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Fix typos in KM4 interface definition documentation
Test: N/A Change-Id: I037ae8bc8cd35479a8e19af2f4651206fb02fda9
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@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ interface IKeymasterDevice {
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* device with a StrongBox Keymaster has two Keymasters instances, because there must be a TEE
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* Keymaster as well. The HMAC key used to MAC and verify authentication tokens must be shared
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* between TEE and StrongBox so they can each validate tokens produced by the other. This
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* method is the second and final step in the process for for agreeing on a shared key. It is
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* method is the second and final step in the process for agreeing on a shared key. It is
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* called by Keystore during startup if and only if Keystore loads multiple Keymaster HALs.
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* Keystore calls it on each of the HAL instances, and sends to it all of the
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* HmacSharingParameters returned by all HALs.
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@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ interface IKeymasterDevice {
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* Any method of securely establishing K that ensures that an attacker cannot obtain or
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* derive its value is acceptable. What follows is a recommended approach, to be executed
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* during each factory reset. It relies on use of the factory-installed attestation keys to
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* mitigate man-in-the-middle attacks. This protocol requires that one of the instancess
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* mitigate man-in-the-middle attacks. This protocol requires that one of the instances
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* have secure persistent storage. This model was chosen because StrongBox has secure
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* persistent storage (by definition), but the TEE may not. The instance without storage is
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* assumed to be able to derive a unique hardware-bound key (HBK) which is used only for
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