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Merge "Update Identity Credential HAL docs." am: 638d95b901 am: 04516a1440

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Change-Id: I8a9b7cd0826cc3b425743e3c1d67dc666dfea518
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Treehugger Robot
2020-04-21 20:53:43 +00:00
committed by Automerger Merge Worker
parent ab45aad4a3 04516a1440
commit c65ef8fe46
5 changed files with 115 additions and 49 deletions
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14
identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/CipherSuite.aidl
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@@ -24,13 +24,15 @@ package android.hardware.identity;
enum CipherSuite {
/**
* Specifies that the cipher suite that will be used to secure communications between the reader
* is:
* and the prover is using the following primitives
*
* - ECDHE with HKDF-SHA-256 for key agreement.
* - AES-256 with GCM block mode for authenticated encryption (nonces are incremented by
* one for every message).
* - ECDSA with SHA-256 for signing (used for signing session transcripts to defeat
* man-in-the-middle attacks), signing keys are not ephemeral.
* - ECKA-DH (Elliptic Curve Key Agreement Algorithm - Diffie-Hellman, see BSI TR-03111)
* - HKDF-SHA-256 (see RFC 5869)
* - AES-256-GCM (see NIST SP 800-38D)
* - HMAC-SHA-256 (see RFC 2104)
*
* The exact way these primitives are combined to derive the session key is specified in
* section 9.2.1.4 of ISO/IEC 18013-5 (see description of cipher suite '1').
*
* At present this is the only supported cipher suite and it is mandatory for all
* implementations to support it.

61
identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
View File

@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ interface IIdentityCredential {
* with the reader. The reason for generating the key pair in the secure environment is so that
* the secure environment knows what public key to expect to find in the session transcript.
*
* The generated key must be an EC key using the P-256 curve.
*
* This method may only be called once per instance. If called more than once, STATUS_FAILED
* will be returned.
*
@@ -61,7 +63,8 @@ interface IIdentityCredential {
* This method may only be called once per instance. If called more than once, STATUS_FAILED
* will be returned.
*
* @param publicKey contains the reader's ephemeral public key, in uncompressed form.
* @param publicKey contains the reader's ephemeral public key, in uncompressed
* form (e.g. 0x04 || X || Y).
*/
void setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(in byte[] publicKey);
@@ -82,9 +85,9 @@ interface IIdentityCredential {
* This method be called after createEphemeralKeyPair(), setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(),
* createAuthChallenge() and before startRetrieveEntry(). This method call is followed by
* multiple calls of startRetrieveEntryValue(), retrieveEntryValue(), and finally
* finishRetrieval().This whole process is called a "credential presentation".
* finishRetrieval().
*
* It is permissible to perform multiple credential presentations using the same instance (e.g.
* It is permissible to perform data retrievals multiple times using the same instance (e.g.
* startRetrieval(), then multiple calls of startRetrieveEntryValue(), retrieveEntryValue(),
* then finally finishRetrieval()) but if this is done, the sessionTranscript parameter
* must be identical for each startRetrieval() invocation. If this is not the case, this call
@@ -148,6 +151,8 @@ interface IIdentityCredential {
* EReaderKeyBytes = #6.24(bstr .cbor EReaderKey.Pub)
* ItemsRequestBytes = #6.24(bstr .cbor ItemsRequest)
*
* EReaderKey.Pub = COSE_Key ; Ephemeral public key provided by reader
*
* The public key corresponding to the key used to made signature, can be found in the
* 'x5chain' unprotected header element of the COSE_Sign1 structure (as as described
* in 'draft-ietf-cose-x509-04'). There will be at least one certificate in said element
@@ -220,13 +225,11 @@ interface IIdentityCredential {
*
* It is permissible to keep retrieving values if an access control check fails.
*
* @param nameSpace is the namespace of the element, e.g. "org.iso.18013"
* @param nameSpace is the namespace of the element, e.g. "org.iso.18013.5.1"
*
* @param name is the name of the element.
* @param name is the name of the element, e.g. "driving_privileges".
*
* @param entrySize is the size of the entry value, if it's a text string or a byte string.
* It must be zero if the entry value is an integer or boolean. If this requirement
* is not met the call fails with STATUS_INVALID_DATA.
* @param entrySize is the size of the entry value encoded in CBOR.
*
* @param accessControlProfileIds specifies the set of access control profiles that can
* authorize access to the provisioned element. If an identifier of a profile
@@ -260,14 +263,12 @@ interface IIdentityCredential {
* @param out mac is empty if signingKeyBlob or the sessionTranscript passed to
* startRetrieval() is empty. Otherwise it is a COSE_Mac0 with empty payload
* and the detached content is set to DeviceAuthentication as defined below.
* The key used for the MAC operation is EMacKey and is derived as follows:
*
* KDF(ECDH(SDeviceKey.Priv, EReaderKey.Pub))
*
* where SDeviceKey.Priv is the key identified by signingKeyBlob. The KDF
* and ECDH functions shall be the same as the ciphersuite selected and
* passed to IIdentityStore.getCredential(). The EMacKey shall be derived
* using a salt of 0x00.
* This code is produced by using the key agreement and key derivation function
* from the ciphersuite with the authentication private key and the reader
* ephemeral public key to compute a shared message authentication code (MAC)
* key, then using the MAC function from the ciphersuite to compute a MAC of
* the authenticated data. See section 9.2.3.5 of ISO/IEC 18013-5 for details
* of this operation.
*
* DeviceAuthentication = [
* "DeviceAuthentication",
@@ -308,6 +309,34 @@ interface IIdentityCredential {
/**
* Generate a key pair to be used for signing session data and retrieved data items.
*
* The generated key must be an EC key using the P-256 curve.
*
* This method shall return just a single X.509 certificate which is signed by CredentialKey.
* When combined with the certificate chain returned at provisioning time by
* getAttestationCertificate() on IWritableIdentityCredential (for the credential key), this
* forms a chain all the way from the root of trust to the generated key.
*
* The public part of a signing key is usually included in issuer-signed data and is
* used for anti-cloning purposes or as a mechanism for the issuer to attest to data
* generated on the device.
*
* The following non-optional fields for the X.509 certificate shall be set as follows:
*
* - version: INTEGER 2 (means v3 certificate).
*
* - serialNumber: INTEGER 1 (fixed value: same on all certs).
*
* - signature: must be set to ECDSA.
*
* - subject: CN shall be set to "Android Identity Credential Authentication Key".
*
* - issuer: shall be set to "credentialStoreName (credentialStoreAuthorName)" using the
* values returned in HardwareInformation.
*
* - validity: should be from current time and one year in the future.
*
* - subjectPublicKeyInfo: must contain attested public key.
*
* @param out signingKeyBlob contains an encrypted copy of the newly-generated private
* signing key.
*

37
identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredentialStore.aidl
View File

@@ -55,8 +55,8 @@ import android.hardware.identity.CipherSuite;
*
* - For each namespase, a set of name/value pairs, each with an associated set of access control
* profile IDs. Names are UTF-8 strings of up to 256 bytes in length (most should be much
* shorter). Values stored must be encoed as valid CBOR (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7049) and
* the encoeded size is is limited to at most 512 KiB.
* shorter). Values stored must be encoded as CBOR (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7049) and
* the encoded size is is limited to at most 512 KiB.
*
* - A set of access control profiles, each with a profile ID and a specification of the
* conditions which satisfy the profile's requirements.
@@ -108,12 +108,13 @@ import android.hardware.identity.CipherSuite;
@VintfStability
interface IIdentityCredentialStore {
/**
* Success.
* Success. This is never returned but included for completeness and for use by code
* using these statuses for internal use.
*/
const int STATUS_OK = 0;
/**
* The operation failed. This is used as a generic catch-all for errors that don't belong
* The operation failed. This is used as a generic catch-all for errors that don't belong
* in other categories, including memory/resource allocation failures and I/O errors.
*/
const int STATUS_FAILED = 1;
@@ -124,7 +125,7 @@ interface IIdentityCredentialStore {
const int STATUS_CIPHER_SUITE_NOT_SUPPORTED = 2;
/**
* The passed data was invalid. This is a generic catch all for errors that don't belong
* The passed data was invalid. This is a generic catch all for errors that don't belong
* in other categories related to parameter validation.
*/
const int STATUS_INVALID_DATA = 3;
@@ -186,16 +187,19 @@ interface IIdentityCredentialStore {
HardwareInformation getHardwareInformation();
/**
* createCredential creates a new Credential. When a Credential is created, two cryptographic
* createCredential creates a new credential. When a credential is created, two cryptographic
* keys are created: StorageKey, an AES key used to secure the externalized Credential
* contents, and CredentialKeyPair, an EC key pair used to authenticate the store to the IA. In
* addition, all of the Credential data content is imported and a certificate for the
* CredentialKeyPair and a signature produced with the CredentialKeyPair are created. These
* contents, and CredentialKey, an EC key pair used to authenticate the store to the IA.
*
* CredentialKey must be an EC key using the P-256 curve.
*
* In addition, all of the Credential data content is imported and a certificate for the
* CredentialKey and a signature produced with the CredentialKey are created. These
* latter values may be checked by an issuing authority to verify that the data was imported
* into secure hardware and that it was imported unmodified.
*
* @param docType is an optional name (may be an empty string) that identifies the type of
* credential being created, e.g. "org.iso.18013-5.2019.mdl" (the doc type of the ISO
* credential being created, e.g. "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL" (the doc type of the ISO
* driving license standard).
*
* @param testCredential indicates if this is a test store. Test credentials must use an
@@ -213,15 +217,8 @@ interface IIdentityCredentialStore {
* Credential.
*
* The cipher suite used to communicate with the remote verifier must also be specified. Currently
* only a single cipher-suite is supported and the details of this are as follow:
*
* - ECDHE with HKDF-SHA-256 for key agreement.
* - AES-256 with GCM block mode for authenticated encryption (nonces are incremented by one
* for every message).
* - ECDSA with SHA-256 for signing (used for signing session transcripts to defeat
* man-in-the-middle attacks), signing keys are not ephemeral.
*
* Support for other cipher suites may be added in a future version of this HAL.
* only a single cipher-suite is supported. Support for other cipher suites may be added in a
* future version of this HAL.
*
* This method fails with STATUS_INVALID_DATA if the passed in credentialData cannot be
* decoded or decrypted.
@@ -233,7 +230,7 @@ interface IIdentityCredentialStore {
* return argument of the same name in finishAddingEntries(), in
* IWritableIdentityCredential.
*
* @return an IIdentityCredential HIDL interface that provides operations on the Credential.
* @return an IIdentityCredential interface that provides operations on the Credential.
*/
IIdentityCredential getCredential(in CipherSuite cipherSuite, in byte[] credentialData);
}

50
identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
View File

@@ -60,12 +60,50 @@ interface IWritableIdentityCredential {
* attestationApplicationId.
*
* - The teeEnforced field in the attestation extension must include
* Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY. This tag indicates that the key is an Identity
* Credential key (which can only sign/MAC very specific messages) and not an Android
* Keystore key (which can be used to sign/MAC anything).
*
* - Tag::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY which indicates that the key is an Identity
* Credential key (which can only sign/MAC very specific messages) and not an Android
* Keystore key (which can be used to sign/MAC anything).
*
* - Tag::PURPOSE must be set to SIGN
*
* - Tag::KEY_SIZE must be set to the appropriate key size, in bits (e.g. 256)
*
* - Tag::ALGORITHM must be set to EC
*
* - Tag::NO_AUTH_REQUIRED must be set
*
* - Tag::DIGEST must be set to SHA_2_256
*
* - Tag::EC_CURVE must be set to P_256
*
* Additional authorizations may be needed in the softwareEnforced and teeEnforced
* fields - the above is not an exhaustive list.
* fields - the above is not an exhaustive list. Specifically, authorizations containing
* information about the root of trust, OS version, verified boot state, and so on should
* be included.
*
* Since the chain is required to be generated using Keymaster Attestation, the returned
* certificate chain has the following properties:
*
* - The certificate chain is of at least length three.
*
* - The root of trust is the same as for Keymaster Attestation. This is usually
* a certificate owned by Google but depending on the specific Android device it may
* be another certificate.
*
* As with any user of attestation, the Issuing Authority (as a relying party) wishing
* to issue a credential to a device using these APIs, must carefully examine the
* returned certificate chain for all of the above (and more). In particular, the Issuing
* Authority should check the root of trust, verified boot state, patch level,
* application id, etc.
*
* This all depends on the needs of the Issuing Authority and the kind of credential but
* in general an Issuing Authority should never issue a credential to a device without
* verified boot enabled, to an unrecognized application, or if it appears the device
* hasn't been updated for a long time.
*
* See https://github.com/google/android-key-attestation for an example of how to
* examine attestations generated from Android devices.
*
* @param attestationApplicationId is the DER encoded value to be stored
* in Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID. This schema is described in
@@ -105,7 +143,7 @@ interface IWritableIdentityCredential {
* be used to reference the profile. If this is not satisfied the call fails with
* STATUS_INVALID_DATA.
*
* @param readerCertificate if non-empty, specifies a X.509 certificate (or chain of
* @param readerCertificate if non-empty, specifies a single X.509 certificate (not a chain of
* certificates) that must be used to authenticate requests (see the readerSignature
* parameter in IIdentityCredential.startRetrieval).
*
@@ -142,7 +180,7 @@ interface IWritableIdentityCredential {
* @param accessControlProfileIds specifies the set of access control profiles that can
* authorize access to the provisioned element.
*
* @param nameSpace is the namespace of the element, e.g. "org.iso.18013"
* @param nameSpace is the namespace of the element, e.g. "org.iso.18013.5.1"
*
* @param name is the name of the element.
*

2
identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/SecureAccessControlProfile.aidl
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@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ parcelable SecureAccessControlProfile {
/**
* readerCertificate, if non-empty, specifies a single X.509 certificate (not a chain
* of certificates) that must be used to authenticate requests. For details about how
* this is done, see the readerSignature paremter of IIdentityCredential.startRetrieval.
* this is done, see the readerSignature parameter of IIdentityCredential.startRetrieval.
*/
Certificate readerCertificate;