Evolution-x/hardware_interfaces
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/Evolution-X/hardware_interfaces synced 2026-02-01 16:50:18 +00:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

KeyMint VTS: local asymmetric verification

Browse Source 
Change verification of ECDSA and RSA signatures so it happens locally
in the test, rather than by invoking a VERIFY operation against KeyMint.

Bug: 188385353
Test: VtsAidlKeyMintTargetTest
Merged-In: I0efc30f3c96cd70ac636d34718eff53cc23f1480
Change-Id: I0efc30f3c96cd70ac636d34718eff53cc23f1480
This commit is contained in:
David Drysdale
2021-05-06 08:10:58 +01:00
parent 561d79e024
commit fe42aa3a3f
3 changed files with 194 additions and 209 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

109
security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
View File

@@ -59,6 +59,11 @@ using ::testing::MatchesRegex;
namespace test {
namespace {
// Overhead for PKCS#1 v1.5 signature padding of undigested messages. Digested messages have
// additional overhead, for the digest algorithmIdentifier required by PKCS#1.
const size_t kPkcs1UndigestedSignaturePaddingOverhead = 11;
typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase::KeyData KeyData;
// Predicate for testing basic characteristics validity in generation or import.
bool KeyCharacteristicsBasicallyValid(SecurityLevel secLevel,
@@ -590,6 +595,110 @@ void KeyMintAidlTestBase::VerifyMessage(const string& message, const string& sig
VerifyMessage(key_blob_, message, signature, params);
}
void KeyMintAidlTestBase::LocalVerifyMessage(const string& message, const string& signature,
const AuthorizationSet& params) {
SCOPED_TRACE("LocalVerifyMessage");
// Retrieve the public key from the leaf certificate.
ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
X509_Ptr key_cert(parse_cert_blob(cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
ASSERT_TRUE(key_cert.get());
EVP_PKEY_Ptr pub_key(X509_get_pubkey(key_cert.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(pub_key.get());
Digest digest = params.GetTagValue(TAG_DIGEST).value();
PaddingMode padding = PaddingMode::NONE;
auto tag = params.GetTagValue(TAG_PADDING);
if (tag.has_value()) {
padding = tag.value();
}
if (digest == Digest::NONE) {
switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pub_key.get())) {
case EVP_PKEY_EC: {
vector<uint8_t> data((EVP_PKEY_bits(pub_key.get()) + 7) / 8);
size_t data_size = std::min(data.size(), message.size());
memcpy(data.data(), message.data(), data_size);
EC_KEY_Ptr ecdsa(EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pub_key.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(ecdsa.get());
ASSERT_EQ(1,
ECDSA_verify(0, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(data.data()), data_size,
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(signature.data()),
signature.size(), ecdsa.get()));
break;
}
case EVP_PKEY_RSA: {
vector<uint8_t> data(EVP_PKEY_size(pub_key.get()));
size_t data_size = std::min(data.size(), message.size());
memcpy(data.data(), message.data(), data_size);
RSA_Ptr rsa(EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(const_cast<EVP_PKEY*>(pub_key.get())));
ASSERT_TRUE(rsa.get());
size_t key_len = RSA_size(rsa.get());
int openssl_padding = RSA_NO_PADDING;
switch (padding) {
case PaddingMode::NONE:
ASSERT_TRUE(data_size <= key_len);
ASSERT_EQ(key_len, signature.size());
openssl_padding = RSA_NO_PADDING;
break;
case PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN:
ASSERT_TRUE(data_size + kPkcs1UndigestedSignaturePaddingOverhead <=
key_len);
openssl_padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
break;
default:
ADD_FAILURE() << "Unsupported RSA padding mode " << padding;
}
vector<uint8_t> decrypted_data(key_len);
int bytes_decrypted = RSA_public_decrypt(
signature.size(), reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(signature.data()),
decrypted_data.data(), rsa.get(), openssl_padding);
ASSERT_GE(bytes_decrypted, 0);
const uint8_t* compare_pos = decrypted_data.data();
size_t bytes_to_compare = bytes_decrypted;
uint8_t zero_check_result = 0;
if (padding == PaddingMode::NONE && data_size < bytes_to_compare) {
// If the data is short, for "unpadded" signing we zero-pad to the left. So
// during verification we should have zeros on the left of the decrypted data.
// Do a constant-time check.
const uint8_t* zero_end = compare_pos + bytes_to_compare - data_size;
while (compare_pos < zero_end) zero_check_result |= *compare_pos++;
ASSERT_EQ(0, zero_check_result);
bytes_to_compare = data_size;
}
ASSERT_EQ(0, memcmp(compare_pos, data.data(), bytes_to_compare));
break;
}
default:
ADD_FAILURE() << "Unknown public key type";
}
} else {
EVP_MD_CTX digest_ctx;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&digest_ctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX* pkey_ctx;
const EVP_MD* md = openssl_digest(digest);
ASSERT_NE(md, nullptr);
ASSERT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&digest_ctx, &pkey_ctx, md, nullptr, pub_key.get()));
if (padding == PaddingMode::RSA_PSS) {
EXPECT_GT(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkey_ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING), 0);
EXPECT_GT(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkey_ctx, EVP_MD_size(md)), 0);
}
ASSERT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&digest_ctx,
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(message.data()),
message.size()));
ASSERT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&digest_ctx,
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(signature.data()),
signature.size()));
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&digest_ctx);
}
}
string KeyMintAidlTestBase::EncryptMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const string& message,
const AuthorizationSet& in_params,
AuthorizationSet* out_params) {

2
security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
View File

@@ -162,6 +162,8 @@ class KeyMintAidlTestBase : public ::testing::TestWithParam<string> {
const string& signature, const AuthorizationSet& params);
void VerifyMessage(const string& message, const string& signature,
const AuthorizationSet& params);
void LocalVerifyMessage(const string& message, const string& signature,
const AuthorizationSet& params);
string EncryptMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const string& message,
const AuthorizationSet& in_params, AuthorizationSet* out_params);

292
security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
View File

@@ -482,7 +482,6 @@ class NewKeyGenerationTest : public KeyMintAidlTestBase {
void CheckBaseParams(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& keyCharacteristics) {
AuthorizationSet auths = CheckCommonParams(keyCharacteristics);
EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN));
EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::VERIFY));
// Check that some unexpected tags/values are NOT present.
EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT));
@@ -495,7 +494,6 @@ class NewKeyGenerationTest : public KeyMintAidlTestBase {
EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT));
EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN));
EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::VERIFY));
}
AuthorizationSet CheckCommonParams(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& keyCharacteristics) {
@@ -1986,6 +1984,50 @@ TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaSuccess) {
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
string signature = SignMessage(
message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaAllPaddingsAndDigests
*
* Verifies RSA signature/verification for all padding modes and digests.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaAllPaddingsAndDigests) {
auto authorizations = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */))
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
.SetDefaultValidity();
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(authorizations));
string message(128, 'a');
string corrupt_message(message);
++corrupt_message[corrupt_message.size() / 2];
for (auto padding :
{PaddingMode::NONE, PaddingMode::RSA_PSS, PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN}) {
for (auto digest : ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */)) {
if (padding == PaddingMode::NONE && digest != Digest::NONE) {
// Digesting only makes sense with padding.
continue;
}
if (padding == PaddingMode::RSA_PSS && digest == Digest::NONE) {
// PSS requires digesting.
continue;
}
string signature =
SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding));
LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding));
}
}
}
/*
@@ -2431,6 +2473,39 @@ TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcdsaAllSizesAndHashes) {
}
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.EcdsaAllDigestsAndCurves
*
* Verifies ECDSA signature/verification for all digests and curves.
*/
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcdsaAllDigestsAndCurves) {
auto digests = ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, false /* withMD5 */);
string message = "1234567890";
string corrupt_message = "2234567890";
for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "Curve::" << curve);
ErrorCode error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
.Digest(digests)
.SetDefaultValidity());
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error) << "Failed to generate key for EC curve " << curve;
if (error != ErrorCode::OK) {
continue;
}
for (auto digest : digests) {
SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "Digest::" << digest);
string signature = SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
}
auto rc = DeleteKey();
ASSERT_TRUE(rc == ErrorCode::OK || rc == ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED);
}
}
/*
* SigningOperationsTest.EcdsaAllCurves
*
@@ -2698,207 +2773,6 @@ INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(SigningOperationsTest);
typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase VerificationOperationsTest;
/*
* VerificationOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
*
* Verifies that a simple RSA signature/verification sequence succeeds.
*/
TEST_P(VerificationOperationsTest, RsaSuccess) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.SetDefaultValidity()));
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
string signature = SignMessage(
message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
VerifyMessage(message, signature,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
}
/*
* VerificationOperationsTest.RsaAllPaddingsAndDigests
*
* Verifies RSA signature/verification for all padding modes and digests.
*/
TEST_P(VerificationOperationsTest, RsaAllPaddingsAndDigests) {
auto authorizations = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */))
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
.SetDefaultValidity();
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(authorizations));
string message(128, 'a');
string corrupt_message(message);
++corrupt_message[corrupt_message.size() / 2];
for (auto padding :
{PaddingMode::NONE, PaddingMode::RSA_PSS, PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN}) {
for (auto digest : ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */)) {
if (padding == PaddingMode::NONE && digest != Digest::NONE) {
// Digesting only makes sense with padding.
continue;
}
if (padding == PaddingMode::RSA_PSS && digest == Digest::NONE) {
// PSS requires digesting.
continue;
}
string signature =
SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding));
VerifyMessage(message, signature,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding));
/* TODO(seleneh) add exportkey tests back later when we have decided on
* the new api.
if (digest != Digest::NONE) {
// Verify with OpenSSL.
vector<uint8_t> pubkey;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ExportKey(KeyFormat::X509, &pubkey));
const uint8_t* p = pubkey.data();
EVP_PKEY_Ptr pkey(d2i_PUBKEY(nullptr, &p, pubkey.size()));
ASSERT_TRUE(pkey.get());
EVP_MD_CTX digest_ctx;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&digest_ctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX* pkey_ctx;
const EVP_MD* md = openssl_digest(digest);
ASSERT_NE(md, nullptr);
EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&digest_ctx, &pkey_ctx, md,
nullptr, pkey.get()));
switch (padding) {
case PaddingMode::RSA_PSS:
EXPECT_GT(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkey_ctx,
RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING), 0); EXPECT_GT(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkey_ctx,
EVP_MD_size(md)), 0); break; case PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN:
// PKCS1 is the default; don't need to set anything.
break;
default:
FAIL();
break;
}
EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&digest_ctx, message.data(),
message.size())); EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&digest_ctx,
reinterpret_cast<const
uint8_t*>(signature.data()), signature.size())); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&digest_ctx);
}
*/
// Corrupt signature shouldn't verify.
string corrupt_signature(signature);
++corrupt_signature[corrupt_signature.size() / 2];
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding)));
string result;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(message, corrupt_signature, &result));
// Corrupt message shouldn't verify
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding)));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(corrupt_message, signature, &result));
}
}
}
/*
* VerificationOperationsTest.RsaAllDigestsAndCurves
*
* Verifies ECDSA signature/verification for all digests and curves.
*/
TEST_P(VerificationOperationsTest, EcdsaAllDigestsAndCurves) {
auto digests = ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, false /* withMD5 */);
string message = "1234567890";
string corrupt_message = "2234567890";
for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
ErrorCode error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
.Digest(digests)
.SetDefaultValidity());
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error) << "Failed to generate key for EC curve " << curve;
if (error != ErrorCode::OK) {
continue;
}
for (auto digest : digests) {
string signature = SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
VerifyMessage(message, signature, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
/* TODO(seleneh) add exportkey tests back later when we have decided on
* the new api.
// Verify with OpenSSL
if (digest != Digest::NONE) {
vector<uint8_t> pubkey;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ExportKey(KeyFormat::X509, &pubkey))
<< curve << ' ' << digest;
const uint8_t* p = pubkey.data();
EVP_PKEY_Ptr pkey(d2i_PUBKEY(nullptr, &p, pubkey.size()));
ASSERT_TRUE(pkey.get());
EVP_MD_CTX digest_ctx;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&digest_ctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX* pkey_ctx;
const EVP_MD* md = openssl_digest(digest);
EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&digest_ctx, &pkey_ctx, md,
nullptr, pkey.get()))
<< curve << ' ' << digest;
EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&digest_ctx, message.data(),
message.size()))
<< curve << ' ' << digest;
EXPECT_EQ(1,
EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&digest_ctx,
reinterpret_cast<const
uint8_t*>(signature.data()), signature.size()))
<< curve << ' ' << digest;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&digest_ctx);
}
*/
// Corrupt signature shouldn't verify.
string corrupt_signature(signature);
++corrupt_signature[corrupt_signature.size() / 2];
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest)))
<< curve << ' ' << digest;
string result;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(message, corrupt_signature, &result))
<< curve << ' ' << digest;
// Corrupt message shouldn't verify
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest)))
<< curve << ' ' << digest;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(corrupt_message, signature, &result))
<< curve << ' ' << digest;
}
auto rc = DeleteKey();
ASSERT_TRUE(rc == ErrorCode::OK || rc == ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED);
}
}
/*
* VerificationOperationsTest.HmacSigningKeyCannotVerify
*
@@ -3016,7 +2890,7 @@ TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, RsaSuccess) {
string message(1024 / 8, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS);
string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
}
/*
@@ -3058,7 +2932,7 @@ TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, RsaSuccessWithoutParams) {
string message(1024 / 8, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS);
string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
}
/*
@@ -3116,7 +2990,7 @@ TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaSuccess) {
string message(32, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
}
/*
@@ -3143,7 +3017,7 @@ TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaP256RFC5915Success) {
string message(32, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
}
/*
@@ -3169,7 +3043,7 @@ TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaP256SEC1Success) {
string message(32, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
}
/*
@@ -3195,7 +3069,7 @@ TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, Ecdsa521Success) {
string message(32, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
}
/*