signer_subj =
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(signing_cert.get()), nullptr, 0);
EXPECT_STREQ(cert_issuer, signer_subj) << "Cert " << i
<< " has wrong issuer. (Possibly b/38394614)";
if (i == 0) {
char* cert_sub = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(key_cert.get()), nullptr, 0);
EXPECT_STREQ("/CN=Android Keystore Key", cert_sub)
<< "Cert " << i << " has wrong subject. (Possibly b/38394614)";
OPENSSL_free(cert_sub);
}
OPENSSL_free(cert_issuer);
OPENSSL_free(signer_subj);
if (dump_Attestations) std::cout << bin2hex(chain[i]) << std::endl;
}
return true;
}
// Extract attestation record from cert. Returned object is still part of cert; don't free it
// separately.
ASN1_OCTET_STRING* get_attestation_record(X509* certificate) {
ASN1_OBJECT_Ptr oid(OBJ_txt2obj(kAttestionRecordOid, 1 /* dotted string format */));
EXPECT_TRUE(!!oid.get());
if (!oid.get()) return nullptr;
int location = X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(certificate, oid.get(), -1 /* search from beginning */);
EXPECT_NE(-1, location);
if (location == -1) return nullptr;
X509_EXTENSION* attest_rec_ext = X509_get_ext(certificate, location);
EXPECT_TRUE(!!attest_rec_ext);
if (!attest_rec_ext) return nullptr;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attest_rec = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(attest_rec_ext);
EXPECT_TRUE(!!attest_rec);
return attest_rec;
}
bool tag_in_list(const KeyParameter& entry) {
// Attestations don't contain everything in key authorization lists, so we need to filter
// the key lists to produce the lists that we expect to match the attestations.
auto tag_list = {
Tag::USER_ID, Tag::INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID, Tag::BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS,
Tag::EC_CURVE /* Tag::EC_CURVE will be included by KM2 implementations */,
};
return std::find(tag_list.begin(), tag_list.end(), entry.tag) != tag_list.end();
}
AuthorizationSet filter_tags(const AuthorizationSet& set) {
AuthorizationSet filtered;
std::remove_copy_if(set.begin(), set.end(), std::back_inserter(filtered), tag_in_list);
return filtered;
}
std::string make_string(const uint8_t* data, size_t length) {
return std::string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(data), length);
}
template <size_t N> std::string make_string(const uint8_t (&a)[N]) {
return make_string(a, N);
}
class HidlBuf : public hidl_vec<uint8_t> {
typedef hidl_vec<uint8_t> super;
public:
HidlBuf() {}
HidlBuf(const super& other) : super(other) {}
HidlBuf(super&& other) : super(std::move(other)) {}
explicit HidlBuf(const std::string& other) : HidlBuf() { *this = other; }
HidlBuf& operator=(const super& other) {
super::operator=(other);
return *this;
}
HidlBuf& operator=(super&& other) {
super::operator=(std::move(other));
return *this;
}
HidlBuf& operator=(const string& other) {
resize(other.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < other.size(); ++i) {
(*this)[i] = static_cast<uint8_t>(other[i]);
}
return *this;
}
string to_string() const { return string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(data()), size()); }
};
constexpr uint64_t kOpHandleSentinel = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF;
} // namespace
class KeymasterHidlTest : public ::testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
public:
void TearDown() override {
if (key_blob_.size()) {
CheckedDeleteKey();
}
AbortIfNeeded();
keymaster_.clear();
}
void SetUp() override {
keymaster_ = IKeymasterDevice::getService(GetParam());
ASSERT_NE(keymaster_, nullptr);
ASSERT_TRUE(
keymaster_
->getHardwareFeatures([&](bool isSecure, bool supportsEc, bool supportsSymmetric,
bool supportsAttestation, bool supportsAllDigests,
const hidl_string& name, const hidl_string& author) {
is_secure_ = isSecure;
supports_ec_ = supportsEc;
supports_symmetric_ = supportsSymmetric;
supports_attestation_ = supportsAttestation;
supports_all_digests_ = supportsAllDigests;
name_ = name;
author_ = author;
})
.isOk());
os_version_ = ::keymaster::GetOsVersion();
os_patch_level_ = ::keymaster::GetOsPatchlevel();
}
IKeymasterDevice& keymaster() { return *keymaster_; }
uint32_t os_version() { return os_version_; }
uint32_t os_patch_level() { return os_patch_level_; }
AuthorizationSet UserAuths() { return AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_USER_ID, 7); }
ErrorCode GenerateKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc, HidlBuf* key_blob,
KeyCharacteristics* key_characteristics) {
EXPECT_NE(key_blob, nullptr);
EXPECT_NE(key_characteristics, nullptr);
EXPECT_EQ(0U, key_blob->size());
ErrorCode error;
EXPECT_TRUE(keymaster_
->generateKey(key_desc.hidl_data(),
[&](ErrorCode hidl_error, const HidlBuf& hidl_key_blob,
const KeyCharacteristics& hidl_key_characteristics) {
error = hidl_error;
*key_blob = hidl_key_blob;
*key_characteristics = hidl_key_characteristics;
})
.isOk());
// On error, blob & characteristics should be empty.
if (error != ErrorCode::OK) {
EXPECT_EQ(0U, key_blob->size());
EXPECT_EQ(0U, (key_characteristics->softwareEnforced.size() +
key_characteristics->teeEnforced.size()));
}
return error;
}
ErrorCode GenerateKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc) {
return GenerateKey(key_desc, &key_blob_, &key_characteristics_);
}
ErrorCode ImportKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc, KeyFormat format,
const string& key_material, HidlBuf* key_blob,
KeyCharacteristics* key_characteristics) {
ErrorCode error;
EXPECT_TRUE(keymaster_
->importKey(key_desc.hidl_data(), format, HidlBuf(key_material),
[&](ErrorCode hidl_error, const HidlBuf& hidl_key_blob,
const KeyCharacteristics& hidl_key_characteristics) {
error = hidl_error;
*key_blob = hidl_key_blob;
*key_characteristics = hidl_key_characteristics;
})
.isOk());
// On error, blob & characteristics should be empty.
if (error != ErrorCode::OK) {
EXPECT_EQ(0U, key_blob->size());
EXPECT_EQ(0U, (key_characteristics->softwareEnforced.size() +
key_characteristics->teeEnforced.size()));
}
return error;
}
ErrorCode ImportKey(const AuthorizationSet& key_desc, KeyFormat format,
const string& key_material) {
return ImportKey(key_desc, format, key_material, &key_blob_, &key_characteristics_);
}
ErrorCode ExportKey(KeyFormat format, const HidlBuf& key_blob, const HidlBuf& client_id,
const HidlBuf& app_data, HidlBuf* key_material) {
ErrorCode error;
EXPECT_TRUE(
keymaster_
->exportKey(format, key_blob, client_id, app_data,
[&](ErrorCode hidl_error_code, const HidlBuf& hidl_key_material) {
error = hidl_error_code;
*key_material = hidl_key_material;
})
.isOk());
// On error, blob should be empty.
if (error != ErrorCode::OK) {
EXPECT_EQ(0U, key_material->size());
}
return error;
}
ErrorCode ExportKey(KeyFormat format, HidlBuf* key_material) {
HidlBuf client_id, app_data;
return ExportKey(format, key_blob_, client_id, app_data, key_material);
}
ErrorCode DeleteKey(HidlBuf* key_blob, bool keep_key_blob = false) {
auto rc = keymaster_->deleteKey(*key_blob);
if (!keep_key_blob) *key_blob = HidlBuf();
if (!rc.isOk()) return ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
return rc;
}
ErrorCode DeleteKey(bool keep_key_blob = false) {
return DeleteKey(&key_blob_, keep_key_blob);
}
ErrorCode DeleteAllKeys() {
ErrorCode error = keymaster_->deleteAllKeys();
return error;
}
void CheckedDeleteKey(HidlBuf* key_blob, bool keep_key_blob = false) {
auto rc = DeleteKey(key_blob, keep_key_blob);
EXPECT_TRUE(rc == ErrorCode::OK || rc == ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED);
}
void CheckedDeleteKey() { CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob_); }
ErrorCode GetCharacteristics(const HidlBuf& key_blob, const HidlBuf& client_id,
const HidlBuf& app_data, KeyCharacteristics* key_characteristics) {
ErrorCode error = ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
EXPECT_TRUE(
keymaster_
->getKeyCharacteristics(
key_blob, client_id, app_data,
[&](ErrorCode hidl_error, const KeyCharacteristics& hidl_key_characteristics) {
error = hidl_error, *key_characteristics = hidl_key_characteristics;
})
.isOk());
return error;
}
ErrorCode GetCharacteristics(const HidlBuf& key_blob, KeyCharacteristics* key_characteristics) {
HidlBuf client_id, app_data;
return GetCharacteristics(key_blob, client_id, app_data, key_characteristics);
}
ErrorCode Begin(KeyPurpose purpose, const HidlBuf& key_blob, const AuthorizationSet& in_params,
AuthorizationSet* out_params, OperationHandle* op_handle) {
SCOPED_TRACE("Begin");
ErrorCode error;
OperationHandle saved_handle = *op_handle;
EXPECT_TRUE(
keymaster_
->begin(purpose, key_blob, in_params.hidl_data(),
[&](ErrorCode hidl_error, const hidl_vec<KeyParameter>& hidl_out_params,
uint64_t hidl_op_handle) {
error = hidl_error;
*out_params = hidl_out_params;
*op_handle = hidl_op_handle;
})
.isOk());
if (error != ErrorCode::OK) {
// Some implementations may modify *op_handle on error.
*op_handle = saved_handle;
}
return error;
}
ErrorCode Begin(KeyPurpose purpose, const AuthorizationSet& in_params,
AuthorizationSet* out_params) {
SCOPED_TRACE("Begin");
EXPECT_EQ(kOpHandleSentinel, op_handle_);
return Begin(purpose, key_blob_, in_params, out_params, &op_handle_);
}
ErrorCode Begin(KeyPurpose purpose, const AuthorizationSet& in_params) {
SCOPED_TRACE("Begin");
AuthorizationSet out_params;
ErrorCode error = Begin(purpose, in_params, &out_params);
EXPECT_TRUE(out_params.empty());
return error;
}
ErrorCode Update(OperationHandle op_handle, const AuthorizationSet& in_params,
const string& input, AuthorizationSet* out_params, string* output,
size_t* input_consumed) {
SCOPED_TRACE("Update");
ErrorCode error;
EXPECT_TRUE(keymaster_
->update(op_handle, in_params.hidl_data(), HidlBuf(input),
[&](ErrorCode hidl_error, uint32_t hidl_input_consumed,
const hidl_vec<KeyParameter>& hidl_out_params,
const HidlBuf& hidl_output) {
error = hidl_error;
out_params->push_back(AuthorizationSet(hidl_out_params));
output->append(hidl_output.to_string());
*input_consumed = hidl_input_consumed;
})
.isOk());
return error;
}
ErrorCode Update(const string& input, string* out, size_t* input_consumed) {
SCOPED_TRACE("Update");
AuthorizationSet out_params;
ErrorCode error = Update(op_handle_, AuthorizationSet() /* in_params */, input, &out_params,
out, input_consumed);
EXPECT_TRUE(out_params.empty());
return error;
}
ErrorCode Finish(OperationHandle op_handle, const AuthorizationSet& in_params,
const string& input, const string& signature, AuthorizationSet* out_params,
string* output) {
SCOPED_TRACE("Finish");
ErrorCode error;
EXPECT_TRUE(
keymaster_
->finish(op_handle, in_params.hidl_data(), HidlBuf(input), HidlBuf(signature),
[&](ErrorCode hidl_error, const hidl_vec<KeyParameter>& hidl_out_params,
const HidlBuf& hidl_output) {
error = hidl_error;
*out_params = hidl_out_params;
output->append(hidl_output.to_string());
})
.isOk());
op_handle_ = kOpHandleSentinel; // So dtor doesn't Abort().
return error;
}
ErrorCode Finish(const string& message, string* output) {
SCOPED_TRACE("Finish");
AuthorizationSet out_params;
string finish_output;
ErrorCode error = Finish(op_handle_, AuthorizationSet() /* in_params */, message,
"" /* signature */, &out_params, output);
if (error != ErrorCode::OK) {
return error;
}
EXPECT_EQ(0U, out_params.size());
return error;
}
ErrorCode Finish(const string& message, const string& signature, string* output) {
SCOPED_TRACE("Finish");
AuthorizationSet out_params;
ErrorCode error = Finish(op_handle_, AuthorizationSet() /* in_params */, message, signature,
&out_params, output);
op_handle_ = kOpHandleSentinel; // So dtor doesn't Abort().
if (error != ErrorCode::OK) {
return error;
}
EXPECT_EQ(0U, out_params.size());
return error;
}
ErrorCode Abort(OperationHandle op_handle) {
SCOPED_TRACE("Abort");
auto retval = keymaster_->abort(op_handle);
EXPECT_TRUE(retval.isOk());
return retval;
}
void AbortIfNeeded() {
SCOPED_TRACE("AbortIfNeeded");
if (op_handle_ != kOpHandleSentinel) {
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Abort(op_handle_));
op_handle_ = kOpHandleSentinel;
}
}
ErrorCode AttestKey(const HidlBuf& key_blob, const AuthorizationSet& attest_params,
hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>>* cert_chain) {
SCOPED_TRACE("AttestKey");
ErrorCode error;
auto rc = keymaster_->attestKey(
key_blob, attest_params.hidl_data(),
[&](ErrorCode hidl_error, const hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>>& hidl_cert_chain) {
error = hidl_error;
*cert_chain = hidl_cert_chain;
});
EXPECT_TRUE(rc.isOk()) << rc.description();
if (!rc.isOk()) return ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
return error;
}
ErrorCode AttestKey(const AuthorizationSet& attest_params,
hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>>* cert_chain) {
SCOPED_TRACE("AttestKey");
return AttestKey(key_blob_, attest_params, cert_chain);
}
string ProcessMessage(const HidlBuf& key_blob, KeyPurpose operation, const string& message,
const AuthorizationSet& in_params, AuthorizationSet* out_params) {
SCOPED_TRACE("ProcessMessage");
AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(operation, key_blob, in_params, &begin_out_params, &op_handle_));
string unused;
AuthorizationSet finish_params;
AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
string output;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Finish(op_handle_, finish_params, message, unused, &finish_out_params, &output));
op_handle_ = kOpHandleSentinel;
out_params->push_back(begin_out_params);
out_params->push_back(finish_out_params);
return output;
}
string SignMessage(const HidlBuf& key_blob, const string& message,
const AuthorizationSet& params) {
SCOPED_TRACE("SignMessage");
AuthorizationSet out_params;
string signature = ProcessMessage(key_blob, KeyPurpose::SIGN, message, params, &out_params);
EXPECT_TRUE(out_params.empty());
return signature;
}
string SignMessage(const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& params) {
SCOPED_TRACE("SignMessage");
return SignMessage(key_blob_, message, params);
}
string MacMessage(const string& message, Digest digest, size_t mac_length) {
SCOPED_TRACE("MacMessage");
return SignMessage(
key_blob_, message,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, mac_length));
}
void CheckHmacTestVector(const string& key, const string& message, Digest digest,
const string& expected_mac) {
SCOPED_TRACE("CheckHmacTestVector");
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.HmacKey(key.size() * 8)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, expected_mac.size() * 8)
.Digest(digest),
KeyFormat::RAW, key));
string signature = MacMessage(message, digest, expected_mac.size() * 8);
EXPECT_EQ(expected_mac, signature) << "Test vector didn't match for digest " << (int)digest;
CheckedDeleteKey();
}
void CheckAesCtrTestVector(const string& key, const string& nonce, const string& message,
const string& expected_ciphertext) {
SCOPED_TRACE("CheckAesCtrTestVector");
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(key.size() * 8)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::CTR)
.Authorization(TAG_CALLER_NONCE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
KeyFormat::RAW, key));
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NONCE, nonce.data(), nonce.size())
.BlockMode(BlockMode::CTR)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
AuthorizationSet out_params;
string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(key_blob_, message, params, &out_params);
EXPECT_EQ(expected_ciphertext, ciphertext);
}
void VerifyMessage(const HidlBuf& key_blob, const string& message, const string& signature,
const AuthorizationSet& params) {
SCOPED_TRACE("VerifyMessage");
AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY, key_blob, params, &begin_out_params, &op_handle_));
string unused;
AuthorizationSet finish_params;
AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
string output;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(op_handle_, finish_params, message, signature,
&finish_out_params, &output));
op_handle_ = kOpHandleSentinel;
EXPECT_TRUE(output.empty());
}
void VerifyMessage(const string& message, const string& signature,
const AuthorizationSet& params) {
SCOPED_TRACE("VerifyMessage");
VerifyMessage(key_blob_, message, signature, params);
}
string EncryptMessage(const HidlBuf& key_blob, const string& message,
const AuthorizationSet& in_params, AuthorizationSet* out_params) {
SCOPED_TRACE("EncryptMessage");
return ProcessMessage(key_blob, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, message, in_params, out_params);
}
string EncryptMessage(const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& params,
AuthorizationSet* out_params) {
SCOPED_TRACE("EncryptMessage");
return EncryptMessage(key_blob_, message, params, out_params);
}
string EncryptMessage(const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& params) {
SCOPED_TRACE("EncryptMessage");
AuthorizationSet out_params;
string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
EXPECT_TRUE(out_params.empty())
<< "Output params should be empty. Contained: " << out_params;
return ciphertext;
}
string DecryptMessage(const HidlBuf& key_blob, const string& ciphertext,
const AuthorizationSet& params) {
SCOPED_TRACE("DecryptMessage");
AuthorizationSet out_params;
string plaintext =
ProcessMessage(key_blob, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, ciphertext, params, &out_params);
EXPECT_TRUE(out_params.empty());
return plaintext;
}
string DecryptMessage(const string& ciphertext, const AuthorizationSet& params) {
SCOPED_TRACE("DecryptMessage");
return DecryptMessage(key_blob_, ciphertext, params);
}
template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag, typename ValueT>
void CheckKm0CryptoParam(TypedTag<tag_type, tag> ttag, ValueT expected) {
SCOPED_TRACE("CheckKm0CryptoParam");
if (is_secure_) {
EXPECT_TRUE(contains(key_characteristics_.teeEnforced, ttag, expected));
EXPECT_FALSE(contains(key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced, ttag));
} else {
EXPECT_TRUE(contains(key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced, ttag, expected));
EXPECT_FALSE(contains(key_characteristics_.teeEnforced, ttag));
}
}
template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag, typename ValueT>
void CheckKm1CryptoParam(TypedTag<tag_type, tag> ttag, ValueT expected) {
SCOPED_TRACE("CheckKm1CryptoParam");
if (is_secure_ && supports_symmetric_) {
EXPECT_TRUE(contains(key_characteristics_.teeEnforced, ttag, expected));
EXPECT_FALSE(contains(key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced, ttag));
} else {
EXPECT_TRUE(contains(key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced, ttag, expected));
EXPECT_FALSE(contains(key_characteristics_.teeEnforced, ttag));
}
}
template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag, typename ValueT>
void CheckKm2CryptoParam(TypedTag<tag_type, tag> ttag, ValueT expected) {
SCOPED_TRACE("CheckKm2CryptoParam");
if (supports_attestation_) {
EXPECT_TRUE(contains(key_characteristics_.teeEnforced, ttag, expected));
EXPECT_FALSE(contains(key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced, ttag));
} else if (!supports_symmetric_ /* KM version < 1 or SW */) {
EXPECT_TRUE(contains(key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced, ttag, expected));
EXPECT_FALSE(contains(key_characteristics_.teeEnforced, ttag));
}
}
void CheckOrigin(bool asymmetric = false) {
SCOPED_TRACE("CheckOrigin");
if (is_secure_ && supports_symmetric_) {
EXPECT_TRUE(
contains(key_characteristics_.teeEnforced, TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::IMPORTED));
} else if (is_secure_) {
// wrapped KM0
if (asymmetric) {
EXPECT_TRUE(
contains(key_characteristics_.teeEnforced, TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::UNKNOWN));
} else {
EXPECT_TRUE(contains(key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced, TAG_ORIGIN,
KeyOrigin::IMPORTED));
}
} else {
EXPECT_TRUE(
contains(key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced, TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::IMPORTED));
}
}
bool IsSecure() { return is_secure_; }
bool SupportsEc() { return supports_ec_; }
bool SupportsSymmetric() { return supports_symmetric_; }
bool SupportsAllDigests() { return supports_all_digests_; }
bool SupportsAttestation() { return supports_attestation_; }
bool Km2Profile() {
return SupportsAttestation() && SupportsAllDigests() && SupportsSymmetric() &&
SupportsEc() && IsSecure();
}
bool Km1Profile() {
return !SupportsAttestation() && SupportsSymmetric() && SupportsEc() && IsSecure();
}
bool Km0Profile() {
return !SupportsAttestation() && !SupportsAllDigests() && !SupportsSymmetric() &&
IsSecure();
}
bool SwOnlyProfile() {
return !SupportsAttestation() && !SupportsAllDigests() && !SupportsSymmetric() &&
!SupportsEc() && !IsSecure();
}
bool verify_attestation_record(const string& challenge, const string& app_id,
AuthorizationSet expected_sw_enforced,
AuthorizationSet expected_tee_enforced,
const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& attestation_cert) {
X509_Ptr cert(parse_cert_blob(attestation_cert));
EXPECT_TRUE(!!cert.get());
if (!cert.get()) return false;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attest_rec = get_attestation_record(cert.get());
EXPECT_TRUE(!!attest_rec);
if (!attest_rec) return false;
AuthorizationSet att_sw_enforced;
AuthorizationSet att_tee_enforced;
uint32_t att_attestation_version;
uint32_t att_keymaster_version;
SecurityLevel att_attestation_security_level;
SecurityLevel att_keymaster_security_level;
HidlBuf att_challenge;
HidlBuf att_unique_id;
HidlBuf att_app_id;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
parse_attestation_record(attest_rec->data, //
attest_rec->length, //
&att_attestation_version, //
&att_attestation_security_level, //
&att_keymaster_version, //
&att_keymaster_security_level, //
&att_challenge, //
&att_sw_enforced, //
&att_tee_enforced, //
&att_unique_id));
EXPECT_TRUE(att_attestation_version == 1 || att_attestation_version == 2);
expected_sw_enforced.push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf(app_id));
if (!IsSecure()) {
// SW is KM3
EXPECT_EQ(att_keymaster_version, 3U);
}
if (SupportsSymmetric()) {
EXPECT_GE(att_keymaster_version, 1U);
}
if (SupportsAttestation()) {
EXPECT_GE(att_keymaster_version, 2U);
}
EXPECT_EQ(IsSecure() ? SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT : SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE,
att_keymaster_security_level);
EXPECT_EQ(SupportsAttestation() ? SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT
: SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE,
att_attestation_security_level);
EXPECT_EQ(challenge.length(), att_challenge.size());
EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(challenge.data(), att_challenge.data(), challenge.length()));
att_sw_enforced.Sort();
expected_sw_enforced.Sort();
EXPECT_EQ(filter_tags(expected_sw_enforced), filter_tags(att_sw_enforced))
<< "(Possibly b/38394619)";
att_tee_enforced.Sort();
expected_tee_enforced.Sort();
EXPECT_EQ(filter_tags(expected_tee_enforced), filter_tags(att_tee_enforced))
<< "(Possibly b/38394619)";
return true;
}
HidlBuf key_blob_;
KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics_;
OperationHandle op_handle_ = kOpHandleSentinel;
private:
sp<IKeymasterDevice> keymaster_;
uint32_t os_version_;
uint32_t os_patch_level_;
bool is_secure_;
bool supports_ec_;
bool supports_symmetric_;
bool supports_attestation_;
bool supports_all_digests_;
hidl_string name_;
hidl_string author_;
};
typedef KeymasterHidlTest KeymasterVersionTest;
/*
* KeymasterVersionTest.SensibleFeatures:
*
* Queries keymaster to find the set of features it supports. Fails if the combination doesn't
* correspond to any well-defined keymaster version.
*/
TEST_P(KeymasterVersionTest, SensibleFeatures) {
EXPECT_TRUE(Km2Profile() || Km1Profile() || Km0Profile() || SwOnlyProfile())
<< "Keymaster feature set doesn't fit any reasonable profile. Reported features:"
<< "SupportsAttestation [" << SupportsAttestation() << "], "
<< "SupportsSymmetric [" << SupportsSymmetric() << "], "
<< "SupportsAllDigests [" << SupportsAllDigests() << "], "
<< "SupportsEc [" << SupportsEc() << "], "
<< "IsSecure [" << IsSecure() << "]";
}
class NewKeyGenerationTest : public KeymasterHidlTest {
protected:
void CheckBaseParams(const KeyCharacteristics& keyCharacteristics, bool asymmetric = false) {
// TODO(swillden): Distinguish which params should be in which auth list.
AuthorizationSet auths(keyCharacteristics.teeEnforced);
auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(keyCharacteristics.softwareEnforced));
if (IsSecure() && !SupportsSymmetric() && asymmetric) {
EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::UNKNOWN));
} else {
EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED));
}
EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN));
EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::VERIFY));
EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_USER_ID, 7))
<< "User ID should be 7, was " << auths.GetTagValue(TAG_USER_ID);
// Verify that App ID, App data and ROT are NOT included.
EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST));
EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_APPLICATION_ID));
EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA));
// Check that some unexpected tags/values are NOT present.
EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT));
EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT));
EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, 301));
// Now check that unspecified, defaulted tags are correct.
EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_CREATION_DATETIME));
if (SupportsAttestation()) {
EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version()))
<< "OS version is " << os_version() << " key reported "
<< auths.GetTagValue(TAG_OS_VERSION);
EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level()))
<< "OS patch level is " << os_patch_level() << " key reported "
<< auths.GetTagValue(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL);
}
}
};
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.Rsa
*
* Verifies that keymaster can generate all required RSA key sizes, and that the resulting keys have
* correct characteristics.
*/
TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, Rsa) {
for (auto key_size : {1024, 2048, 3072, 4096}) {
HidlBuf key_blob;
KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(key_size, 3)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorizations(UserAuths()),
&key_blob, &key_characteristics));
ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics, true /* asymmetric */);
AuthorizationSet crypto_params;
if (IsSecure()) {
crypto_params = key_characteristics.teeEnforced;
} else {
crypto_params = key_characteristics.softwareEnforced;
}
EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, KM_ALGORITHM_RSA));
EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size));
EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 3));
CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
}
}
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.RsaNoDefaultSize
*
* Verifies that failing to specify a key size for RSA key generation returns UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
*/
TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, RsaNoDefaultSize) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA)
.Authorization(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 3)
.SigningKey()));
}
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.Ecdsa
*
* Verifies that keymaster can generate all required EC key sizes, and that the resulting keys have
* correct characteristics.
*/
TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, Ecdsa) {
for (auto key_size : {224, 256, 384, 521}) {
HidlBuf key_blob;
KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.EcdsaSigningKey(key_size)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Authorizations(UserAuths()),
&key_blob, &key_characteristics));
ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics, true /* asymmetric */);
AuthorizationSet crypto_params;
if (IsSecure()) {
crypto_params = key_characteristics.teeEnforced;
} else {
crypto_params = key_characteristics.softwareEnforced;
}
EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC));
EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size));
CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
}
}
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaDefaultSize
*
* Verifies that failing to specify a key size for EC key generation returns UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
*/
TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaDefaultSize) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC)
.SigningKey()
.Digest(Digest::NONE)));
}
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaInvalidSize
*
* Verifies that failing to specify an invalid key size for EC key generation returns
* UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
*/
TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaInvalidSize) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcdsaSigningKey(190).Digest(Digest::NONE)));
}
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaMismatchKeySize
*
* Verifies that specifying mismatched key size and curve for EC key generation returns
* INVALID_ARGUMENT.
*/
TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaMismatchKeySize) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.EcdsaSigningKey(224)
.Authorization(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)))
<< "(Possibly b/36233343)";
}
TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAllValidSizes) {
size_t valid_sizes[] = {224, 256, 384, 521};
for (size_t size : valid_sizes) {
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcdsaSigningKey(size).Digest(Digest::NONE)))
<< "Failed to generate size: " << size;
CheckedDeleteKey();
}
}
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaAllValidCurves
*
* Verifies that keymaster supports all required EC curves.
*/
TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAllValidCurves) {
EcCurve curves[] = {EcCurve::P_224, EcCurve::P_256, EcCurve::P_384, EcCurve::P_521};
for (auto curve : curves) {
EXPECT_EQ(
ErrorCode::OK,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcdsaSigningKey(curve).Digest(Digest::SHA_2_512)))
<< "Failed to generate key on curve: " << curve;
CheckedDeleteKey();
}
}
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.Hmac
*
* Verifies that keymaster supports all required digests, and that the resulting keys have correct
* characteristics.
*/
TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, Hmac) {
for (auto digest : {Digest::MD5, Digest::SHA1, Digest::SHA_2_224, Digest::SHA_2_256,
Digest::SHA_2_384, Digest::SHA_2_512}) {
HidlBuf key_blob;
KeyCharacteristics key_characteristics;
constexpr size_t key_size = 128;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.HmacKey(key_size)
.Digest(digest)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)
.Authorizations(UserAuths()),
&key_blob, &key_characteristics));
ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
AuthorizationSet teeEnforced = key_characteristics.teeEnforced;
AuthorizationSet softwareEnforced = key_characteristics.softwareEnforced;
if (SupportsAttestation() || SupportsAllDigests()) {
// Either KM2, which must support all, or KM1 that claims full support
EXPECT_TRUE(teeEnforced.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC));
EXPECT_TRUE(teeEnforced.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size));
} else if (SupportsSymmetric()) {
if (digest == Digest::SHA1 || digest == Digest::SHA_2_256) {
// KM1 must support SHA1 and SHA256 in hardware
EXPECT_TRUE(teeEnforced.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC));
EXPECT_TRUE(teeEnforced.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size));
} else {
// Othere digests may or may not be supported
EXPECT_TRUE(teeEnforced.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC) ||
softwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC));
EXPECT_TRUE(teeEnforced.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size) ||
softwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size));
}
} else {
// KM0 and SW KM do all digests in SW.
EXPECT_TRUE(softwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC));
EXPECT_TRUE(softwareEnforced.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size));
}
CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
}
}
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.HmacCheckKeySizes
*
* Verifies that keymaster supports all key sizes, and rejects all invalid key sizes.
*/
TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, HmacCheckKeySizes) {
for (size_t key_size = 0; key_size <= 512; ++key_size) {
if (key_size < 64 || key_size % 8 != 0) {
// To keep this test from being very slow, we only test a random fraction of non-byte
// key sizes. We test only ~10% of such cases. Since there are 392 of them, we expect
// to run ~40 of them in each run.
if (key_size % 8 == 0 || random() % 10 == 0) {
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.HmacKey(key_size)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 256)))
<< "HMAC key size " << key_size << " invalid (Possibly b/33462346)";
}
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.HmacKey(key_size)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 256)));
CheckedDeleteKey();
}
}
}
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.HmacCheckMinMacLengths
*
* Verifies that keymaster supports all required MAC lengths and rejects all invalid lengths. This
* test is probabilistic in order to keep the runtime down, but any failure prints out the specific
* MAC length that failed, so reproducing a failed run will be easy.
*/
TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, HmacCheckMinMacLengths) {
for (size_t min_mac_length = 0; min_mac_length <= 256; ++min_mac_length) {
if (min_mac_length < 64 || min_mac_length % 8 != 0) {
// To keep this test from being very long, we only test a random fraction of non-byte
// lengths. We test only ~10% of such cases. Since there are 172 of them, we expect to
// run ~17 of them in each run.
if (min_mac_length % 8 == 0 || random() % 10 == 0) {
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MIN_MAC_LENGTH,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.HmacKey(128)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, min_mac_length)))
<< "HMAC min mac length " << min_mac_length << " invalid.";
}
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.HmacKey(128)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, min_mac_length)));
CheckedDeleteKey();
}
}
}
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.HmacMultipleDigests
*
* Verifies that keymaster rejects HMAC key generation with multiple specified digest algorithms.
*/
TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, HmacMultipleDigests) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.HmacKey(128)
.Digest(Digest::SHA1)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
}
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.HmacDigestNone
*
* Verifies that keymaster rejects HMAC key generation with no digest or Digest::NONE
*/
TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, HmacDigestNone) {
ASSERT_EQ(
ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder().HmacKey(128).Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.HmacKey(128)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
}
typedef KeymasterHidlTest GetKeyCharacteristicsTest;
/*
* GetKeyCharacteristicsTest.HmacDigestNone
*
* Verifies that getKeyCharacteristics functions, and that generated and retrieved key
* characteristics match.
*/
TEST_P(GetKeyCharacteristicsTest, SimpleRsa) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 3)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
KeyCharacteristics retrieved_chars;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GetCharacteristics(key_blob_, &retrieved_chars));
AuthorizationSet gen_sw = key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced;
AuthorizationSet gen_tee = key_characteristics_.teeEnforced;
AuthorizationSet retrieved_sw = retrieved_chars.softwareEnforced;
AuthorizationSet retrieved_tee = retrieved_chars.teeEnforced;
EXPECT_EQ(gen_sw, retrieved_sw);
EXPECT_EQ(gen_tee, retrieved_tee);
}
typedef KeymasterHidlTest SigningOperationsTest;
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
*
* Verifies that raw RSA signature operations succeed.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaSuccess) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 3)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)));
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
string signature = SignMessage(
message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssSha256Success
*
* Verifies that RSA-PSS signature operations succeed.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaPssSha256Success) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 3)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)));
// Use large message, which won't work without digesting.
string message(1024, 'a');
string signature = SignMessage(
message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaPaddingNoneDoesNotAllowOther
*
* Verifies that keymaster rejects signature operations that specify a padding mode when the key
* supports only unpadded operations.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaPaddingNoneDoesNotAllowOther) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 3)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
string signature;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaPkcs1Sha256Success
*
* Verifies that digested RSA-PKCS1 signature operations succeed.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaPkcs1Sha256Success) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 3)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
string message(1024, 'a');
string signature = SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaPkcs1NoDigestSuccess
*
* Verifies that undigested RSA-PKCS1 signature operations succeed.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaPkcs1NoDigestSuccess) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 3)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
string message(53, 'a');
string signature = SignMessage(
message,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaPkcs1NoDigestTooLarge
*
* Verifies that undigested RSA-PKCS1 signature operations fail with the correct error code when
* given a too-long message.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaPkcs1NoDigestTooLong) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 3)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
string message(129, 'a');
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
string signature;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, &signature));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssSha512TooSmallKey
*
* Verifies that undigested RSA-PSS signature operations fail with the correct error code when
* used with a key that is too small for the message.
*
* A PSS-padded message is of length salt_size + digest_size + 16 (sizes in bits), and the keymaster
* specification requires that salt_size == digest_size, so the message will be digest_size * 2 +
* 16. Such a message can only be signed by a given key if the key is at least that size. This test
* uses SHA512, which has a digest_size == 512, so the message size is 1040 bits, too large for a
* 1024-bit key.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaPssSha512TooSmallKey) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 3)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_512)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)));
EXPECT_EQ(
ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_512).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)))
<< "(Possibly b/33346750)";
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingTooLong
*
* Verifies that raw RSA signature operations fail with the correct error code when
* given a too-long message.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaNoPaddingTooLong) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 3)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
// One byte too long
string message(1024 / 8 + 1, 'a');
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
string result;
ErrorCode finish_error_code = Finish(message, &result);
EXPECT_TRUE(finish_error_code == ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ||
finish_error_code == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
// Very large message that should exceed the transfer buffer size of any reasonable TEE.
message = string(128 * 1024, 'a');
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
finish_error_code = Finish(message, &result);
EXPECT_TRUE(finish_error_code == ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ||
finish_error_code == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaAbort
*
* Verifies that operations can be aborted correctly. Uses an RSA signing operation for the test,
* but the behavior should be algorithm and purpose-independent.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaAbort) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 3)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Abort(op_handle_));
// Another abort should fail
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE, Abort(op_handle_));
// Set to sentinel, so TearDown() doesn't try to abort again.
op_handle_ = kOpHandleSentinel;
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaUnsupportedPadding
*
* Verifies that RSA operations fail with the correct error (but key gen succeeds) when used with a
* padding mode inappropriate for RSA.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaUnsupportedPadding) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 3)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256 /* supported digest */)
.Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
ASSERT_EQ(
ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssNoDigest
*
* Verifies that RSA PSS operations fail when no digest is used. PSS requires a digest.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaNoDigest) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 3)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)));
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)));
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssNoDigest
*
* Verifies that RSA operations fail when no padding mode is specified. PaddingMode::NONE is
* supported in some cases (as validated in other tests), but a mode must be specified.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaNoPadding) {
// Padding must be specified
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaKey(1024, 3)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.SigningKey()
.Digest(Digest::NONE)));
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE)));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaShortMessage
*
* Verifies that raw RSA signatures succeed with a message shorter than the key size.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaTooShortMessage) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 3)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
// Barely shorter
string message(1024 / 8 - 1, 'a');
SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
// Much shorter
message = "a";
SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaSignWithEncryptionKey
*
* Verifies that RSA encryption keys cannot be used to sign.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaSignWithEncryptionKey) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaEncryptionKey(1024, 3)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaSignTooLargeMessage
*
* Verifies that attempting a raw signature of a message which is the same length as the key, but
* numerically larger than the public modulus, fails with the correct error.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaSignTooLargeMessage) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 3)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
// Largest possible message will always be larger than the public modulus.
string message(1024 / 8, static_cast<char>(0xff));
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
string signature;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT, Finish(message, &signature));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.EcdsaAllSizesAndHashes
*
* Verifies that ECDSA operations succeed with all possible key sizes and hashes.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcdsaAllSizesAndHashes) {
for (auto key_size : {224, 256, 384, 521}) {
for (auto digest : {
Digest::SHA1, Digest::SHA_2_224, Digest::SHA_2_256, Digest::SHA_2_384,
Digest::SHA_2_512,
}) {
ErrorCode error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(key_size)
.Digest(digest));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error) << "Failed to generate ECDSA key with size " << key_size
<< " and digest " << digest;
if (error != ErrorCode::OK) continue;
string message(1024, 'a');
if (digest == Digest::NONE) message.resize(key_size / 8);
SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
CheckedDeleteKey();
}
}
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.EcdsaAllCurves
*
* Verifies that ECDSA operations succeed with all possible curves.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcdsaAllCurves) {
for (auto curve : {EcCurve::P_224, EcCurve::P_256, EcCurve::P_384, EcCurve::P_521}) {
ErrorCode error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error) << "Failed to generate ECDSA key with curve " << curve;
if (error != ErrorCode::OK) continue;
string message(1024, 'a');
SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256));
CheckedDeleteKey();
}
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.EcdsaNoDigestHugeData
*
* Verifies that ECDSA operations support very large messages, even without digesting. This should
* work because ECDSA actually only signs the leftmost L_n bits of the message, however large it may
* be. Not using digesting is a bad idea, but in some cases digesting is done by the framework.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcdsaNoDigestHugeData) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(224)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)));
string message(2 * 1024, 'a');
SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.AesEcbSign
*
* Verifies that attempts to use AES keys to sign fail in the correct way.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, AesEcbSign) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.SigningKey()
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)))
<< "(Possibly b/36252957)";
AuthorizationSet out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSet() /* in_params */, &out_params))
<< "(Possibly b/36233187)";
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE,
Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY, AuthorizationSet() /* in_params */, &out_params))
<< "(Possibly b/36233187)";
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.HmacAllDigests
*
* Verifies that HMAC works with all digests.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, HmacAllDigests) {
for (auto digest : {Digest::SHA1, Digest::SHA_2_224, Digest::SHA_2_256, Digest::SHA_2_384,
Digest::SHA_2_512}) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.HmacKey(128)
.Digest(digest)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 160)))
<< "Failed to create HMAC key with digest " << digest;
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
string signature = MacMessage(message, digest, 160);
EXPECT_EQ(160U / 8U, signature.size())
<< "Failed to sign with HMAC key with digest " << digest;
CheckedDeleteKey();
}
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.HmacSha256TooLargeMacLength
*
* Verifies that HMAC fails in the correct way when asked to generate a MAC larger than the digest
* size.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, HmacSha256TooLargeMacLength) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.HmacKey(128)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 256)));
AuthorizationSet output_params;
EXPECT_EQ(
ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH,
Begin(
KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 264),
&output_params, &op_handle_));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.HmacSha256TooSmallMacLength
*
* Verifies that HMAC fails in the correct way when asked to generate a MAC smaller than the
* specified minimum MAC length.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, HmacSha256TooSmallMacLength) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.HmacKey(128)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
AuthorizationSet output_params;
EXPECT_EQ(
ErrorCode::INVALID_MAC_LENGTH,
Begin(
KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 120),
&output_params, &op_handle_));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.HmacRfc4231TestCase3
*
* Validates against the test vectors from RFC 4231 test case 3.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, HmacRfc4231TestCase3) {
string key(20, 0xaa);
string message(50, 0xdd);
uint8_t sha_224_expected[] = {
0x7f, 0xb3, 0xcb, 0x35, 0x88, 0xc6, 0xc1, 0xf6, 0xff, 0xa9, 0x69, 0x4d, 0x7d, 0x6a,
0xd2, 0x64, 0x93, 0x65, 0xb0, 0xc1, 0xf6, 0x5d, 0x69, 0xd1, 0xec, 0x83, 0x33, 0xea,
};
uint8_t sha_256_expected[] = {
0x77, 0x3e, 0xa9, 0x1e, 0x36, 0x80, 0x0e, 0x46, 0x85, 0x4d, 0xb8,
0xeb, 0xd0, 0x91, 0x81, 0xa7, 0x29, 0x59, 0x09, 0x8b, 0x3e, 0xf8,
0xc1, 0x22, 0xd9, 0x63, 0x55, 0x14, 0xce, 0xd5, 0x65, 0xfe,
};
uint8_t sha_384_expected[] = {
0x88, 0x06, 0x26, 0x08, 0xd3, 0xe6, 0xad, 0x8a, 0x0a, 0xa2, 0xac, 0xe0,
0x14, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x6f, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x35, 0xd9, 0x47, 0xac, 0x9f, 0xeb,
0xe8, 0x3e, 0xf4, 0xe5, 0x59, 0x66, 0x14, 0x4b, 0x2a, 0x5a, 0xb3, 0x9d,
0xc1, 0x38, 0x14, 0xb9, 0x4e, 0x3a, 0xb6, 0xe1, 0x01, 0xa3, 0x4f, 0x27,
};
uint8_t sha_512_expected[] = {
0xfa, 0x73, 0xb0, 0x08, 0x9d, 0x56, 0xa2, 0x84, 0xef, 0xb0, 0xf0, 0x75, 0x6c,
0x89, 0x0b, 0xe9, 0xb1, 0xb5, 0xdb, 0xdd, 0x8e, 0xe8, 0x1a, 0x36, 0x55, 0xf8,
0x3e, 0x33, 0xb2, 0x27, 0x9d, 0x39, 0xbf, 0x3e, 0x84, 0x82, 0x79, 0xa7, 0x22,
0xc8, 0x06, 0xb4, 0x85, 0xa4, 0x7e, 0x67, 0xc8, 0x07, 0xb9, 0x46, 0xa3, 0x37,
0xbe, 0xe8, 0x94, 0x26, 0x74, 0x27, 0x88, 0x59, 0xe1, 0x32, 0x92, 0xfb,
};
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_224, make_string(sha_224_expected));
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_256, make_string(sha_256_expected));
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_384, make_string(sha_384_expected));
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_512, make_string(sha_512_expected));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.HmacRfc4231TestCase5
*
* Validates against the test vectors from RFC 4231 test case 5.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, HmacRfc4231TestCase5) {
string key(20, 0x0c);
string message = "Test With Truncation";
uint8_t sha_224_expected[] = {
0x0e, 0x2a, 0xea, 0x68, 0xa9, 0x0c, 0x8d, 0x37,
0xc9, 0x88, 0xbc, 0xdb, 0x9f, 0xca, 0x6f, 0xa8,
};
uint8_t sha_256_expected[] = {
0xa3, 0xb6, 0x16, 0x74, 0x73, 0x10, 0x0e, 0xe0,
0x6e, 0x0c, 0x79, 0x6c, 0x29, 0x55, 0x55, 0x2b,
};
uint8_t sha_384_expected[] = {
0x3a, 0xbf, 0x34, 0xc3, 0x50, 0x3b, 0x2a, 0x23,
0xa4, 0x6e, 0xfc, 0x61, 0x9b, 0xae, 0xf8, 0x97,
};
uint8_t sha_512_expected[] = {
0x41, 0x5f, 0xad, 0x62, 0x71, 0x58, 0x0a, 0x53,
0x1d, 0x41, 0x79, 0xbc, 0x89, 0x1d, 0x87, 0xa6,
};
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_224, make_string(sha_224_expected));
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_256, make_string(sha_256_expected));
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_384, make_string(sha_384_expected));
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_512, make_string(sha_512_expected));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.HmacRfc4231TestCase6
*
* Validates against the test vectors from RFC 4231 test case 6.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, HmacRfc4231TestCase6) {
string key(131, 0xaa);
string message = "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key - Hash Key First";
uint8_t sha_224_expected[] = {
0x95, 0xe9, 0xa0, 0xdb, 0x96, 0x20, 0x95, 0xad, 0xae, 0xbe, 0x9b, 0x2d, 0x6f, 0x0d,
0xbc, 0xe2, 0xd4, 0x99, 0xf1, 0x12, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0xb7, 0x27, 0x3f, 0xa6, 0x87, 0x0e,
};
uint8_t sha_256_expected[] = {
0x60, 0xe4, 0x31, 0x59, 0x1e, 0xe0, 0xb6, 0x7f, 0x0d, 0x8a, 0x26,
0xaa, 0xcb, 0xf5, 0xb7, 0x7f, 0x8e, 0x0b, 0xc6, 0x21, 0x37, 0x28,
0xc5, 0x14, 0x05, 0x46, 0x04, 0x0f, 0x0e, 0xe3, 0x7f, 0x54,
};
uint8_t sha_384_expected[] = {
0x4e, 0xce, 0x08, 0x44, 0x85, 0x81, 0x3e, 0x90, 0x88, 0xd2, 0xc6, 0x3a,
0x04, 0x1b, 0xc5, 0xb4, 0x4f, 0x9e, 0xf1, 0x01, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x58, 0x8f,
0x3c, 0xd1, 0x1f, 0x05, 0x03, 0x3a, 0xc4, 0xc6, 0x0c, 0x2e, 0xf6, 0xab,
0x40, 0x30, 0xfe, 0x82, 0x96, 0x24, 0x8d, 0xf1, 0x63, 0xf4, 0x49, 0x52,
};
uint8_t sha_512_expected[] = {
0x80, 0xb2, 0x42, 0x63, 0xc7, 0xc1, 0xa3, 0xeb, 0xb7, 0x14, 0x93, 0xc1, 0xdd,
0x7b, 0xe8, 0xb4, 0x9b, 0x46, 0xd1, 0xf4, 0x1b, 0x4a, 0xee, 0xc1, 0x12, 0x1b,
0x01, 0x37, 0x83, 0xf8, 0xf3, 0x52, 0x6b, 0x56, 0xd0, 0x37, 0xe0, 0x5f, 0x25,
0x98, 0xbd, 0x0f, 0xd2, 0x21, 0x5d, 0x6a, 0x1e, 0x52, 0x95, 0xe6, 0x4f, 0x73,
0xf6, 0x3f, 0x0a, 0xec, 0x8b, 0x91, 0x5a, 0x98, 0x5d, 0x78, 0x65, 0x98,
};
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_224, make_string(sha_224_expected));
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_256, make_string(sha_256_expected));
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_384, make_string(sha_384_expected));
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_512, make_string(sha_512_expected));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.HmacRfc4231TestCase7
*
* Validates against the test vectors from RFC 4231 test case 7.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, HmacRfc4231TestCase7) {
string key(131, 0xaa);
string message = "This is a test using a larger than block-size key and a larger than "
"block-size data. The key needs to be hashed before being used by the HMAC "
"algorithm.";
uint8_t sha_224_expected[] = {
0x3a, 0x85, 0x41, 0x66, 0xac, 0x5d, 0x9f, 0x02, 0x3f, 0x54, 0xd5, 0x17, 0xd0, 0xb3,
0x9d, 0xbd, 0x94, 0x67, 0x70, 0xdb, 0x9c, 0x2b, 0x95, 0xc9, 0xf6, 0xf5, 0x65, 0xd1,
};
uint8_t sha_256_expected[] = {
0x9b, 0x09, 0xff, 0xa7, 0x1b, 0x94, 0x2f, 0xcb, 0x27, 0x63, 0x5f,
0xbc, 0xd5, 0xb0, 0xe9, 0x44, 0xbf, 0xdc, 0x63, 0x64, 0x4f, 0x07,
0x13, 0x93, 0x8a, 0x7f, 0x51, 0x53, 0x5c, 0x3a, 0x35, 0xe2,
};
uint8_t sha_384_expected[] = {
0x66, 0x17, 0x17, 0x8e, 0x94, 0x1f, 0x02, 0x0d, 0x35, 0x1e, 0x2f, 0x25,
0x4e, 0x8f, 0xd3, 0x2c, 0x60, 0x24, 0x20, 0xfe, 0xb0, 0xb8, 0xfb, 0x9a,
0xdc, 0xce, 0xbb, 0x82, 0x46, 0x1e, 0x99, 0xc5, 0xa6, 0x78, 0xcc, 0x31,
0xe7, 0x99, 0x17, 0x6d, 0x38, 0x60, 0xe6, 0x11, 0x0c, 0x46, 0x52, 0x3e,
};
uint8_t sha_512_expected[] = {
0xe3, 0x7b, 0x6a, 0x77, 0x5d, 0xc8, 0x7d, 0xba, 0xa4, 0xdf, 0xa9, 0xf9, 0x6e,
0x5e, 0x3f, 0xfd, 0xde, 0xbd, 0x71, 0xf8, 0x86, 0x72, 0x89, 0x86, 0x5d, 0xf5,
0xa3, 0x2d, 0x20, 0xcd, 0xc9, 0x44, 0xb6, 0x02, 0x2c, 0xac, 0x3c, 0x49, 0x82,
0xb1, 0x0d, 0x5e, 0xeb, 0x55, 0xc3, 0xe4, 0xde, 0x15, 0x13, 0x46, 0x76, 0xfb,
0x6d, 0xe0, 0x44, 0x60, 0x65, 0xc9, 0x74, 0x40, 0xfa, 0x8c, 0x6a, 0x58,
};
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_224, make_string(sha_224_expected));
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_256, make_string(sha_256_expected));
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_384, make_string(sha_384_expected));
CheckHmacTestVector(key, message, Digest::SHA_2_512, make_string(sha_512_expected));
}
typedef KeymasterHidlTest VerificationOperationsTest;
/*
* VerificationOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
*
* Verifies that a simple RSA signature/verification sequence succeeds.
*/
TEST_P(VerificationOperationsTest, RsaSuccess) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 3)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
string signature = SignMessage(
message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
VerifyMessage(message, signature,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
}
/*
* VerificationOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
*
* Verifies RSA signature/verification for all padding modes and digests.
*/
TEST_P(VerificationOperationsTest, RsaAllPaddingsAndDigests) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 3)
.Digest(Digest::NONE, Digest::MD5, Digest::SHA1, Digest::SHA_2_224,
Digest::SHA_2_256, Digest::SHA_2_384, Digest::SHA_2_512)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
string message(128, 'a');
string corrupt_message(message);
++corrupt_message[corrupt_message.size() / 2];
for (auto padding :
{PaddingMode::NONE, PaddingMode::RSA_PSS, PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN}) {
for (auto digest : {Digest::NONE, Digest::MD5, Digest::SHA1, Digest::SHA_2_224,
Digest::SHA_2_256, Digest::SHA_2_384, Digest::SHA_2_512}) {
if (padding == PaddingMode::NONE && digest != Digest::NONE) {
// Digesting only makes sense with padding.
continue;
}
if (padding == PaddingMode::RSA_PSS && digest == Digest::NONE) {
// PSS requires digesting.
continue;
}
string signature =
SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding));
VerifyMessage(message, signature,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding));
if (digest != Digest::NONE) {
// Verify with OpenSSL.
HidlBuf pubkey;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ExportKey(KeyFormat::X509, &pubkey));
const uint8_t* p = pubkey.data();
EVP_PKEY_Ptr pkey(d2i_PUBKEY(nullptr /* alloc new */, &p, pubkey.size()));
ASSERT_TRUE(pkey.get());
EVP_MD_CTX digest_ctx;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&digest_ctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX* pkey_ctx;
const EVP_MD* md = openssl_digest(digest);
ASSERT_NE(md, nullptr);
EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&digest_ctx, &pkey_ctx, md, nullptr /* engine */,
pkey.get()));
switch (padding) {
case PaddingMode::RSA_PSS:
EXPECT_GT(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkey_ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING), 0);
EXPECT_GT(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkey_ctx, EVP_MD_size(md)), 0);
break;
case PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN:
// PKCS1 is the default; don't need to set anything.
break;
default:
FAIL();
break;
}
EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&digest_ctx, message.data(), message.size()));
EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(
&digest_ctx, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(signature.data()),
signature.size()));
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&digest_ctx);
}
// Corrupt signature shouldn't verify.
string corrupt_signature(signature);
++corrupt_signature[corrupt_signature.size() / 2];
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding)));
string result;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(message, corrupt_signature, &result));
// Corrupt message shouldn't verify
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding)));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(corrupt_message, signature, &result));
}
}
}
/*
* VerificationOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
*
* Verifies ECDSA signature/verification for all digests and curves.
*/
TEST_P(VerificationOperationsTest, EcdsaAllDigestsAndCurves) {
auto digests = {
Digest::NONE, Digest::SHA1, Digest::SHA_2_224,
Digest::SHA_2_256, Digest::SHA_2_384, Digest::SHA_2_512,
};
string message = "1234567890";
string corrupt_message = "2234567890";
for (auto curve : {EcCurve::P_224, EcCurve::P_256, EcCurve::P_384, EcCurve::P_521}) {
ErrorCode error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
.Digest(digests));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error) << "Failed to generate key for EC curve " << curve;
if (error != ErrorCode::OK) {
continue;
}
for (auto digest : digests) {
string signature = SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
VerifyMessage(message, signature, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
// Verify with OpenSSL
if (digest != Digest::NONE) {
HidlBuf pubkey;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ExportKey(KeyFormat::X509, &pubkey))
<< curve << ' ' << digest;
const uint8_t* p = pubkey.data();
EVP_PKEY_Ptr pkey(d2i_PUBKEY(nullptr /* alloc new */, &p, pubkey.size()));
ASSERT_TRUE(pkey.get());
EVP_MD_CTX digest_ctx;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&digest_ctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX* pkey_ctx;
const EVP_MD* md = openssl_digest(digest);
EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&digest_ctx, &pkey_ctx, md, nullptr /* engine */,
pkey.get()))
<< curve << ' ' << digest;
EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&digest_ctx, message.data(), message.size()))
<< curve << ' ' << digest;
EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(
&digest_ctx, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(signature.data()),
signature.size()))
<< curve << ' ' << digest;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&digest_ctx);
}
// Corrupt signature shouldn't verify.
string corrupt_signature(signature);
++corrupt_signature[corrupt_signature.size() / 2];
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest)))
<< curve << ' ' << digest;
string result;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(message, corrupt_signature, &result))
<< curve << ' ' << digest;
// Corrupt message shouldn't verify
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest)))
<< curve << ' ' << digest;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(corrupt_message, signature, &result))
<< curve << ' ' << digest;
}
auto rc = DeleteKey();
ASSERT_TRUE(rc == ErrorCode::OK || rc == ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED);
}
}
/*
* VerificationOperationsTest.HmacSigningKeyCannotVerify
*
* Verifies HMAC signing and verification, but that a signing key cannot be used to verify.
*/
TEST_P(VerificationOperationsTest, HmacSigningKeyCannotVerify) {
string key_material = "HelloThisIsAKey";
HidlBuf signing_key, verification_key;
KeyCharacteristics signing_key_chars, verification_key_chars;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC)
.Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN)
.Digest(Digest::SHA1)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 160),
KeyFormat::RAW, key_material, &signing_key, &signing_key_chars));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC)
.Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::VERIFY)
.Digest(Digest::SHA1)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 160),
KeyFormat::RAW, key_material, &verification_key, &verification_key_chars));
string message = "This is a message.";
string signature = SignMessage(
signing_key, message,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA1).Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 160));
// Signing key should not work.
AuthorizationSet out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE,
Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY, signing_key, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA1),
&out_params, &op_handle_));
// Verification key should work.
VerifyMessage(verification_key, message, signature,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA1));
CheckedDeleteKey(&signing_key);
CheckedDeleteKey(&verification_key);
}
typedef KeymasterHidlTest ExportKeyTest;
/*
* ExportKeyTest.RsaUnsupportedKeyFormat
*
* Verifies that attempting to export RSA keys in PKCS#8 format fails with the correct error.
*/
TEST_P(ExportKeyTest, RsaUnsupportedKeyFormat) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 3)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
HidlBuf export_data;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_FORMAT, ExportKey(KeyFormat::PKCS8, &export_data));
}
/*
* ExportKeyTest.RsaCorruptedKeyBlob
*
* Verifies that attempting to export RSA keys from corrupted key blobs fails. This is essentially
* a poor-man's key blob fuzzer.
*/
TEST_P(ExportKeyTest, RsaCorruptedKeyBlob) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 3)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
for (size_t i = 0; i < key_blob_.size(); ++i) {
HidlBuf corrupted(key_blob_);
++corrupted[i];
HidlBuf export_data;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
ExportKey(KeyFormat::X509, corrupted, HidlBuf(), HidlBuf(), &export_data))
<< "Blob corrupted at offset " << i << " erroneously accepted as valid";
}
}
/*
* ExportKeyTest.RsaCorruptedKeyBlob
*
* Verifies that attempting to export ECDSA keys from corrupted key blobs fails. This is
* essentially a poor-man's key blob fuzzer.
*/
TEST_P(ExportKeyTest, EcCorruptedKeyBlob) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)));
for (size_t i = 0; i < key_blob_.size(); ++i) {
HidlBuf corrupted(key_blob_);
++corrupted[i];
HidlBuf export_data;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
ExportKey(KeyFormat::X509, corrupted, HidlBuf(), HidlBuf(), &export_data))
<< "Blob corrupted at offset " << i << " erroneously accepted as valid";
}
}
/*
* ExportKeyTest.AesKeyUnexportable
*
* Verifies that attempting to export AES keys fails in the expected way.
*/
TEST_P(ExportKeyTest, AesKeyUnexportable) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.EcbMode()
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
HidlBuf export_data;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_FORMAT, ExportKey(KeyFormat::X509, &export_data));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_FORMAT, ExportKey(KeyFormat::PKCS8, &export_data));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_FORMAT, ExportKey(KeyFormat::RAW, &export_data));
}
typedef KeymasterHidlTest ImportKeyTest;
/*
* ImportKeyTest.RsaSuccess
*
* Verifies that importing and using an RSA key pair works correctly.
*/
TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, RsaSuccess) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS),
KeyFormat::PKCS8, rsa_key));
CheckKm0CryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA);
CheckKm0CryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 1024U);
CheckKm0CryptoParam(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 65537U);
CheckKm1CryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
CheckKm1CryptoParam(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::RSA_PSS);
CheckOrigin(true /* asymmetric */);
string message(1024 / 8, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS);
string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
}
/*
* ImportKeyTest.RsaKeySizeMismatch
*
* Verifies that importing an RSA key pair with a size that doesn't match the key fails in the
* correct way.
*/
TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, RsaKeySizeMismatch) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH,
ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(2048 /* Doesn't match key */, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
KeyFormat::PKCS8, rsa_key));
}
/*
* ImportKeyTest.RsaPublicExponentMismatch
*
* Verifies that importing an RSA key pair with a public exponent that doesn't match the key fails
* in the correct way.
*/
TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, RsaPublicExponentMismatch) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH,
ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 3 /* Doesn't match key */)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
KeyFormat::PKCS8, rsa_key));
}
/*
* ImportKeyTest.EcdsaSuccess
*
* Verifies that importing and using an ECDSA P-256 key pair works correctly.
*/
TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaSuccess) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(256)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256),
KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key))
<< "(Possibly b/33945114)";
CheckKm0CryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
CheckKm0CryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 256U);
CheckKm1CryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
CheckKm2CryptoParam(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256);
CheckOrigin(true /* asymmetric */);
string message(32, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
}
/*
* ImportKeyTest.Ecdsa521Success
*
* Verifies that importing and using an ECDSA P-521 key pair works correctly.
*/
TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, Ecdsa521Success) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(521)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256),
KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_521_key))
<< "(Possibly b/33945114)";
CheckKm0CryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
CheckKm0CryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 521U);
CheckKm1CryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
CheckKm2CryptoParam(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_521);
CheckOrigin(true /* asymmetric */);
string message(32, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
}
/*
* ImportKeyTest.EcdsaSizeMismatch
*
* Verifies that importing an ECDSA key pair with a size that doesn't match the key fails in the
* correct way.
*/
TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaSizeMismatch) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH,
ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.EcdsaSigningKey(224 /* Doesn't match key */)
.Digest(Digest::NONE),
KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key));
}
/*
* ImportKeyTest.EcdsaCurveMismatch
*
* Verifies that importing an ECDSA key pair with a curve that doesn't match the key fails in the
* correct way.
*/
TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaCurveMismatch) {
if (SupportsSymmetric() && !SupportsAttestation()) {
// KM1 hardware doesn't know about curves
return;
}
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH,
ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_224 /* Doesn't match key */)
.Digest(Digest::NONE),
KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key))
<< "(Possibly b/36233241)";
}
/*
* ImportKeyTest.AesSuccess
*
* Verifies that importing and using an AES key works.
*/
TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, AesSuccess) {
string key = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(key.size() * 8)
.EcbMode()
.Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
KeyFormat::RAW, key));
CheckKm1CryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::AES);
CheckKm1CryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 128U);
CheckKm1CryptoParam(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::PKCS7);
CheckKm1CryptoParam(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB);
CheckOrigin();
string message = "Hello World!";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
}
/*
* ImportKeyTest.AesSuccess
*
* Verifies that importing and using an HMAC key works.
*/
TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, HmacKeySuccess) {
string key = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.HmacKey(key.size() * 8)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 256),
KeyFormat::RAW, key));
CheckKm1CryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC);
CheckKm1CryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 128U);
CheckKm1CryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
CheckOrigin();
string message = "Hello World!";
string signature = MacMessage(message, Digest::SHA_2_256, 256);
VerifyMessage(message, signature, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256));
}
typedef KeymasterHidlTest EncryptionOperationsTest;
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingSuccess
*
* Verifies that raw RSA encryption works.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaNoPaddingSuccess) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaEncryptionKey(1024, 3)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
string message = string(1024 / 8, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
EXPECT_EQ(1024U / 8, ciphertext1.size());
string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
EXPECT_EQ(1024U / 8, ciphertext2.size());
// Unpadded RSA is deterministic
EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingShortMessage
*
* Verifies that raw RSA encryption of short messages works.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaNoPaddingShortMessage) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaEncryptionKey(1024, 3)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
string message = "1";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
EXPECT_EQ(1024U / 8, ciphertext.size());
string expected_plaintext = string(1024 / 8 - 1, 0) + message;
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
EXPECT_EQ(expected_plaintext, plaintext);
// Degenerate case, encrypting a numeric 1 yields 0x00..01 as the ciphertext.
message = static_cast<char>(1);
ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
EXPECT_EQ(1024U / 8, ciphertext.size());
EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext, string(1024 / 8 - 1, 0) + message);
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingTooLong
*
* Verifies that raw RSA encryption of too-long messages fails in the expected way.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaNoPaddingTooLong) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaEncryptionKey(1024, 3)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
string message(1024 / 8 + 1, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
string result;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, &result));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingTooLarge
*
* Verifies that raw RSA encryption of too-large (numerically) messages fails in the expected way.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaNoPaddingTooLarge) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaEncryptionKey(1024, 3)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
HidlBuf exported;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ExportKey(KeyFormat::X509, &exported));
const uint8_t* p = exported.data();
EVP_PKEY_Ptr pkey(d2i_PUBKEY(nullptr /* alloc new */, &p, exported.size()));
RSA_Ptr rsa(EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey.get()));
const BIGNUM* n = RSA_get0_n(rsa.get());
size_t modulus_len = BN_num_bytes(n);
ASSERT_EQ(1024U / 8, modulus_len);
std::unique_ptr<uint8_t[]> modulus_buf(new uint8_t[modulus_len]);
BN_bn2bin(n, modulus_buf.get());
// The modulus is too big to encrypt.
string message(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(modulus_buf.get()), modulus_len);
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
string result;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT, Finish(message, &result));
// One smaller than the modulus is okay.
BIGNUM_Ptr n_minus_1(BN_new());
ASSERT_TRUE(n_minus_1);
ASSERT_TRUE(BN_sub(n_minus_1.get(), n, BN_value_one()));
modulus_len = BN_num_bytes(n_minus_1.get());
ASSERT_EQ(1024U / 8, modulus_len);
BN_bn2bin(n_minus_1.get(), modulus_buf.get());
message = string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(modulus_buf.get()), modulus_len);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(message, &result));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepSuccess
*
* Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations work, with all digests.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepSuccess) {
auto digests = {Digest::MD5, Digest::SHA1, Digest::SHA_2_224,
Digest::SHA_2_256, Digest::SHA_2_384, Digest::SHA_2_512};
size_t key_size = 2048; // Need largish key for SHA-512 test.
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaEncryptionKey(key_size, 3)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
.Digest(digests)));
string message = "Hello";
for (auto digest : digests) {
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP);
string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
if (HasNonfatalFailure()) std::cout << "-->" << digest << std::endl;
EXPECT_EQ(key_size / 8, ciphertext1.size());
string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
EXPECT_EQ(key_size / 8, ciphertext2.size());
// OAEP randomizes padding so every result should be different (with astronomically high
// probability).
EXPECT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
string plaintext1 = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, params);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext1) << "RSA-OAEP failed with digest " << digest;
string plaintext2 = DecryptMessage(ciphertext2, params);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext2) << "RSA-OAEP failed with digest " << digest;
// Decrypting corrupted ciphertext should fail.
size_t offset_to_corrupt = random() % ciphertext1.size();
char corrupt_byte;
do {
corrupt_byte = static_cast<char>(random() % 256);
} while (corrupt_byte == ciphertext1[offset_to_corrupt]);
ciphertext1[offset_to_corrupt] = corrupt_byte;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
string result;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR, Finish(ciphertext1, &result));
EXPECT_EQ(0U, result.size());
}
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepInvalidDigest
*
* Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to operate
* without a digest.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepInvalidDigest) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaEncryptionKey(1024, 3)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)));
string message = "Hello World!";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP).Digest(Digest::NONE);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepInvalidDigest
*
* Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to decrypt with a
* different digest than was used to encrypt.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepDecryptWithWrongDigest) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaEncryptionKey(1024, 3)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256, Digest::SHA_2_224)));
string message = "Hello World!";
string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(
message,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_224).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP));
EXPECT_EQ(
ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
string result;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR, Finish(ciphertext, &result));
EXPECT_EQ(0U, result.size());
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepTooLarge
*
* Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to encrypt a
* too-large message.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepTooLarge) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaEncryptionKey(1024, 3)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
.Digest(Digest::SHA1)));
constexpr size_t digest_size = 160 /* SHA1 */ / 8;
constexpr size_t oaep_overhead = 2 * digest_size + 2;
string message(1024 / 8 - oaep_overhead + 1, 'a');
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP).Digest(Digest::SHA1)));
string result;
auto error = Finish(message, &result);
EXPECT_TRUE(error == ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH || error == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
EXPECT_EQ(0U, result.size());
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaPkcs1Success
*
* Verifies that RSA PKCS encryption/decrypts works.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaPkcs1Success) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaEncryptionKey(1024, 3)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT)));
string message = "Hello World!";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT);
string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
EXPECT_EQ(1024U / 8, ciphertext1.size());
string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
EXPECT_EQ(1024U / 8, ciphertext2.size());
// PKCS1 v1.5 randomizes padding so every result should be different.
EXPECT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, params);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
// Decrypting corrupted ciphertext should fail.
size_t offset_to_corrupt = random() % ciphertext1.size();
char corrupt_byte;
do {
corrupt_byte = static_cast<char>(random() % 256);
} while (corrupt_byte == ciphertext1[offset_to_corrupt]);
ciphertext1[offset_to_corrupt] = corrupt_byte;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
string result;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR, Finish(ciphertext1, &result));
EXPECT_EQ(0U, result.size());
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaPkcs1TooLarge
*
* Verifies that RSA PKCS encryption fails in the correct way when the mssage is too large.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaPkcs1TooLarge) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaEncryptionKey(1024, 3)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT)));
string message(1024 / 8 - 10, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
string result;
auto error = Finish(message, &result);
EXPECT_TRUE(error == ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH || error == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
EXPECT_EQ(0U, result.size());
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.EcdsaEncrypt
*
* Verifies that attempting to use ECDSA keys to encrypt fails in the correct way.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, EcdsaEncrypt) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(224)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)));
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE);
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params))
<< "(Possibly b/33543625)";
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params))
<< "(Possibly b/33543625)";
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.HmacEncrypt
*
* Verifies that attempting to use HMAC keys to encrypt fails in the correct way.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, HmacEncrypt) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.HmacKey(128)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params))
<< "(Possibly b/33543625)";
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params))
<< "(Possibly b/33543625)";
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbRoundTripSuccess
*
* Verifies that AES ECB mode works.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbRoundTripSuccess) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
// Two-block message.
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext1.size());
string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(string(message), params);
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext2.size());
// ECB is deterministic.
EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, params);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbRoundTripSuccess
*
* Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when an unauthorized mode is specified.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesWrongMode) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
// Two-block message.
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
EXPECT_EQ(
ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE,
Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbNoPaddingWrongInputSize
*
* Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when provided an input that is not a
* multiple of the block size and no padding is specified.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbNoPaddingWrongInputSize) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
// Message is slightly shorter than two blocks.
string message(16 * 2 - 1, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
string ciphertext;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, &ciphertext));
EXPECT_EQ(0U, ciphertext.size());
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbPkcs7Padding
*
* Verifies that AES PKCS7 padding works for any message length.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbPkcs7Padding) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
.Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
// Try various message lengths; all should work.
for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
string message(i, 'a');
string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
EXPECT_EQ(i + 16 - (i % 16), ciphertext.size());
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
}
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbWrongPadding
*
* Verifies that AES enryption fails in the correct way when an unauthorized padding mode is
* specified.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbWrongPadding) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
// Try various message lengths; all should fail
for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
string message(i, 'a');
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
}
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbPkcs7PaddingCorrupted
*
* Verifies that AES decryption fails in the correct way when the padding is corrupted.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbPkcs7PaddingCorrupted) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
.Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
string message = "a";
string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
EXPECT_EQ(16U, ciphertext.size());
EXPECT_NE(ciphertext, message);
++ciphertext[ciphertext.size() / 2];
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
string plaintext;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, &plaintext));
}
HidlBuf CopyIv(const AuthorizationSet& set) {
auto iv = set.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE);
EXPECT_TRUE(iv.isOk());
return iv.value();
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCtrRoundTripSuccess
*
* Verifies that AES CTR mode works.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCtrRoundTripSuccess) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CTR)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CTR).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
string message = "123";
AuthorizationSet out_params;
string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
HidlBuf iv1 = CopyIv(out_params);
EXPECT_EQ(16U, iv1.size());
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext1.size());
out_params.Clear();
string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
HidlBuf iv2 = CopyIv(out_params);
EXPECT_EQ(16U, iv2.size());
// IVs should be random, so ciphertexts should differ.
EXPECT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
auto params_iv1 =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorizations(params).Authorization(TAG_NONCE, iv1);
auto params_iv2 =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorizations(params).Authorization(TAG_NONCE, iv2);
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, params_iv1);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext2, params_iv2);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
// Using the wrong IV will result in a "valid" decryption, but the data will be garbage.
plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, params_iv2);
EXPECT_NE(message, plaintext);
plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext2, params_iv1);
EXPECT_NE(message, plaintext);
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesIncremental
*
* Verifies that AES works, all modes, when provided data in various size increments.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesIncremental) {
auto block_modes = {
BlockMode::ECB, BlockMode::CBC, BlockMode::CTR, BlockMode::GCM,
};
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.BlockMode(block_modes)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
for (int increment = 1; increment <= 240; ++increment) {
for (auto block_mode : block_modes) {
string message(240, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(block_mode)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128) /* for GCM */;
AuthorizationSet output_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params, &output_params));
string ciphertext;
size_t input_consumed;
string to_send;
for (size_t i = 0; i < message.size(); i += increment) {
to_send.append(message.substr(i, increment));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(to_send, &ciphertext, &input_consumed));
to_send = to_send.substr(input_consumed);
switch (block_mode) {
case BlockMode::ECB:
case BlockMode::CBC:
// Implementations must take as many blocks as possible, leaving less than
// a block.
EXPECT_LE(to_send.length(), 16U);
break;
case BlockMode::GCM:
case BlockMode::CTR:
// Implementations must always take all the data.
EXPECT_EQ(0U, to_send.length());
break;
}
}
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(to_send, &ciphertext)) << "Error sending " << to_send;
switch (block_mode) {
case BlockMode::GCM:
EXPECT_EQ(message.size() + 16, ciphertext.size());
break;
case BlockMode::CTR:
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext.size());
break;
case BlockMode::CBC:
case BlockMode::ECB:
EXPECT_EQ(message.size() + message.size() % 16, ciphertext.size());
break;
}
auto iv = output_params.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE);
switch (block_mode) {
case BlockMode::CBC:
case BlockMode::GCM:
case BlockMode::CTR:
ASSERT_TRUE(iv.isOk()) << "No IV for block mode " << block_mode;
EXPECT_EQ(block_mode == BlockMode::GCM ? 12U : 16U, iv.value().size());
params.push_back(TAG_NONCE, iv.value());
break;
case BlockMode::ECB:
EXPECT_FALSE(iv.isOk()) << "ECB mode should not generate IV";
break;
}
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params))
<< "Decrypt begin() failed for block mode " << block_mode;
string plaintext;
for (size_t i = 0; i < ciphertext.size(); i += increment) {
to_send.append(ciphertext.substr(i, increment));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(to_send, &plaintext, &input_consumed));
to_send = to_send.substr(input_consumed);
}
ErrorCode error = Finish(to_send, &plaintext);
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error)
<< "Decryption failed for block mode " << block_mode << " and increment "
<< increment << " (Possibly b/33584622)";
if (error == ErrorCode::OK) {
ASSERT_EQ(message, plaintext) << "Decryption didn't match for block mode "
<< block_mode << " and increment " << increment;
}
}
}
}
struct AesCtrSp80038aTestVector {
const char* key;
const char* nonce;
const char* plaintext;
const char* ciphertext;
};
// These test vectors are taken from
// http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf, section F.5.
static const AesCtrSp80038aTestVector kAesCtrSp80038aTestVectors[] = {
// AES-128
{
"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c", "f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff",
"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51"
"30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710",
"874d6191b620e3261bef6864990db6ce9806f66b7970fdff8617187bb9fffdff"
"5ae4df3edbd5d35e5b4f09020db03eab1e031dda2fbe03d1792170a0f3009cee",
},
// AES-192
{
"8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b", "f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff",
"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51"
"30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710",
"1abc932417521ca24f2b0459fe7e6e0b090339ec0aa6faefd5ccc2c6f4ce8e94"
"1e36b26bd1ebc670d1bd1d665620abf74f78a7f6d29809585a97daec58c6b050",
},
// AES-256
{
"603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d77811f352c073b6108d72d9810a30914dff4",
"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff",
"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51"
"30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710",
"601ec313775789a5b7a7f504bbf3d228f443e3ca4d62b59aca84e990cacaf5c5"
"2b0930daa23de94ce87017ba2d84988ddfc9c58db67aada613c2dd08457941a6",
},
};
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCtrSp80038aTestVector
*
* Verifies AES CTR implementation against SP800-38A test vectors.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCtrSp80038aTestVector) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
const AesCtrSp80038aTestVector& test(kAesCtrSp80038aTestVectors[i]);
const string key = hex2str(test.key);
const string nonce = hex2str(test.nonce);
const string plaintext = hex2str(test.plaintext);
const string ciphertext = hex2str(test.ciphertext);
CheckAesCtrTestVector(key, nonce, plaintext, ciphertext);
}
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCtrIncompatiblePaddingMode
*
* Verifies that keymaster rejects use of CTR mode with PKCS7 padding in the correct way.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCtrIncompatiblePaddingMode) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CTR)
.Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CTR).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCtrInvalidCallerNonce
*
* Verifies that keymaster fails correctly when the user supplies an incorrect-size nonce.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCtrInvalidCallerNonce) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CTR)
.Authorization(TAG_CALLER_NONCE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::CTR)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NONCE, HidlBuf(string(1, 'a')));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::CTR)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NONCE, HidlBuf(string(15, 'a')));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::CTR)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NONCE, HidlBuf(string(17, 'a')));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCtrInvalidCallerNonce
*
* Verifies that keymaster fails correctly when the user supplies an incorrect-size nonce.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCbcRoundTripSuccess) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
// Two-block message.
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
AuthorizationSet out_params;
string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
HidlBuf iv1 = CopyIv(out_params);
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext1.size());
out_params.Clear();
string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
HidlBuf iv2 = CopyIv(out_params);
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext2.size());
// IVs should be random, so ciphertexts should differ.
EXPECT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
params.push_back(TAG_NONCE, iv1);
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext1, params);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCallerNonce
*
* Verifies that AES caller-provided nonces work correctly.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCallerNonce) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC)
.Authorization(TAG_CALLER_NONCE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
// Don't specify nonce, should get a random one.
AuthorizationSetBuilder params =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
AuthorizationSet out_params;
string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext.size());
EXPECT_EQ(16U, out_params.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE).value().size());
params.push_back(TAG_NONCE, out_params.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE).value());
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
// Now specify a nonce, should also work.
params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NONCE, HidlBuf("abcdefghijklmnop"));
out_params.Clear();
ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
// Decrypt with correct nonce.
plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
// Try with wrong nonce.
params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NONCE, HidlBuf("aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"));
plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
EXPECT_NE(message, plaintext);
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCallerNonceProhibited
*
* Verifies that caller-provided nonces are not permitted when not specified in the key
* authorizations.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesCallerNonceProhibited) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
// Don't specify nonce, should get a random one.
AuthorizationSetBuilder params =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
AuthorizationSet out_params;
string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext.size());
EXPECT_EQ(16U, out_params.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE).value().size());
params.push_back(TAG_NONCE, out_params.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE).value());
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
// Now specify a nonce, should fail
params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NONCE, HidlBuf("abcdefghijklmnop"));
out_params.Clear();
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params, &out_params));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmRoundTripSuccess
*
* Verifies that AES GCM mode works.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmRoundTripSuccess) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
string aad = "foobar";
string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
auto update_params =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, aad.data(), aad.size());
// Encrypt
AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params))
<< "Begin encrypt";
string ciphertext;
AuthorizationSet update_out_params;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Finish(op_handle_, update_params, message, "", &update_out_params, &ciphertext));
// Grab nonce
begin_params.push_back(begin_out_params);
// Decrypt.
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, begin_params)) << "Begin decrypt";
string plaintext;
size_t input_consumed;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(op_handle_, update_params, ciphertext, &update_out_params,
&plaintext, &input_consumed));
EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext.size(), input_consumed);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish("", &plaintext));
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmTooShortTag
*
* Verifies that AES GCM mode fails correctly when a too-short tag length is specified.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmTooShortTag) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 96);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_MAC_LENGTH, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmTooShortTagOnDecrypt
*
* Verifies that AES GCM mode fails correctly when a too-short tag is provided to decryption.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmTooShortTagOnDecrypt) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
string aad = "foobar";
string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
auto finish_params =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, aad.data(), aad.size());
// Encrypt
AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params, &begin_out_params));
EXPECT_EQ(1U, begin_out_params.size());
ASSERT_TRUE(begin_out_params.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE).isOk());
AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
string ciphertext;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(op_handle_, finish_params, message, "" /* signature */,
&finish_out_params, &ciphertext));
params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorizations(begin_out_params)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 96);
// Decrypt.
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_MAC_LENGTH, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmCorruptKey
*
* Verifies that AES GCM mode fails correctly when the decryption key is incorrect.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmCorruptKey) {
const uint8_t nonce_bytes[] = {
0xb7, 0x94, 0x37, 0xae, 0x08, 0xff, 0x35, 0x5d, 0x7d, 0x8a, 0x4d, 0x0f,
};
string nonce = make_string(nonce_bytes);
const uint8_t ciphertext_bytes[] = {
0xb3, 0xf6, 0x79, 0x9e, 0x8f, 0x93, 0x26, 0xf2, 0xdf, 0x1e, 0x80, 0xfc, 0xd2, 0xcb, 0x16,
0xd7, 0x8c, 0x9d, 0xc7, 0xcc, 0x14, 0xbb, 0x67, 0x78, 0x62, 0xdc, 0x6c, 0x63, 0x9b, 0x3a,
0x63, 0x38, 0xd2, 0x4b, 0x31, 0x2d, 0x39, 0x89, 0xe5, 0x92, 0x0b, 0x5d, 0xbf, 0xc9, 0x76,
0x76, 0x5e, 0xfb, 0xfe, 0x57, 0xbb, 0x38, 0x59, 0x40, 0xa7, 0xa4, 0x3b, 0xdf, 0x05, 0xbd,
0xda, 0xe3, 0xc9, 0xd6, 0xa2, 0xfb, 0xbd, 0xfc, 0xc0, 0xcb, 0xa0,
};
string ciphertext = make_string(ciphertext_bytes);
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128)
.Authorization(TAG_NONCE, nonce.data(), nonce.size());
auto import_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_CALLER_NONCE)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
// Import correct key and decrypt
const uint8_t key_bytes[] = {
0xba, 0x76, 0x35, 0x4f, 0x0a, 0xed, 0x6e, 0x8d,
0x91, 0xf4, 0x5c, 0x4f, 0xf5, 0xa0, 0x62, 0xdb,
};
string key = make_string(key_bytes);
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(import_params, KeyFormat::RAW, key));
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
CheckedDeleteKey();
// Corrupt key and attempt to decrypt
key[0] = 0;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(import_params, KeyFormat::RAW, key));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(ciphertext, &plaintext));
CheckedDeleteKey();
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmAadNoData
*
* Verifies that AES GCM mode works when provided additional authenticated data, but no data to
* encrypt.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmAadNoData) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
string aad = "1234567890123456";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
auto finish_params =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, aad.data(), aad.size());
// Encrypt
AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params, &begin_out_params));
string ciphertext;
AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(op_handle_, finish_params, "" /* input */, "" /* signature */,
&finish_out_params, &ciphertext));
EXPECT_TRUE(finish_out_params.empty());
// Grab nonce
params.push_back(begin_out_params);
// Decrypt.
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
string plaintext;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(op_handle_, finish_params, ciphertext, "" /* signature */,
&finish_out_params, &plaintext))
<< "(Possibly b/33615032)";
EXPECT_TRUE(finish_out_params.empty());
EXPECT_EQ("", plaintext);
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmMultiPartAad
*
* Verifies that AES GCM mode works when provided additional authenticated data in multiple chunks.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmMultiPartAad) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
auto update_params =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, "foo", (size_t)3);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params));
// No data, AAD only.
string ciphertext;
size_t input_consumed;
AuthorizationSet update_out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(op_handle_, update_params, "" /* input */, &update_out_params,
&ciphertext, &input_consumed));
EXPECT_EQ(0U, input_consumed);
EXPECT_EQ(0U, ciphertext.size());
EXPECT_TRUE(update_out_params.empty());
// AAD and data.
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(op_handle_, update_params, message, &update_out_params,
&ciphertext, &input_consumed));
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), input_consumed);
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext.size());
EXPECT_TRUE(update_out_params.empty());
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish("" /* input */, &ciphertext));
// Grab nonce.
begin_params.push_back(begin_out_params);
// Decrypt
update_params =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, "foofoo", (size_t)6);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, begin_params));
string plaintext;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(op_handle_, update_params, ciphertext, "" /* signature */,
&update_out_params, &plaintext));
EXPECT_TRUE(update_out_params.empty());
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmAadOutOfOrder
*
* Verifies that AES GCM mode fails correctly when given AAD after data to encipher.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmAadOutOfOrder) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
auto update_params =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, "foo", (size_t)3);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params));
// No data, AAD only.
string ciphertext;
size_t input_consumed;
AuthorizationSet update_out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(op_handle_, update_params, "" /* input */, &update_out_params,
&ciphertext, &input_consumed));
EXPECT_EQ(0U, input_consumed);
EXPECT_EQ(0U, ciphertext.size());
EXPECT_TRUE(update_out_params.empty());
// AAD and data.
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(op_handle_, update_params, message, &update_out_params,
&ciphertext, &input_consumed));
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), input_consumed);
EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext.size());
EXPECT_TRUE(update_out_params.empty());
// More AAD
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG, Update(op_handle_, update_params, "", &update_out_params,
&ciphertext, &input_consumed));
op_handle_ = kOpHandleSentinel;
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmBadAad
*
* Verifies that AES GCM decryption fails correctly when additional authenticated date is wrong.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmBadAad) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
auto finish_params =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, "foobar", (size_t)6);
// Encrypt
AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params));
string ciphertext;
AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(op_handle_, finish_params, message, "" /* signature */,
&finish_out_params, &ciphertext));
// Grab nonce
begin_params.push_back(begin_out_params);
finish_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA,
"barfoo" /* Wrong AAD */, (size_t)6);
// Decrypt.
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params));
string plaintext;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED,
Finish(op_handle_, finish_params, ciphertext, "" /* signature */, &finish_out_params,
&plaintext));
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmWrongNonce
*
* Verifies that AES GCM decryption fails correctly when the nonce is incorrect.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmWrongNonce) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
auto begin_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
auto finish_params =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, "foobar", (size_t)6);
// Encrypt
AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params));
string ciphertext;
AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(op_handle_, finish_params, message, "" /* signature */,
&finish_out_params, &ciphertext));
// Wrong nonce
begin_params.push_back(TAG_NONCE, HidlBuf("123456789012"));
// Decrypt.
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, begin_params, &begin_out_params));
string plaintext;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED,
Finish(op_handle_, finish_params, ciphertext, "" /* signature */, &finish_out_params,
&plaintext));
// With wrong nonce, should have gotten garbage plaintext (or none).
EXPECT_NE(message, plaintext);
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmCorruptTag
*
* Verifies that AES GCM decryption fails correctly when the tag is wrong.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmCorruptTag) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
string aad = "1234567890123456";
string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.BlockMode(BlockMode::GCM)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
auto finish_params =
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA, aad.data(), aad.size());
// Encrypt
AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params, &begin_out_params));
string ciphertext;
AuthorizationSet finish_out_params;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Finish(op_handle_, finish_params, message, "" /* signature */,
&finish_out_params, &ciphertext));
EXPECT_TRUE(finish_out_params.empty());
// Corrupt tag
++(*ciphertext.rbegin());
// Grab nonce
params.push_back(begin_out_params);
// Decrypt.
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
string plaintext;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED,
Finish(op_handle_, finish_params, ciphertext, "" /* signature */, &finish_out_params,
&plaintext));
EXPECT_TRUE(finish_out_params.empty());
}
typedef KeymasterHidlTest MaxOperationsTest;
/*
* MaxOperationsTest.TestLimitAes
*
* Verifies that the max uses per boot tag works correctly with AES keys.
*/
TEST_P(MaxOperationsTest, TestLimitAes) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.EcbMode()
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_MAX_USES_PER_BOOT, 3)));
string message = "1234567890123456";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcbMode().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
EncryptMessage(message, params);
EncryptMessage(message, params);
EncryptMessage(message, params);
// Fourth time should fail.
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::KEY_MAX_OPS_EXCEEDED, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
}
/*
* MaxOperationsTest.TestLimitAes
*
* Verifies that the max uses per boot tag works correctly with RSA keys.
*/
TEST_P(MaxOperationsTest, TestLimitRsa) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 3)
.NoDigestOrPadding()
.Authorization(TAG_MAX_USES_PER_BOOT, 3)));
string message = "1234567890123456";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().NoDigestOrPadding();
SignMessage(message, params);
SignMessage(message, params);
SignMessage(message, params);
// Fourth time should fail.
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::KEY_MAX_OPS_EXCEEDED, Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, params));
}
typedef KeymasterHidlTest AddEntropyTest;
/*
* AddEntropyTest.AddEntropy
*
* Verifies that the addRngEntropy method doesn't blow up. There's no way to test that entropy is
* actually added.
*/
TEST_P(AddEntropyTest, AddEntropy) {
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, keymaster().addRngEntropy(HidlBuf("foo")));
}
/*
* AddEntropyTest.AddEmptyEntropy
*
* Verifies that the addRngEntropy method doesn't blow up when given an empty buffer.
*/
TEST_P(AddEntropyTest, AddEmptyEntropy) {
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, keymaster().addRngEntropy(HidlBuf()));
}
/*
* AddEntropyTest.AddLargeEntropy
*
* Verifies that the addRngEntropy method doesn't blow up when given a largish amount of data.
*/
TEST_P(AddEntropyTest, AddLargeEntropy) {
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, keymaster().addRngEntropy(HidlBuf(string(2 * 1024, 'a'))));
}
typedef KeymasterHidlTest AttestationTest;
/*
* AttestationTest.RsaAttestation
*
* Verifies that attesting to RSA keys works and generates the expected output.
*/
TEST_P(AttestationTest, RsaAttestation) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 3)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)));
hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
AttestKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, HidlBuf("challenge"))
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("foo")),
&cert_chain));
EXPECT_GE(cert_chain.size(), 2U);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_chain(cert_chain));
EXPECT_TRUE(
verify_attestation_record("challenge", "foo", //
key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced, //
key_characteristics_.teeEnforced, //
cert_chain[0]));
}
/*
* AttestationTest.RsaAttestationRequiresAppId
*
* Verifies that attesting to RSA requires app ID.
*/
TEST_P(AttestationTest, RsaAttestationRequiresAppId) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 3)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)));
hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID_MISSING,
AttestKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(
TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, HidlBuf("challenge")),
&cert_chain));
}
/*
* AttestationTest.EcAttestation
*
* Verifies that attesting to EC keys works and generates the expected output.
*/
TEST_P(AttestationTest, EcAttestation) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)));
hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
AttestKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, HidlBuf("challenge"))
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("foo")),
&cert_chain));
EXPECT_GE(cert_chain.size(), 2U);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_chain(cert_chain));
EXPECT_TRUE(
verify_attestation_record("challenge", "foo", //
key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced, //
key_characteristics_.teeEnforced, //
cert_chain[0]));
}
/*
* AttestationTest.EcAttestationRequiresAttestationAppId
*
* Verifies that attesting to EC keys requires app ID
*/
TEST_P(AttestationTest, EcAttestationRequiresAttestationAppId) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)));
hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID_MISSING,
AttestKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(
TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, HidlBuf("challenge")),
&cert_chain));
}
/*
* AttestationTest.AesAttestation
*
* Verifies that attesting to AES keys fails in the expected way.
*/
TEST_P(AttestationTest, AesAttestation) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.EcbMode()
.Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
EXPECT_EQ(
ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_ALGORITHM,
AttestKey(
AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, HidlBuf("challenge"))
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("foo")),
&cert_chain));
}
/*
* AttestationTest.HmacAttestation
*
* Verifies that attesting to HMAC keys fails in the expected way.
*/
TEST_P(AttestationTest, HmacAttestation) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.HmacKey(128)
.EcbMode()
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
EXPECT_EQ(
ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_ALGORITHM,
AttestKey(
AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, HidlBuf("challenge"))
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("foo")),
&cert_chain));
}
typedef KeymasterHidlTest KeyDeletionTest;
/**
* KeyDeletionTest.DeleteKey
*
* This test checks that if rollback protection is implemented, DeleteKey invalidates a formerly
* valid key blob.
*/
TEST_P(KeyDeletionTest, DeleteKey) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 3)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)));
// Delete must work if rollback protection is implemented
AuthorizationSet teeEnforced(key_characteristics_.teeEnforced);
bool rollback_protected = teeEnforced.Contains(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANT);
if (rollback_protected) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, DeleteKey(true /* keep key blob */));
} else {
auto delete_result = DeleteKey(true /* keep key blob */);
ASSERT_TRUE(delete_result == ErrorCode::OK | delete_result == ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED);
}
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
if (rollback_protected) {
EXPECT_EQ(
ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
&begin_out_params, &op_handle_))
<< " (Possibly b/37623742)";
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
&begin_out_params, &op_handle_));
}
AbortIfNeeded();
key_blob_ = HidlBuf();
}
/**
* KeyDeletionTest.DeleteInvalidKey
*
* This test checks that the HAL excepts invalid key blobs.
*/
TEST_P(KeyDeletionTest, DeleteInvalidKey) {
// Generate key just to check if rollback protection is implemented
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 3)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)));
// Delete must work if rollback protection is implemented
AuthorizationSet teeEnforced(key_characteristics_.teeEnforced);
bool rollback_protected = teeEnforced.Contains(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANT);
// Delete the key we don't care about the result at this point.
DeleteKey();
// Now create an invalid key blob and delete it.
key_blob_ = HidlBuf("just some garbage data which is not a valid key blob");
if (rollback_protected) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, DeleteKey());
} else {
auto delete_result = DeleteKey();
ASSERT_TRUE(delete_result == ErrorCode::OK | delete_result == ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED);
}
}
/**
* KeyDeletionTest.DeleteAllKeys
*
* This test is disarmed by default. To arm it use --arm_deleteAllKeys.
*
* BEWARE: This test has serious side effects. All user keys will be lost! This includes
* FBE/FDE encryption keys, which means that the device will not even boot until after the
* device has been wiped manually (e.g., fastboot flashall -w), and new FBE/FDE keys have
* been provisioned. Use this test only on dedicated testing devices that have no valuable
* credentials stored in Keystore/Keymaster.
*/
TEST_P(KeyDeletionTest, DeleteAllKeys) {
if (!arm_deleteAllKeys) return;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaSigningKey(1024, 3)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)));
// Delete must work if rollback protection is implemented
AuthorizationSet teeEnforced(key_characteristics_.teeEnforced);
bool rollback_protected = teeEnforced.Contains(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANT);
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, DeleteAllKeys());
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
AuthorizationSet begin_out_params;
if (rollback_protected) {
EXPECT_EQ(
ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
&begin_out_params, &op_handle_));
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE),
&begin_out_params, &op_handle_));
}
AbortIfNeeded();
key_blob_ = HidlBuf();
}
static const auto kKeymasterDeviceChoices =
testing::ValuesIn(android::hardware::getAllHalInstanceNames(IKeymasterDevice::descriptor));
GTEST_ALLOW_UNINSTANTIATED_PARAMETERIZED_TEST(NewKeyGenerationTest);
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(PerInstance, NewKeyGenerationTest, kKeymasterDeviceChoices,
android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString);
GTEST_ALLOW_UNINSTANTIATED_PARAMETERIZED_TEST(KeymasterVersionTest);
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(PerInstance, KeymasterVersionTest, kKeymasterDeviceChoices,
android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString);
GTEST_ALLOW_UNINSTANTIATED_PARAMETERIZED_TEST(GetKeyCharacteristicsTest);
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(PerInstance, GetKeyCharacteristicsTest, kKeymasterDeviceChoices,
android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString);
GTEST_ALLOW_UNINSTANTIATED_PARAMETERIZED_TEST(SigningOperationsTest);
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(PerInstance, SigningOperationsTest, kKeymasterDeviceChoices,
android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString);
GTEST_ALLOW_UNINSTANTIATED_PARAMETERIZED_TEST(VerificationOperationsTest);
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(PerInstance, VerificationOperationsTest, kKeymasterDeviceChoices,
android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString);
GTEST_ALLOW_UNINSTANTIATED_PARAMETERIZED_TEST(ExportKeyTest);
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(PerInstance, ExportKeyTest, kKeymasterDeviceChoices,
android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString);
GTEST_ALLOW_UNINSTANTIATED_PARAMETERIZED_TEST(ImportKeyTest);
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(PerInstance, ImportKeyTest, kKeymasterDeviceChoices,
android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString);
GTEST_ALLOW_UNINSTANTIATED_PARAMETERIZED_TEST(EncryptionOperationsTest);
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(PerInstance, EncryptionOperationsTest, kKeymasterDeviceChoices,
android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString);
GTEST_ALLOW_UNINSTANTIATED_PARAMETERIZED_TEST(MaxOperationsTest);
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(PerInstance, MaxOperationsTest, kKeymasterDeviceChoices,
android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString);
GTEST_ALLOW_UNINSTANTIATED_PARAMETERIZED_TEST(AddEntropyTest);
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(PerInstance, AddEntropyTest, kKeymasterDeviceChoices,
android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString);
GTEST_ALLOW_UNINSTANTIATED_PARAMETERIZED_TEST(AttestationTest);
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(PerInstance, AttestationTest, kKeymasterDeviceChoices,
android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString);
GTEST_ALLOW_UNINSTANTIATED_PARAMETERIZED_TEST(KeyDeletionTest);
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(PerInstance, KeyDeletionTest, kKeymasterDeviceChoices,
android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString);
} // namespace test
} // namespace V3_0
} // namespace keymaster
} // namespace hardware
} // namespace android
int main(int argc, char** argv) {
::testing::InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv);
for (int i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
if (argv[i][0] == '-') {
if (std::string(argv[i]) == "--arm_deleteAllKeys") {
arm_deleteAllKeys = true;
}
if (std::string(argv[i]) == "--dump_attestations") {
dump_Attestations = true;
}
}
}
int status = RUN_ALL_TESTS();
ALOGI("Test result = %d", status);
return status;
}
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