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Add ensuring that test BCC keys not unique ids am: 42c1133fed am: ea113e83c9

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Original change: https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/hardware/interfaces/+/1755320

Change-Id: I4965a2f30f3bbe4a86089808965c49fd443b8a5c
This commit is contained in:
Seth Moore
2021-07-06 07:04:58 +00:00
committed by Automerger Merge Worker
parent 76b8048610 ea113e83c9
commit 9c59da828b
1 changed files with 49 additions and 1 deletions
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50
security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
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@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h>
#include <vector>
#include "KeyMintAidlTestBase.h"
@@ -297,7 +298,8 @@ class CertificateRequestTest : public VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests {
}
void checkProtectedData(const DeviceInfo& deviceInfo, const cppbor::Array& keysToSign,
const bytevec& keysToSignMac, const ProtectedData& protectedData) {
const bytevec& keysToSignMac, const ProtectedData& protectedData,
std::vector<BccEntryData>* bccOutput = nullptr) {
auto [parsedProtectedData, _, protDataErrMsg] = cppbor::parse(protectedData.protectedData);
ASSERT_TRUE(parsedProtectedData) << protDataErrMsg;
ASSERT_TRUE(parsedProtectedData->asArray());
@@ -354,6 +356,10 @@ class CertificateRequestTest : public VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests {
auto macPayload = verifyAndParseCoseMac0(&coseMac0, *macKey);
ASSERT_TRUE(macPayload) << macPayload.message();
if (bccOutput) {
*bccOutput = std::move(*bccContents);
}
}
bytevec eekId_;
@@ -386,6 +392,48 @@ TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, EmptyRequest_testMode) {
}
}
/**
* Ensure that test mode outputs a unique BCC root key every time we request a
* certificate request. Else, it's possible that the test mode API could be used
* to fingerprint devices. Only the GEEK should be allowed to decrypt the same
* device public key multiple times.
*/
TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NewKeyPerCallInTestMode) {
constexpr bool testMode = true;
constexpr size_t eekLength = 2;
generateEek(eekLength);
bytevec keysToSignMac;
DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
ProtectedData protectedData;
auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,
&keysToSignMac);
ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
std::vector<BccEntryData> firstBcc;
checkProtectedData(deviceInfo, /*keysToSign=*/cppbor::Array(), keysToSignMac, protectedData,
&firstBcc);
status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(testMode, {} /* keysToSign */,
eekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
&protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
std::vector<BccEntryData> secondBcc;
checkProtectedData(deviceInfo, /*keysToSign=*/cppbor::Array(), keysToSignMac, protectedData,
&secondBcc);
// Verify that none of the keys in the first BCC are repeated in the second one.
for (const auto& i : firstBcc) {
for (auto& j : secondBcc) {
ASSERT_THAT(i.pubKey, testing::Not(testing::ElementsAreArray(j.pubKey)))
<< "Found a repeated pubkey in two generateCertificateRequest test mode calls";
}
}
}
/**
* Generate an empty certificate request in prod mode. Generation will fail because we don't have a
* valid GEEK.