mirror of
https://github.com/Evolution-X/hardware_interfaces
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Merge "Move CDDL into separate CDDL files" into main
This commit is contained in:
Treehugger Robot
Gerrit Code Review
@@ -185,77 +185,7 @@ interface IRemotelyProvisionedComponent {
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*
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* In either case, the root is self-signed.
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*
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* EekChain = [ + SignedSignatureKey, SignedEek ]
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*
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* SignedSignatureKey = [ ; COSE_Sign1
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* protected: bstr .cbor {
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* 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256, ; Algorithm
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* },
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* unprotected: {},
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* payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKeyEd25519 /
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* bstr .cbor SignatureKeyP256,
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* signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor SignatureKeySignatureInput) /
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* bstr ECDSA(.cbor SignatureKeySignatureInput)
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* ]
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*
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* SignatureKeyEd25519 = { ; COSE_Key
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* 1 : 1, ; Key type : Octet Key Pair
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* 3 : AlgorithmEdDSA, ; Algorithm
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* -1 : 6, ; Curve : Ed25519
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* -2 : bstr ; Ed25519 public key
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* }
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*
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* SignatureKeyP256 = { ; COSE_Key
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* 1 : 2, ; Key type : EC2
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* 3 : AlgorithmES256, ; Algorithm
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* -1 : 1, ; Curve: P256
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* -2 : bstr, ; X coordinate
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* -3 : bstr ; Y coordinate
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* }
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*
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* SignatureKeySignatureInput = [
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* context: "Signature1",
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* body_protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 },
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* external_aad: bstr .size 0,
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* payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKeyEd25519 /
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* bstr .cbor SignatureKeyP256
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* ]
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*
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* ; COSE_Sign1
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* SignedEek = [
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* protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 },
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* unprotected: {},
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* payload: bstr .cbor EekX25519 / .cbor EekP256,
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* signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor EekSignatureInput) /
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* bstr ECDSA(.cbor EekSignatureInput)
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* ]
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*
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* EekX25519 = { ; COSE_Key
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* 1 : 1, ; Key type : Octet Key Pair
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* 2 : bstr ; KID : EEK ID
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* 3 : -25, ; Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
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* -1 : 4, ; Curve : X25519
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* -2 : bstr ; X25519 public key, little-endian
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* }
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*
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* EekP256 = { ; COSE_Key
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* 1 : 2, ; Key type : EC2
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* 2 : bstr ; KID : EEK ID
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* 3 : -25, ; Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
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* -1 : 1, ; Curve : P256
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* -2 : bstr ; Sender X coordinate
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* -3 : bstr ; Sender Y coordinate
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* }
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*
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* EekSignatureInput = [
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* context: "Signature1",
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* body_protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 },
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* external_aad: bstr .size 0,
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* payload: bstr .cbor EekX25519 / .cbor EekP256
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* ]
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*
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* AlgorithmES256 = -7 ; RFC 8152 section 8.1
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* AlgorithmEdDSA = -8 ; RFC 8152 section 8.2
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* See generateCertificateRequest.cddl for CDDL definitions.
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*
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* If the contents of endpointEncryptionKey do not match the SignedEek structure above,
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* the method must return STATUS_INVALID_EEK.
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@@ -283,25 +213,9 @@ interface IRemotelyProvisionedComponent {
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* HMAC-256(EK_mac, .cbor KeysToMacStructure)
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*
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* Where EK_mac is an ephemeral MAC key, found in ProtectedData (see below). The MACed
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* data is the "tag" field of a COSE_Mac0 structure like:
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* data is the "tag" field of a MacedKeys COSE_Mac0 structure.
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*
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* MacedKeys = [ ; COSE_Mac0
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* protected : bstr .cbor {
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* 1 : 5, ; Algorithm : HMAC-256
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* },
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* unprotected : {},
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* ; Payload is PublicKeys from keysToSign argument, in provided order.
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* payload: bstr .cbor [ * PublicKey ],
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* tag: bstr
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* ]
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*
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* KeysToMacStructure = [
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* context : "MAC0",
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* protected : bstr .cbor { 1 : 5 }, ; Algorithm : HMAC-256
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* external_aad : bstr .size 0,
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* ; Payload is PublicKeys from keysToSign argument, in provided order.
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* payload : bstr .cbor [ * PublicKey ]
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* ]
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* See generateCertificateRequest.cddl for CDDL definitions.
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*/
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byte[] generateCertificateRequest(in boolean testMode, in MacedPublicKey[] keysToSign,
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in byte[] endpointEncryptionCertChain, in byte[] challenge, out DeviceInfo deviceInfo,
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@@ -322,168 +236,9 @@ interface IRemotelyProvisionedComponent {
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* use different semantic data for this field, but the supported sizes must be between 0
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* and 64 bytes, inclusive.
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*
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* @return the following CBOR Certificate Signing Request (Csr) serialized into a byte array:
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* @return a CBOR Certificate Signing Request (Csr) serialized into a byte array.
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*
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* Csr = AuthenticatedRequest<CsrPayload>
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*
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* CsrPayload = [ ; CBOR Array defining the payload for Csr
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* version: 3, ; The CsrPayload CDDL Schema version.
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* CertificateType, ; The type of certificate being requested.
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* DeviceInfo, ; Defined in DeviceInfo.aidl
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* KeysToSign, ; Provided by the method parameters
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* ]
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*
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* ; A tstr identifying the type of certificate. The set of supported certificate types may
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* ; be extended without requiring a version bump of the HAL. Custom certificate types may
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* ; be used, but the provisioning server may reject the request for an unknown certificate
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* ; type. The currently defined certificate types are:
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* ; - "widevine"
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* ; - "keymint"
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* CertificateType = tstr
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*
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* KeysToSign = [ * PublicKey ] ; Please see MacedPublicKey.aidl for the PublicKey definition.
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*
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* AuthenticatedRequest<T> = [
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* version: 1, ; The AuthenticatedRequest CDDL Schema version.
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* UdsCerts,
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* DiceCertChain,
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* SignedData<[
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* challenge: bstr .size (0..64), ; Provided by the method parameters
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* bstr .cbor T,
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* ]>,
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* ]
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*
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* ; COSE_Sign1 (untagged)
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* SignedData<Data> = [
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* protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 / AlgorithmES384 },
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* unprotected: {},
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* payload: bstr .cbor Data / nil,
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* signature: bstr ; PureEd25519(CDI_Leaf_Priv, SignedDataSigStruct<Data>) /
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* ; ECDSA(CDI_Leaf_Priv, SignedDataSigStruct<Data>)
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* ]
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*
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* ; Sig_structure for SignedData
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* SignedDataSigStruct<Data> = [
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* context: "Signature1",
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* protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 / AlgorithmES384 },
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* external_aad: bstr .size 0,
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* payload: bstr .cbor Data / nil,
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* ]
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*
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* ; UdsCerts allows the platform to provide additional certifications for the UDS_Pub. For
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* ; example, this could be provided by the hardware vendor, who certifies all of their chips.
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* ; The SignerName is a free-form string describing who generated the signature. The root
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* ; certificate will need to be communicated to the verifier out of band, along with the
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* ; SignerName that is expected for the given root certificate.
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* UdsCerts = {
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* * SignerName => UdsCertChain
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* }
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*
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* ; SignerName is a string identifier that indicates both the signing authority as
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* ; well as the format of the UdsCertChain
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* SignerName = tstr
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*
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* UdsCertChain = [
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* 2* X509Certificate ; Root -> ... -> Leaf. "Root" is the vendor self-signed
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* ; cert, "Leaf" contains UDS_Public. There may also be
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* ; intermediate certificates between Root and Leaf.
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* ]
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*
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* ; A bstr containing a DER-encoded X.509 certificate (RSA, NIST P-curve, or EdDSA)
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* X509Certificate = bstr
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*
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* ; The DICE Chain contains measurements about the device firmware.
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* ; The first entry in the DICE Chain is the UDS_Pub, encoded as a COSE_key. All entries
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* ; after the first describe a link in the boot chain (e.g. bootloaders: BL1, BL2, ... BLN)
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* ; Note that there is no DiceChainEntry for UDS_pub, only a "bare" COSE_key.
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* DiceCertChain = [
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* PubKeyEd25519 / PubKeyECDSA256 / PubKeyECDSA384, ; UDS_Pub
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* + DiceChainEntry, ; First CDI_Certificate -> Last CDI_Certificate
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* ; Last certificate corresponds to KeyMint's DICE key.
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* ]
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*
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* ; This is the signed payload for each entry in the DICE chain. Note that the "Configuration
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* ; Input Values" described by the Open Profile are not used here. Instead, the DICE chain
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* ; defines its own configuration values for the Configuration Descriptor field. See
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* ; the Open Profile for DICE for more details on the fields. SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 are
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* ; acceptable hash algorithms. The digest bstr values in the payload are the digest values
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* ; without any padding. Note that this implies that the digest is a 32-byte bstr for SHA256
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* ; and a 48-byte bstr for SHA384. This is an intentional, minor deviation from Open Profile
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* ; for DICE, which specifies all digests are 64 bytes.
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* DiceChainEntryPayload = { ; CWT [RFC8392]
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* 1 : tstr, ; Issuer
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* 2 : tstr, ; Subject
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* -4670552 : bstr .cbor PubKeyEd25519 /
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* bstr .cbor PubKeyECDSA256 /
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* bstr .cbor PubKeyECDSA384, ; Subject Public Key
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* -4670553 : bstr ; Key Usage
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*
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* ; NOTE: All of the following fields may be omitted for a "Degenerate DICE Chain", as
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* ; described above.
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* -4670545 : bstr, ; Code Hash
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* ? -4670546 : bstr, ; Code Descriptor
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* -4670547 : bstr, ; Configuration Hash
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* -4670548 : bstr .cbor { ; Configuration Descriptor
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* ? -70002 : tstr, ; Component name
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* ? -70003 : int / tstr, ; Component version
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* ? -70004 : null, ; Resettable
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* ? -70005 : uint, ; Security version
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* },
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* -4670549 : bstr, ; Authority Hash
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* ? -4670550 : bstr, ; Authority Descriptor
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* -4670551 : bstr, ; Mode
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* }
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*
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* ; Each entry in the DICE chain is a DiceChainEntryPayload signed by the key from the previous
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* ; entry in the DICE chain array.
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* DiceChainEntry = [ ; COSE_Sign1 (untagged)
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* protected : bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 / AlgorithmES384 },
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* unprotected: {},
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* payload: bstr .cbor DiceChainEntryPayload,
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* signature: bstr ; PureEd25519(SigningKey, DiceChainEntryInput) /
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* ; ECDSA(SigningKey, DiceChainEntryInput)
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* ; See RFC 8032 for details of how to encode the signature value
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* ; for Ed25519.
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* ]
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*
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* DiceChainEntryInput = [
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* context: "Signature1",
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* protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 / AlgorithmES384 },
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* external_aad: bstr .size 0,
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* payload: bstr .cbor DiceChainEntryPayload
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* ]
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*
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* ; The following section defines some types that are reused throughout the above
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* ; data structures.
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* ; NOTE: Integer encoding is different for Ed25519 and P256 keys:
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* ; - Ed25519 is LE: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8032#section-3.1
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* ; - P256 is BE: https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf#page=19 (section 2.3.7)
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* PubKeyEd25519 = { ; COSE_Key
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* 1 : 1, ; Key type : octet key pair
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* 3 : AlgorithmEdDSA, ; Algorithm : EdDSA
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* -1 : 6, ; Curve : Ed25519
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* -2 : bstr ; X coordinate, little-endian
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* }
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*
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* PubKeyECDSA256 = { ; COSE_Key
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* 1 : 2, ; Key type : EC2
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* 3 : AlgorithmES256, ; Algorithm : ECDSA w/ SHA-256
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* -1 : 1, ; Curve: P256
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* -2 : bstr, ; X coordinate, big-endian
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* -3 : bstr ; Y coordinate, big-endian
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* }
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*
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* PubKeyECDSA384 = { ; COSE_Key
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* 1 : 2, ; Key type : EC2
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* 3 : AlgorithmES384, ; Algorithm : ECDSA w/ SHA-384
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* -1 : 2, ; Curve: P384
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* -2 : bstr, ; X coordinate
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* -3 : bstr ; Y coordinate
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* }
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*
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* AlgorithmES256 = -7
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* AlgorithmES384 = -35
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* AlgorithmEdDSA = -8
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* See generateCertificateRequestV2.cddl for CDDL definitions.
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*/
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byte[] generateCertificateRequestV2(in MacedPublicKey[] keysToSign, in byte[] challenge);
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
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; CDDL for the deprecated version 1 generateCertificateRequest method
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; in IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
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EekChain = [ + SignedSignatureKey, SignedEek ]
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SignedSignatureKey = [ ; COSE_Sign1
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protected: bstr .cbor {
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||||
1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256, ; Algorithm
|
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},
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unprotected: {},
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payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKeyEd25519 /
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bstr .cbor SignatureKeyP256,
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signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor SignatureKeySignatureInput) /
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bstr ECDSA(.cbor SignatureKeySignatureInput)
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]
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||||
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SignatureKeyEd25519 = { ; COSE_Key
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||||
1 : 1, ; Key type : Octet Key Pair
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||||
3 : AlgorithmEdDSA, ; Algorithm
|
||||
-1 : 6, ; Curve : Ed25519
|
||||
-2 : bstr ; Ed25519 public key
|
||||
}
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||||
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SignatureKeyP256 = { ; COSE_Key
|
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1 : 2, ; Key type : EC2
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3 : AlgorithmES256, ; Algorithm
|
||||
-1 : 1, ; Curve: P256
|
||||
-2 : bstr, ; X coordinate
|
||||
-3 : bstr ; Y coordinate
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||||
}
|
||||
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SignatureKeySignatureInput = [
|
||||
context: "Signature1",
|
||||
body_protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 },
|
||||
external_aad: bstr .size 0,
|
||||
payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKeyEd25519 /
|
||||
bstr .cbor SignatureKeyP256
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
; COSE_Sign1
|
||||
SignedEek = [
|
||||
protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 },
|
||||
unprotected: {},
|
||||
payload: bstr .cbor EekX25519 / .cbor EekP256,
|
||||
signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor EekSignatureInput) /
|
||||
bstr ECDSA(.cbor EekSignatureInput)
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
EekX25519 = { ; COSE_Key
|
||||
1 : 1, ; Key type : Octet Key Pair
|
||||
2 : bstr ; KID : EEK ID
|
||||
3 : -25, ; Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
|
||||
-1 : 4, ; Curve : X25519
|
||||
-2 : bstr ; X25519 public key, little-endian
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
EekP256 = { ; COSE_Key
|
||||
1 : 2, ; Key type : EC2
|
||||
2 : bstr ; KID : EEK ID
|
||||
3 : -25, ; Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
|
||||
-1 : 1, ; Curve : P256
|
||||
-2 : bstr ; Sender X coordinate
|
||||
-3 : bstr ; Sender Y coordinate
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
EekSignatureInput = [
|
||||
context: "Signature1",
|
||||
body_protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 },
|
||||
external_aad: bstr .size 0,
|
||||
payload: bstr .cbor EekX25519 / .cbor EekP256
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
AlgorithmES256 = -7 ; RFC 8152 section 8.1
|
||||
AlgorithmEdDSA = -8 ; RFC 8152 section 8.2
|
||||
|
||||
MacedKeys = [ ; COSE_Mac0
|
||||
protected : bstr .cbor {
|
||||
1 : 5, ; Algorithm : HMAC-256
|
||||
},
|
||||
unprotected : {},
|
||||
; Payload is PublicKeys from keysToSign argument, in provided order.
|
||||
payload: bstr .cbor [ * PublicKey ],
|
||||
tag: bstr
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
KeysToMacStructure = [
|
||||
context : "MAC0",
|
||||
protected : bstr .cbor { 1 : 5 }, ; Algorithm : HMAC-256
|
||||
external_aad : bstr .size 0,
|
||||
; Payload is PublicKeys from keysToSign argument, in provided order.
|
||||
payload : bstr .cbor [ * PublicKey ]
|
||||
]
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
|
||||
; CDDL for the generateCertificateRequestV2 method in
|
||||
; IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
|
||||
|
||||
Csr = AuthenticatedRequest<CsrPayload>
|
||||
|
||||
CsrPayload = [ ; CBOR Array defining the payload for Csr
|
||||
version: 3, ; The CsrPayload CDDL Schema version.
|
||||
CertificateType, ; The type of certificate being requested.
|
||||
DeviceInfo, ; Defined in DeviceInfo.aidl
|
||||
KeysToSign, ; Provided by the method parameters
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
; A tstr identifying the type of certificate. The set of supported certificate types may
|
||||
; be extended without requiring a version bump of the HAL. Custom certificate types may
|
||||
; be used, but the provisioning server may reject the request for an unknown certificate
|
||||
; type. The currently defined certificate types are:
|
||||
; - "widevine"
|
||||
; - "keymint"
|
||||
CertificateType = tstr
|
||||
|
||||
KeysToSign = [ * PublicKey ] ; Please see MacedPublicKey.aidl for the PublicKey definition.
|
||||
|
||||
AuthenticatedRequest<T> = [
|
||||
version: 1, ; The AuthenticatedRequest CDDL Schema version.
|
||||
UdsCerts,
|
||||
DiceCertChain,
|
||||
SignedData<[
|
||||
challenge: bstr .size (0..64), ; Provided by the method parameters
|
||||
bstr .cbor T,
|
||||
]>,
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
; COSE_Sign1 (untagged)
|
||||
SignedData<Data> = [
|
||||
protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 / AlgorithmES384 },
|
||||
unprotected: {},
|
||||
payload: bstr .cbor Data / nil,
|
||||
signature: bstr ; PureEd25519(CDI_Leaf_Priv, SignedDataSigStruct<Data>) /
|
||||
; ECDSA(CDI_Leaf_Priv, SignedDataSigStruct<Data>)
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
; Sig_structure for SignedData
|
||||
SignedDataSigStruct<Data> = [
|
||||
context: "Signature1",
|
||||
protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 / AlgorithmES384 },
|
||||
external_aad: bstr .size 0,
|
||||
payload: bstr .cbor Data / nil,
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
; UdsCerts allows the platform to provide additional certifications for the UDS_Pub. For
|
||||
; example, this could be provided by the hardware vendor, who certifies all of their chips.
|
||||
; The SignerName is a free-form string describing who generated the signature. The root
|
||||
; certificate will need to be communicated to the verifier out of band, along with the
|
||||
; SignerName that is expected for the given root certificate.
|
||||
UdsCerts = {
|
||||
* SignerName => UdsCertChain
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
; SignerName is a string identifier that indicates both the signing authority as
|
||||
; well as the format of the UdsCertChain
|
||||
SignerName = tstr
|
||||
|
||||
UdsCertChain = [
|
||||
2* X509Certificate ; Root -> ... -> Leaf. "Root" is the vendor self-signed
|
||||
; cert, "Leaf" contains UDS_Public. There may also be
|
||||
; intermediate certificates between Root and Leaf.
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
; A bstr containing a DER-encoded X.509 certificate (RSA, NIST P-curve, or EdDSA)
|
||||
X509Certificate = bstr
|
||||
|
||||
; The DICE Chain contains measurements about the device firmware.
|
||||
; The first entry in the DICE Chain is the UDS_Pub, encoded as a COSE_key. All entries
|
||||
; after the first describe a link in the boot chain (e.g. bootloaders: BL1, BL2, ... BLN)
|
||||
; Note that there is no DiceChainEntry for UDS_pub, only a "bare" COSE_key.
|
||||
DiceCertChain = [
|
||||
PubKeyEd25519 / PubKeyECDSA256 / PubKeyECDSA384, ; UDS_Pub
|
||||
+ DiceChainEntry, ; First CDI_Certificate -> Last CDI_Certificate
|
||||
; Last certificate corresponds to KeyMint's DICE key.
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
; This is the signed payload for each entry in the DICE chain. Note that the "Configuration
|
||||
; Input Values" described by the Open Profile are not used here. Instead, the DICE chain
|
||||
; defines its own configuration values for the Configuration Descriptor field. See
|
||||
; the Open Profile for DICE for more details on the fields. SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 are
|
||||
; acceptable hash algorithms. The digest bstr values in the payload are the digest values
|
||||
; without any padding. Note that this implies that the digest is a 32-byte bstr for SHA256
|
||||
; and a 48-byte bstr for SHA384. This is an intentional, minor deviation from Open Profile
|
||||
; for DICE, which specifies all digests are 64 bytes.
|
||||
DiceChainEntryPayload = { ; CWT [RFC8392]
|
||||
1 : tstr, ; Issuer
|
||||
2 : tstr, ; Subject
|
||||
-4670552 : bstr .cbor PubKeyEd25519 /
|
||||
bstr .cbor PubKeyECDSA256 /
|
||||
bstr .cbor PubKeyECDSA384, ; Subject Public Key
|
||||
-4670553 : bstr ; Key Usage
|
||||
|
||||
; NOTE: All of the following fields may be omitted for a "Degenerate DICE Chain", as
|
||||
; described above.
|
||||
-4670545 : bstr, ; Code Hash
|
||||
? -4670546 : bstr, ; Code Descriptor
|
||||
-4670547 : bstr, ; Configuration Hash
|
||||
-4670548 : bstr .cbor { ; Configuration Descriptor
|
||||
? -70002 : tstr, ; Component name
|
||||
? -70003 : int / tstr, ; Component version
|
||||
? -70004 : null, ; Resettable
|
||||
? -70005 : uint, ; Security version
|
||||
},
|
||||
-4670549 : bstr, ; Authority Hash
|
||||
? -4670550 : bstr, ; Authority Descriptor
|
||||
-4670551 : bstr, ; Mode
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
; Each entry in the DICE chain is a DiceChainEntryPayload signed by the key from the previous
|
||||
; entry in the DICE chain array.
|
||||
DiceChainEntry = [ ; COSE_Sign1 (untagged)
|
||||
protected : bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 / AlgorithmES384 },
|
||||
unprotected: {},
|
||||
payload: bstr .cbor DiceChainEntryPayload,
|
||||
signature: bstr ; PureEd25519(SigningKey, DiceChainEntryInput) /
|
||||
; ECDSA(SigningKey, DiceChainEntryInput)
|
||||
; See RFC 8032 for details of how to encode the signature value
|
||||
; for Ed25519.
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
DiceChainEntryInput = [
|
||||
context: "Signature1",
|
||||
protected: bstr .cbor { 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256 / AlgorithmES384 },
|
||||
external_aad: bstr .size 0,
|
||||
payload: bstr .cbor DiceChainEntryPayload
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
; The following section defines some types that are reused throughout the above
|
||||
; data structures.
|
||||
; NOTE: Integer encoding is different for Ed25519 and P256 keys:
|
||||
; - Ed25519 is LE: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8032#section-3.1
|
||||
; - P256 is BE: https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf#page=19 (section 2.3.7)
|
||||
PubKeyEd25519 = { ; COSE_Key
|
||||
1 : 1, ; Key type : octet key pair
|
||||
3 : AlgorithmEdDSA, ; Algorithm : EdDSA
|
||||
-1 : 6, ; Curve : Ed25519
|
||||
-2 : bstr ; X coordinate, little-endian
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
PubKeyECDSA256 = { ; COSE_Key
|
||||
1 : 2, ; Key type : EC2
|
||||
3 : AlgorithmES256, ; Algorithm : ECDSA w/ SHA-256
|
||||
-1 : 1, ; Curve: P256
|
||||
-2 : bstr, ; X coordinate, big-endian
|
||||
-3 : bstr ; Y coordinate, big-endian
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
PubKeyECDSA384 = { ; COSE_Key
|
||||
1 : 2, ; Key type : EC2
|
||||
3 : AlgorithmES384, ; Algorithm : ECDSA w/ SHA-384
|
||||
-1 : 2, ; Curve: P384
|
||||
-2 : bstr, ; X coordinate
|
||||
-3 : bstr ; Y coordinate
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
AlgorithmES256 = -7
|
||||
AlgorithmES384 = -35
|
||||
AlgorithmEdDSA = -8
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user